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Abstract  
Moving services to the Cloud environment is a trend that has been increasing in recent years, 
with a constant increase in sophistication and complexity of such services. Today, even critical 
infrastructure operators are considering moving their services and data to the Cloud. As Cloud 
computing grows in popularity, new models are deployed to further the associated benefits. 
Federated Clouds are one such concept, which are an alternative for companies reluctant to 
move their data out of house to a Cloud Service Providers (CSP) due to security and 
confidentiality concerns. Lack of collaboration among different components within a Cloud 
federation, or among CSPs, for detection or prevention of attacks is an issue. For protecting 
these services and data, as Cloud environments and Cloud federations are large scale, it is 
essential that any potential solution should scale alongside the environment adapt to the 
underlying infrastructure without any issues or performance implications.  
This thesis presents a novel architecture for collaborative intrusion detection specifically for 
CSPs within a Cloud federation. Our approach offers a proactive model for Cloud intrusion 
detection based on the distribution of responsibilities, whereby the responsibility for managing 
the elements of the Cloud is distributed among several monitoring nodes and brokering, 
utilising our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection – “Security as a Service” 
methodology. For collaborative intrusion detection, the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of 
evidence is applied, executing as a fusion node with the role of collecting and fusing the 
information provided by the monitoring entities, taking the final decision regarding a possible 
attack. This type of detection and prevention helps increase resilience to attacks in the Cloud.  
The main novel contribution of this project is that it provides the means by which DDoS attacks 
are detected within a Cloud federation, so as to enable an early propagated response to block 
the attack. This inter-domain cooperation will offer holistic security, and add to the defence in 
depth. However, while the utilisation of D-S seems promising, there is an issue regarding 
conflicting evidences which is addressed with an extended two stage D-S fusion process. The 
evidence from the research strongly suggests that fusion algorithms can play a key role in 
autonomous decision making schemes, however our experimentation highlights areas upon 
which improvements are needed before fully applying to federated environments.  
  
iii 
Table of Contents 
 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION__________________________________________________________ 12 
1.1  MOTIVATION ______________________________________________________________________ 15 
1.2  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES _______________________________________________________________ 16 
1.3  NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS ______________________________________________________________ 19 
1.4  PUBLICATIONS RESULTING FROM THIS RESEARCH __________________________________________ 20 
1.5  THESIS STRUCTURE _________________________________________________________________ 22 
1.6  SUMMARY ________________________________________________________________________ 23 
CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND ___________________________________________________________ 24 
2.1  CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ___________________________________________________________ 24 
2.1.1 Cloud computing and critical infrastructure utilisation__________________________________ 26 
2.1.2 Use case ______________________________________________________________________ 27 
2.2.3 Requirements for critical infrastructure ______________________________________________ 29 
2.2  CLOUD COMPUTING _________________________________________________________________ 31 
2.3  CLOUD FEDERATIONS ________________________________________________________________ 35 
2.4  SUMMARY ________________________________________________________________________ 40 
CHAPTER 3 – RELATED WORK ________________________________________________________ 42 
3.1  INTRUSION DETECTION AND INTRUSION PREVENTION _______________________________________ 42 
3.2  COLLABORATIVE MONITORING ________________________________________________________ 54 
3.3  PLACEMENT OF SOLUTIONS ___________________________________________________________ 56 
3.4  RESEARCH CHALLENGES _____________________________________________________________ 58 
3.5  REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION IN CLOUD ENVIRONMENTS ___________ 59 
3.6  THRESHOLD ALGORITHMS ____________________________________________________________ 64 
3.7  DECISION MAKING ALGORITHMS _______________________________________________________ 67 
3.8  DEMPSTER-SHAFER (D-S) THEORY OF EVIDENCE __________________________________________ 68 
3.9  PROBLEM ANALYSIS ________________________________________________________________ 70 
3.10  SUMMARY _______________________________________________________________________ 72 
 
iv 
CHAPTER 4 - SERVICE-BASED COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION FRAMEWORK _ 73 
4.1  OVERVIEW OF SERVICE-BASED COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION FRAMEWORK  _____________ 74 
4.2  SERVICE-BASED COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION ARCHITECTURE _______________________ 75 
4.3  THRESHOLD CALCULATION ALGORITHMS – CUSUM AND EWMA ____________________________ 78 
4.3.1 Monitoring Nodes_______________________________________________________________ 82 
4.3.2 Super Node ____________________________________________________________________ 85 
4.3.3 C2 ___________________________________________________________________________ 87 
4.3.4 Cloud Broker __________________________________________________________________ 89 
4.4  COLLABORATION ___________________________________________________________________ 91 
4.5  BELIEF GENERATION USING DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY OF EVIDENCE __________________________ 94 
4.6  EXTENDED D-S THEORY OF EVIDENCE FUSION PROCESS ____________________________________ 100 
4.7  SUMMARY _______________________________________________________________________ 103 
CHAPTER 5 – SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION ____________________________________________ 104 
5.1  ENVIRONMENT ____________________________________________________________________ 105 
5.2  CO-SIMULATING SCENARIOS _________________________________________________________ 114 
5.3  COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION APPLICATION _____________________________________ 118 
5.4  SUMMARY _______________________________________________________________________ 127 
CHAPTER 6 – EVALUATION ___________________________________________________________ 128 
6.1  SYSTEM EVALUATION ______________________________________________________________ 130 
Summary of aims and objectives fulfilment _______________________________________________ 130 
Summary of design requirements evidence _______________________________________________ 132 
6.2  DEMPSTER-SHAFER ________________________________________________________________ 134 
6.3  COMPARISONS TO EXISTING WORK ____________________________________________________ 137 
6.3.1 Cooperative intrusion detection ___________________________________________________ 137 
6.3.2 D-S for intrusion detection _______________________________________________________ 139 
6.4  SUMMARY _______________________________________________________________________ 141 
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS ___________________________ 142 
7.1  SUMMARY OF NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS __________________________________________________ 143 
v 
7.2  THESIS SUMMARY _________________________________________________________________ 145 
7.3  FURTHER WORK __________________________________________________________________ 146 
7.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS ____________________________________________________________ 148 
REFERENCES ________________________________________________________________________ 149 
APPENDIX ___________________________________________________________________________ 167 
FURTHER STATISTICS ON SIMULATION DEVICES ______________________________________________ 167 
PSEUDO CODE FOR EXCHANGE IN COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION SCHEMA __________________ 171 
DS_PROOFOFCONCEPT CODE ___________________________________________________________ 174 
 
vi 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1-1: C2 role within the Cloud federation………………………………………………14 
Figure 2-1: Attack interfaces in a Cloud Federation ................................................................ 38 
Figure 3-1: Intrusion detection and associated attributes ........................................................ 43 
Figure 3-2: Comparison of communication architectures for detection systems .................... 49 
Figure 4-1: Service-based collaborative intrusion detection in a Cloud federation ................. 76 
Figure 4-2: Monitoring node flow chart .................................................................................. 85 
Figure 4-3: SN flow chart ........................................................................................................ 87 
Figure 4-4: C2 and Broker flow chart ...................................................................................... 88 
Figure 4-5: Hierarchical communication schema .................................................................... 92 
Figure 4-6: Levels of communication ...................................................................................... 93 
Figure 5-1: Overview of Cloud Federation topology ............................................................ 106 
Figure 5-2: Cyber effects configuration ................................................................................. 106 
Figure 5-3: Cloud broker realm ............................................................................................. 107 
Figure 5-4: CSP 2 domain...................................................................................................... 107 
Figure 5-5: CSP 3 domain...................................................................................................... 108 
Figure 5-6: CSP 1/Attacker Realm ........................................................................................ 109 
Figure 5-7: Return infection status code excerpt ................................................................... 110 
Figure 5-8: Send traffic to destination code excerpt .............................................................. 110 
Figure 5-9: Infection probability adjustment ......................................................................... 110 
Figure 5-10: Server under attack domain............................................................................... 111 
Figure 5-11: Scan and clean script sample ............................................................................ 111 
Figure 5-12: Infected devices count ....................................................................................... 112 
Figure 5-13: Ethernet delay within Cloud federation ............................................................ 114 
Figure 5-14: Co simulation of single monitoring entity vs hierarchical structure ................. 115 
vii 
Figure 5-15: Ethernet delay comparison of co-simulation of single monitoring entity vs 
hierarchical structure .............................................................................................................. 116 
Figure 5-16: Ethernet traffic against Server ........................................................................... 117 
Figure 5-17: Runtime flowchart............................................................................................. 120 
Figure 5-18: Enter Domain and IP address ............................................................................ 121 
Figure 5-19: Blocked user key return .................................................................................... 121 
Figure 5-20: Value on white list ............................................................................................ 122 
Figure 5-21: Threat value ranges ........................................................................................... 122 
Figure 5-22: IP assigned to list depending on the range of score .......................................... 123 
Figure 5-23: User added to grey list with low risk ................................................................ 123 
Figure 5-24: Example hypothesis set generation for a threat score of 80 .............................. 124 
Figure 5-25: A belief generation of 0.6 ................................................................................. 124 
Figure 5-26: A belief generation of 0.0 ................................................................................. 124 
Figure 5-27: D-S belief fusion code....................................................................................... 125 
Figure 5-28: D-S belief fusion from 3 CSPs .......................................................................... 126 
Figure 5-29: D-S belief fusion from 3 CSPs .......................................................................... 126 
  
viii 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Cloud computing benefits and risks for critical infrastructure……………………30 
Table 2.2:  Cloud computing security threats per service level………………………………..34 
Table 3.1:  Comparison between centralised and distributed IDS desirable characteristics ... 50 
Table 3.2: Intrusion detection techniques summary ................................................................ 60 
Table 3.3: Comparison of existing techniques against collaborative intrusion detection 
requirements ............................................................................................................................. 63 
Table 4.1: Notations for Figure 4-1. ........................................................................................ 96 
Table 4.2: Hypothesis sets of values for Belief values between 0 and 1. ................................ 96 
Table 5.1: Cyber effects infected device count……………………………………………....114 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Server statistics in co-simulation ................................................. 118 
Table 6.1: Possible status for an IDPS reaction ..................................................................... 168 
Table 6.2: Design requirements evidence .............................................................................. 169 
  
ix 
List of abbreviations 
 
AI: Artificial Intelligence 
APT: Advanced Persistent Threat 
BPA: Basic Probability Assignment 
BPAF: Basic Probability Assignment Function 
C2: Command and Control server 
CIDS: Cloud Intrusion Detection System 
CIIP: Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
CNSMS: Collaborative Network Security Management System 
CPNI: Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure 
CPU: Central Processing Unit 
CSP: Cloud Service Provider 
CUSUM: Cumulative Sum Control Chart 
DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service 
DES: Discrete Event Simulator  
DoS: Denial of Service 
D-S: Dempster Shafer 
eDOS: Economic Denial of Service 
ENISA: European Network and Information Security Agency 
EWMA: Exponentially Weighted Moving Average 
FIS: Fuzzy Inference Systems 
FN: False Negative 
FP: False Positive 
HMI: Human Machine Interface 
IaaS: Infrastructure as a Service 
x 
ICS-CERT: Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team 
ICT: Information Communication Technology 
IDPS: Intrusion Detection / Prevention System 
IDS: Intrusion Detection System 
IED: Intelligent Electronic Devices 
IoT: Internet of Things 
IP: Internet Protocol 
IPS: Intrusion Prevention System 
LDDoS: Low-rate Distributed Denial of Service 
LGP: Linear Genetic Programming 
MARS: Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines 
MN: Monitoring Node 
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NMA: Node Monitor Agent 
NSA: Node Supervisor Agent 
OS: Operating System 
PaaS: Platform as a Service 
PLC: Programmable Logic Controller 
RAT: Remote Access Trojan 
RED: Random Early Drop 
RRED: Robust Random Early Drop 
SaaS: Software as a Service 
SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SLA: Service Level Agreement 
SN: Super Node 
SNMP: Simple Network Management Protocol 
xi 
SVM: Support Vector Machine 
TCP/IP: Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol 
TN: True Negative 
TNR: True Negative Rate 
TP: True Positive 
TPR: True Positive Rate 
UTM: Unified Threat Management 
VLAN: Virtual Local Area Network 
VM: Virtual Machine 
WSN: Wireless Sensor Network  
12 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction  
Critical infrastructures are essential for the functioning of society and the economy; examples 
include telecommunications, energy, oil, gas, and transport. Technologies associated with 
operating and controlling the operations of these critical infrastructures are industrial control 
systems, more commonly known as SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) 
systems. In recent years, critical infrastructures have become increasingly interlinked and 
networked, often connected to the Internet; consequently making these systems more 
vulnerable and exposed to the threat of cyber-attacks [1]. In this thesis, critical infrastructures 
are referred to as those whose disruption could have a high socioeconomic impact. 
The critical infrastructure systems that support major industries, such as manufacturing, 
transportation, and energy, are highly dependent on Information Communication Technology 
(ICT) for their command and control. Whilst a high dependence on industrial control systems, 
such as SCADA still exists, critical infrastructure systems are migrating to new communication 
technologies. As a result, common communications protocols and open architecture standards 
are replacing the diverse and disparate proprietary mechanics of industrial control systems — 
this can have both positive and negative implications [2]. Cybercrime affects society as a 
whole; not only threatens individuals’ privacy, but it may also potentially compromise a 
country’s critical infrastructure and its ability to provide essential services to its citizens [3]. 
Exploitations that can affect countries’ infrastructure are usually infiltrated by simple or 
sophisticated tools that can access mobile and other personal devices to infiltrate high-value 
sectors, such as transportation, energy, or financial systems [3]. The consequences of an attack 
on one of these could result in loss of life, economic damage or a devastating effect on the 
operation of government services and military defence.  
Operators of critical infrastructures, in particular the ICT that supports gas and electricity 
utilities and government services, are considering using the Cloud to provision their high 
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assurance services. This is reflected in a white paper produced by the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) [4] in 2013, which provides specific guidelines in this 
area, with particular emphasis on the technical, procedural/policy-based and legal implications. 
The European Commission [4] has defined Critical Information Infrastructures as ICT systems 
which are either, a) critical infrastructure themselves, or b) essential for the operation of other 
critical infrastructures. Many operators do not have the infrastructure to support the growing 
need for accurate predictive and historical simulations imposed by the adoption of renewable 
energy sources and the on-going development of smart grids. To overcome this, Cloud 
computing allows these operators to reduce or avoid over investment in hardware resources 
and their associated maintenance [5].  
While this may offer improved performance and scalability, the associated security threats 
impede this progression. Availability issues and real world implications would be the main 
concern for providers of critical infrastructure, depending upon the operations or services they 
are hosting [6]. To address these concerns, a range of security measures must be put in place, 
such as intrusion detection and prevention techniques, cryptographic storage, and network 
firewalls. Several recent studies have proposed intrusion detection approaches that are tailored 
to the needs of industrial installations. However, at this time, the more challenging problem of 
integrating large scale critical infrastructure communications, intrusion detection and risk 
levels in a comprehensive framework for distributed intrusion detection system (IDS) design 
has not been addressed adequately [7].  
Cloud computing is already a successful paradigm for distributed computing and is still 
growing in popularity. However, many problems still linger in the application of this model 
and some new ideas are emerging to help leverage its features even further. One of these ideas 
is the Cloud federation, which is a way of aggregating different Clouds to enable the sharing 
of resources and increase scalability and availability [8]. The federation of Cloud resources 
allows an enterprise to distribute workloads globally, move data between disparate networks 
and implement innovative security models for user access to Cloud resources. Federation 
across different Cloud resource avenues allows applications to run in the most appropriate 
infrastructure environments. 
Based on the problem at hand, it is clear that the development of a Cloud-based intrusion 
detection protection method for hosting critical infrastructure services in the Cloud 
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environment is required. However, the greater scalability and larger size of Clouds compared 
to traditional service hosting infrastructure involve more complex monitoring systems. 
Monitoring systems must be scalable, robust, and fast; and able to manage and verify a large 
number of resources and effectively and efficiently. This has to be achieved through short 
measurement times and fast warning systems, able to quickly identify and report performance 
impairments or other issues, and to ensure timely interventions such as the allocation of new 
resources. Therefore, monitoring systems and current IDS methods must be refined and 
adapted to differing situations in Cloud environments.  
Within this thesis, a methodology that develops a Service-based collaborative intrusion 
detection framework in a federated Cloud environment is proposed. Our collaborative 
architecture consists of four major entities: the Cloud broker, the monitoring nodes (MNs), the 
local coordinators (Super Nodes - SNs), and the global coordinators (Command and Control 
server - C2). The C2 is located within each CSP domain and is effectively a domain 
management node. The C2 provides management of SNs and MNs, responses to attacks 
detected and reported by SNs and/or the broker, and cooperates with adjacent domains when 
polled which is illustrated in Figure 1-1.  
 
Figure 1-1: C2 role within the Cloud federation 
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Once a belief that an attack is underway is generated, an alert is sent to a C2. The C2 queries 
the broker, and if no information on the attack is possessed, a global poll procedure is taken, 
where C2s in adjacent domains are queried. The broker fuses the information provided by the 
C2s together and facilitates collaborative decision making – this in turn, could help trace the 
source of attack to the domain of origin. The broker coordinates attack responses, facilitating 
inter-domain cooperation, aiming to improve the resilience of the interconnected infrastructure. 
The work that is presented in this thesis focuses on the problem of collaborative intrusion 
detection within a Cloud federation and autonomous sharing of information. The proposed 
solution looks towards improving the detection and prevention accuracy and speed in dealing 
with a compromised domain via collaborative decision making. The approach will not detect 
and prevent all intrusions but will focus on DDoS. There is no current solution that can provide 
adequate protection for Cloud federations, as existing solutions instead provide inadequacies 
which are detailed in Chapter 3.5.  There is therefore a need to develop a collaborative Cloud 
IDS that can overcome the challenges within this area, and this thesis presents such a solution 
Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework – “Security as a Service”. 
1.1 Motivation 
Adoption of Cloud technologies allows critical infrastructure to benefit from dynamic resource 
allocation for managing unpredictable load peaks. Given the public awareness of critical 
infrastructures and their importance, the public wants to be assured that these systems are built 
to function in a secure manner [9]. Hence, appropriate security means have to be selected and 
documented accordingly when developing such systems. Most existing technologies and 
methodologies for developing secure applications only explore security requirements in either 
critical infrastructure or Cloud computing.  
Individual methodologies and techniques or standards may even only support a subset of 
specific critical infrastructure requirements. Requirements based on security issues can be quite 
different for these applications and for common ICT Cloud applications but need to be 
considered in combination for the given context. Disruptions in one part of the infrastructure 
may spread out through the system and have cascading effects on other sectors [10]. Critical 
infrastructure protection relates to application processes, electronic systems, and information 
stored and processed by such systems. 
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The concern is that critical ICT resources and information in Cloud systems might be 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks or unauthorised access. The primary security concerns with Cloud 
environments pertain to security, availability, and performance. Many attacks are designed to 
block users from accessing services and providers from delivering services, i.e., Denial of 
Service (DoS). Service providers may face significant penalties due to their inability to deliver 
services to customers in accordance with regulatory requirements and Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) [53]. 
Due to the potentially high profile effects of attacks on critical infrastructure systems, these 
industries have become even more attractive targets for cybercriminals [3] – and utilising Cloud 
computing into their paradigm increases the system complexity and vulnerability. It is 
imperative to develop a solution that can address the complexity of detecting attacks in a large 
scale interconnected infrastructure [7]. Traditional network monitoring schemes are not 
dynamic to cope with high speed networks such as Cloud networks, let alone Cloud federations, 
as conveyed in Chapter 3. A number of approaches have been proposed to resolve the problem, 
however they are insufficient. It is clear that an IDS alone cannot protect the Cloud environment 
from attack. If an IDS is deployed in each Cloud computing region, but without any cooperation 
and communication, it may easily suffer from a single point of failure. The Cloud environment 
could not support services continually, as it is not always easy for the victim to determine that 
it is being attacked, or where the attack is originating from. 
DDoS is a serious and growing problem for corporate and government services conducting 
business on the Internet. Resource management to prevent DDoS attacks is receiving attention, 
as the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) architecture effectively ‘supports’ the attacker as when 
the Cloud system observes the high workload on the flooded service, it provides more 
computational resources in order to cope with it. Additionally, a unique type of attack is the 
Economic Denial of Sustainability (eDoS) [11]. This type of attack is directly connected with 
a DoS or DDoS attack, but has financial implications as well. 
1.2 Aims and objectives  
The research presented in this thesis has highlighted the security concerns for migrating critical 
infrastructure services to the Cloud environment. This is predominantly caused by the 
inadequacies and limitations of current security protection measures which fail to cope with 
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the sheer size and vast dynamic nature of the Cloud environment. The sensitive nature of 
critical infrastructure services deems their protection critical, and their services additionally. 
Attacks and failures are inevitable; therefore, it is important to develop approaches to 
understand the Cloud environment under attack. Lack of collaboration among different 
components within a Cloud federation, or among different CSPs, for detection or prevention 
of attacks is a key focus of our work.  
Additionally, our research focuses on maintaining the availability of the data, as previously 
described, the service in question could be financial, organisational, or on demand. Protecting 
the Cloud environment from DDoS attacks is imperative as these attacks can threaten the 
availability of Cloud functionalities.  
To address the security challenges in this area and provide solutions for the protection of critical 
infrastructure services, we summarise our research aims as the following: 
 Develop a Cloud-based intrusion detection method for hosting critical infrastructure 
services in the Cloud environment having identified the limitations within existing 
intrusion detection techniques.  
 Create a model that can be tailored to the different Cloud environments as these may 
comprise similar functionality but can differ depending on the services needed. 
 Focus on the availability of services and assets, making sure the high value processes 
continue to function regardless of what is occurring elsewhere.  
In this thesis the above issues are addressed by proposing a collaborative intrusion detection 
methodology which offers the following features:  
 Monitoring system that can run in a non-intrusive and transparent manner to any 
underlying virtualised infrastructure. 
 Application adaptive which diminishes the need for re-contextualisation each time an 
application and/or resource related parameter changes. 
 Generates high-level application metrics dynamically at runtime by aggregating and 
grouping low level metrics. 
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 Adopts a collaborative mitigation strategy, which focuses on: 
o Containing the attack close to the source(s) 
o Robustness to attack via a distributed mitigation architecture  
o Autonomous sharing of threat information 
The key objective of this research is to produce a methodology for the protection of critical 
infrastructure services in the Cloud environment through collaborative intrusion detection. The 
project objectives will be achieved by examining further the current approaches, and evaluating 
and advancing the best methods and combination of approaches to be used. 
A breakdown of our project objectives is provided below:  
 Design of a collaborative Cloud-based framework that focuses on the monitoring and 
protection of the critical infrastructure services in the Cloud computing environment. 
This has been achieved by the development of our Security as a Service architecture for 
CSPs within a Cloud federation. 
 Demonstrate a solution and technique that can effectively monitor Cloud domains and 
reliably help to secure and block threats, through efficient communication and 
exchanging threat information before a threat could propagate throughout the network. 
This approach is inspired by agent based intrusion detection but with a combination of 
communication algorithms and a hierarchical monitoring structure will have 
improvements in terms of scalability and message dissemination.  
 Create a technique to analyse attack data in multiple domains and come to a decision 
on its importance as to whether an anomaly has occurred. This has been fulfilled with 
the application of the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence being used for belief 
generation by monitoring entities, and data fusion by the Cloud broker to facilitate 
collaborative intrusion detection. 
 Develop appropriate assessment metrics to analyse if the methods proposed, or the 
combinations of selected methods, effectively address the issue of infrastructure service 
protection in the Cloud environment via collaborative intrusion detection. This has been 
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achieved via the comparison of our extended D-S fusion process to the works of Lo et 
al. and a high level assessment using our design requirements in Chapter 2.6 – the 
comparison outcomes to highlight the merits of our solution. 
1.3 Novel contributions 
The research within this thesis presents the principles, techniques, protocols and algorithms 
adapted from other distributed computing paradigms to the development of our Service-based 
collaborative intrusion detection framework, providing “Security as a Service” within Cloud 
federations.  
This thesis makes the following novel contributions to the field of intrusion detection within 
Cloud federation environments: 
1. A collaborative intrusion detection framework that can detect and prevent intrusion in 
Cloud federations and/or collaborative domains in real-time via the autonomous sharing 
of information. This features a novel application of the D-S theory of evidence 
algorithm to detect intrusions and fuse generated beliefs for collaborative intrusion 
detection, and an extension of D-S to include confidence values for conflicting 
decisions. There is no current solution that can provide adequate protection for Cloud 
federations, or identified solution which implements the D-S algorithm and produces 
collaborative decisions in Cloud federations to improve upon the Cloud security 
contribution.  
2. The Cloud broker coordinates attack responses, both within the domain itself, and with 
other domains, and is facilitating inter-domain cooperation. D-S is used to fuse the 
generated beliefs and make a system-wide decision. This cooperation between CSPs 
ensures that the scalable defence required against DDoS attacks is carried out in an 
efficient way; aiming to improve the overall resilience of the interconnected 
infrastructure.  
3. Cumulative sum control chart (CUSUM) and Exponentially Weighted Moving Average 
(EWMA) algorithms are used for adaptive threshold calculation. A local propagation 
mechanism collects statistics at a local level via MNs, and in order to minimise 
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detection delay and reduce the communication overhead, this is propagated among 
MNs using a gossip algorithm.  
4. The main novel contribution of this project is that it provides the means by which DDoS 
attacks are detected within a Cloud federation, so as to enable an early propagated 
response to block the attack, particularly by the interdependent CSPs within the Cloud 
federation. This is effectively inter-domain cooperation as these CSPs will cooperate 
with each other to offer holistic security, and add to the defence in depth. The D-S 
theory of evidence is used to facilitate this autonomous sharing of information, and to 
fuse the generated beliefs to form a system-wide decision. 
1.4 Publications resulting from this research 
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1.5 Thesis structure  
The remainder of the thesis is arranged into six subsequent chapters; the order and contents of 
these chapters are as follows: 
Chapter 2 – “Background”, with contextual material on critical infrastructure and Cloud 
computing. Each of the topics is detailed and then focuses specifically on its evident utilisation, 
with particular focus on legal considerations, protection problems, and general issues that arise 
due to its advancement. The Cloud computing paradigm has security vulnerabilities and threats 
that need to be resolved, and through a Cloud-based IDS and collaborative intrusion detection 
framework. 
Chapter 3 – “Related Work”, an overview of the different types of protection and 
preventative measures in place for intrusion detection in the Cloud environment is presented. 
An in-depth critical review of related work and existing approaches within this area is 
undertaken, and an observation of the evident inadequacies are conveyed. These help identify 
the essential characteristics for our collaborative intrusion detection framework. 
Chapter 4 - “Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework” details the 
design and architectural details for the novel solution. The entities within the architecture and 
their functionality are conveyed, in addition to the algorithms and methods utilised. Our 
extended D-S theory of evidence fusion process is outlined, in addition to requirements and 
considerations for the implementation. 
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Chapter 5 – “System Implementation”, the implementation details of our intrusion detection 
approach for federated Cloud environments are highlighted. We begin with an overview of the 
architecture of the implementation and a discussion of its core components. Through the use 
of Riverbed Modeler 18.0 [12], the effects of DDoS attacks on Cloud federations are conveyed 
and analysed, and collaborative intrusion detection using the D-S theory of evidence is 
demonstrated using a proof of concept developed in C#.  
Chapter 6 – “Evaluation”, we evaluate our novel solution against the metrics we consider to 
be the most important for determining the efficiency of a collaborative IDS. The solution is 
evaluated using the requirements established in 3.8 which define the characteristics which 
collaborative intrusion detection solutions must possess. The approach is also compared to 
related work within this research field. 
Chapter 7 – “Conclusions and future work”, we provide a thesis summary, present a 
summary of our novelty, and express some concluding remarks. This chapter will also highlight 
how the work can be built on for future research projects. 
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of this thesis, outlining research motivation, aims and 
objectives, and highlighting the novel contributions. The increasing integration of critical 
infrastructure services and sensitive data to the ICT paradigm offers great concerns for the 
protection of these services and information. The more interconnected and available they 
become, the more threats they are opening themselves up to. Traditional intrusion detection 
mechanisms are not sufficient for protecting infrastructure services in the Cloud environment, 
as many solutions do not have the economy of scale and are inefficient at processing data of 
such a volume.  
This chapter has provided further context on this emerging situation and identified a new and 
novel solution to the problem: our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework. 
In Chapter 2, background information to this problem is provided, focusing on the areas of 
critical infrastructure, Cloud computing, and their evident utilisation. Research challenges and 
requirements for collaborative intrusion detection will be identified and explored in the next 
chapter, and details of how the proposed solution can meet these will be conveyed.
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Chapter 2 
Background 
Critical infrastructures, such as the power grid and water distribution facilities, include a high 
number of devices over a large geographical area. These infrastructures face a significant 
increase in threats targeting their operations due to the growth in their use of industrial control 
systems and their integration to networks. While this provides great capabilities for operation, 
control, and business, this augmented interconnectedness also increases the security risks due 
to the cyber related vulnerabilities they possess. The importance of protecting these 
infrastructures has been particularly highlighted by the increase in malware designed to target 
these systems and disrupt their functionality; examples include Stuxnet [13], Duqu [14] and 
Flame [7]. Effective protection of critical infrastructures is crucial as it is apparent that existing 
methods do not meet the security requirements of such interconnected infrastructures.  
Infrastructures will inevitably fully grasp the benefits being offered by Cloud computing. Once 
their services are in the Cloud environment, resourceful functionality is essential. There needs 
to be an assurance that the Cloud computing environment can provide proficient protection of 
the sensitive critical infrastructure data. The reality of today’s advanced malware and targeted 
attacks is that 100% protection is not realistic. Reducing attack vectors and marginalising the 
impact of an attack is a realistic approach. In this chapter background on Critical Infrastructures 
and their protection problem is provided, and how Cloud computing can provide notable 
advancements and benefits but can expose them to more attack vectors and vulnerabilities [15].   
2.1  Critical infrastructure  
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) defines critical infrastructure 
as “Those critical elements of national infrastructure (facilities, systems, sites, property, 
information, people, networks and processes), the loss or compromise of which would result in 
major detrimental impact on the availability, delivery or integrity of essential services, leading 
to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life” [16]. CPNI is focussed on 
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providing advice and assistance to those who have responsibility for protecting these most 
crucial elements of the UK’s national infrastructure from national security threats. These 
infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separated systems that had little 
interdependence [17]. Nowadays modern critical infrastructures largely make use of 
technologies where wireless sensor networks (WSNs) with open access have become an 
integral part of virtually any critical infrastructure. Due to advances in ICT and efforts to 
improve efficiency in these systems, these infrastructures have become increasingly automated 
and interlinked.  
Critical infrastructures are controlled by networked computers and can be defined as sectors 
that would have a debilitating impact on national security if incapacitated [18]. Failures can 
result in devastating impact on critical sectors, such as national defence, the economy, 
communication, e-government systems, and society as a whole. Natural phenomena, system 
errors, or cyber-attacks have the ability to produce failures, which cascade as a result of the 
high level in interconnectivity between the infrastructures [19]. The resulting impact would 
cover large sectors causing devastating consequences. Critical infrastructure protection has 
now become a multi-disciplinary area, which requires interdisciplinary involvement. 
Concern in the industry is how many of these infrastructures are dependent upon each other for 
functioning [20]. Interdependencies among computers, communication, and power 
infrastructures have increased security risks due to the complexity of the integrated 
infrastructures. Critical infrastructure control systems may vary depending on the different 
environments and infrastructure; additionally, they are created with different design goals 
compared to traditional systems. Securing control systems is difficult as the usual security 
assumptions and practices that are applied for protecting ICT systems are not sufficient. Each 
point in the SCADA network is a potential entry point. This is in part due to the fact that little 
work has been done to enhance their security because of the belief that they had no problem 
[21]. The connectivity of SCADA networks increases the risk of cyber-attacks and the critical 
need to improve the security of these networks. SCADA systems are rarely patched or updated 
as engineers are often hesitant to do so due to concerns that the patch itself could potentially 
negatively affect the operation of the system.  
Critical infrastructure protection methods and resources deter or mitigate attacks and focus on 
protecting those assets considered invaluable to society. Security experts around the globe are 
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now recognising the importance of effective simulation in planning the fight against the 
growing cyber-threat. The consequences of failure can produce unexpected results and must be 
planned for in order to prevent disasters escalating through a cascading effect [22].  
2.1.1 Cloud computing and critical infrastructure utilisation 
Due to virtually unlimited scalability of resources and performance, as well as significant 
improvement regarding maintainability, it is inevitable that Cloud computing will eventually 
reach the ICT services that are operating critical infrastructures [23]. These services have very 
high requirements towards trustworthiness, i.e., dependability, security, and performance, 
which cannot be provided by using the available off-the-shelf offerings [24]. Cloud computing 
proposes that, one day, all levels would become virtualised, i.e. “everything-as-a-service.” 
Critical infrastructure currently makes use of the benefits offered by general ICT services, so 
benefiting from the intricate Cloud computing paradigm is expected. Critical infrastructures 
provide essential utilities like water supply, electricity, or transportation. Such infrastructures 
need to cope with variable usage, high flexibility, and failovers to work properly.  
Modern IP-based critical infrastructure control systems allow more efficient control than 
traditional systems. The variable workload, unpredictable usage spikes and outsourcing of data 
handling, make the Cloud an interesting alternative for critical infrastructure ICT due to the 
unlimited resource capabilities, ability to scale considerably, and storage advancements, i.e. 
resources, outsourcing, backups, etc. Another advantage of using the Cloud in this context is 
to aggregate data from the IP enabled control devices, which have limited resources and cannot 
process data locally. This means that sooner or later infrastructure providers will use Cloud 
applications for their systems and hence related issues need to be investigated [25] [26].  
With the technical development and market growth in Cloud computing, organisations that 
provide, operate and maintain ICT systems for critical infrastructure are making the decision 
as to when they should make the paradigm shift. Cloud services can offer efficient access to 
large ICT infrastructures that benefit from the economy of scale. Therefore, it would be highly 
desirable to maintain irrecoverable and valuable data obtained from critical infrastructure 
within secure Cloud infrastructures. The current issue is that existing security mechanisms, 
including SLAs provided by current Cloud offerings, lack transparency. They cannot be 
adopted, negotiated, or verified against institutional policies [23]. This issue has led to 
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hesitation from organisations that maintain sensitive data from pledging fully to the Cloud 
Computing movement, thus disabling them from utilising Cloud services and critical 
infrastructure fully.  
The increasing flexibility and unpredictable usage of such utilities often means that many 
challenges that can occur in the utility networks used. The usage of modern ICT systems to 
control and manage critical infrastructure helps in dealing with such issues [9]. Many operators 
do not have the infrastructure to support the growing need for accurate predictive and historical 
simulations imposed by the adoption of renewable energy sources and the on-going 
development of smart grids. Cloud computing allows these operators to reduce or avoid over 
investment in hardware resources and their associated maintenance. Infrastructure vendors will 
inevitably take advantage of the benefits Cloud computing has to offer [27]. 
2.1.2 Use case 
Most industrial plants employ networked process historian servers storing process data and 
other possible business and process interfaces. For example, direct file transfer from 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to spreadsheets [28]. PLCs in the control system 
generate a huge amount of data and logs. Logs of communication are stored in the historian 
databases. These databases possess historical data that is being logged 24/7 from over 6,700 
data points so that it could be easily accessible by both operators and engineers [29], [30]. 
These historian servers receive data from field control processors or front-end processors, 
which issue control commands to and poll data from devices in field networks. The control 
network typically contains assets such as the human-machine interface (HMI) and other 
workstations, which run control system applications on conventional computer platforms. The 
field network devices directly monitor and control a physical process, such as refining, 
manufacturing, or electric power generation/transmission/distribution [31]. 
One way for critical infrastructure to utilise the Cloud environment would be for the historian 
database to send these historical processes to a private Cloud. The use of a private Cloud to 
audit the data from the system and process it more effectively would be valuable. This would 
overcome the challenges associated with processing vast data sets generated by the control 
systems. The Cloud environment is suitable as it has massive storage and computational 
capabilities, is distributed and elastic, offering improved processing rates and efficiency 
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compared to current methods. Private Clouds grant complete control over how data is managed 
and what security measures are in place.  
This is two-folds though. This collection of data could be used to perform behavioural analysis 
and modelling of this information flow – looking for trends and subtle changes in the data 
would be beneficial in achieving state awareness. Behaviour modelling can take place without 
affecting the system in any way. By monitoring the evolution of the plant process states, and 
tracking down when the industrial process is entering into a critical state, it would be possible 
to detect these attack patterns (known or unknown) aiming at putting the process system into a 
known critical state by using state of commands. In control system architectures, the major 
cyber-attack vector is the flow of network commands [32].  
By processing the sensor data from the historian in a private cloud environment, the behaviour 
of the infrastructure and use the critical state metric as a trigger for logging a chain of packets 
can be analysed. It is possible to discriminate between critical states due to cyber-attacks and 
critical states due to faults/physical attacks. A reference behaviour model could be 
implemented with the use of Bayesian classification procedure associated to unsupervised 
learning algorithms to evaluate the deviation between current and reference behaviour [33]. By 
training with unsupervised learning algorithms, the log analysers can discover the inherent 
nature of the dataset by clustering similar instances into classes. 
A further advantage of using the Cloud in this context is to aggregate data from the IP-enabled 
control devices, which have limited resources and cannot process data locally. Though there 
are benefits of this connection, one of the main concerns with utilising critical infrastructure 
services in the cloud environment is the threat of attack. Deploying high assurance services in 
the Cloud increases cyber security concerns, as successful attacks could lead to outages of key 
services, and/or disclosure of sensitive personal information. 
Adoption of Cloud computing services allows critical infrastructure vendors to benefit from 
dynamic resource allocation for managing unpredictable load peaks, storing of historical 
process data (either on site in a private Cloud, or sharing among other related vendors in a 
hybrid Cloud), federating into a larger Cloud, and large scale data analytics based on historical 
data of consumers, to name a few. 
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2.1.3 Requirements for critical infrastructure 
There are many benefits and limitations associated with the utilisation of Cloud computing by 
critical infrastructure operators. In Table 2.1 some of these attributes are identified and 
considerations for each point are made [34]. 
 
Table 2.1: Cloud computing benefits and risks for critical infrastructure 
Cloud computing attribute Benefits Limitations 
Agility 
Ability to adapt to resource intensive 
tasks, and scale up/down with ease. 
Lack of efficiency in ability to scale to 
match demand; and associated latency 
costs. 
Device and location 
independence 
Location and geographical 
independence. 
Consistency of data in terms of 
connectivity, latency and performance 
issues. 
Real time response and 
elastic performance 
Quick response to fluctuations in 
service demand and distribution. 
Consistency of data with regards to 
connectivity, latency and associated 
performance issues. 
Self-healing 
Enhance the robustness and 
resilience of critical infrastructure 
and interdependent systems. 
Self-repair may lead to system 
inefficiencies or data accuracy as 
underlying issues may remain 
unsolved. 
Virtualisation and 
automation of services 
Faster response time, disaster 
recovery/planning, deployment of 
security implementations. 
Data security due to hypervisor and 
VM vulnerabilities/misconfigurations/ 
exploitation. 
 
Requirements in critical infrastructure regarding overall redundancy, data availability, 
authenticity, secure access, and low latency network connectivity are typically higher than in 
commercial applications. Critical infrastructure imposes much stronger requirements for 
security, reliability, and resilience on Cloud computing environments. There are also more 
stringent considerations for control of data, data-centric security requirements, protection of 
data, and legal issues surrounding location of data. 
Control  
An SLA defines how the consumer will use the services and how the provider will deliver 
them. Responsibilities of each party and remedies should be included. The SLA cannot be 
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adopted or negotiated, which often deters organisations from pledging fully to the Cloud. 
Control is a common challenge as depending on which deployment model is chosen, control is 
not always in the hand of the owner.  Private Clouds allow organisations to shape how their 
data is stored and controlled, and what security measures are in place.  
 
Data-centric security approach 
In general, a data-centric security approach must ensure that data protection mechanisms are 
deployed across all provided security solutions and that data owners have the full control over 
who has the right to use the data and what they are authorised to do with it. In addition, 
institutional security policies and access rules can be specified and mapped to the Cloud 
environment. Requirements-based security issues can be quite different for critical 
infrastructure applications and for common ICT applications but need to be considered in 
combination for the given context.  
Protection 
Since Cloud computing supports a distributed service oriented paradigm, multi-domain and 
multi-users administrative infrastructure, it is more prone to security threats and vulnerabilities, 
such as data breaches, data loss, service hijacking, DDoS attacks, and malicious insiders [35]. 
Tailored ID/IP mechanisms are essential. Compared to other systems and services in the Cloud 
environment, a critical infrastructure requires a much higher level of assurance. One of the 
risks in a multi-tenant environment is over provisioning of resources. Over provisioning of 
resources results in resource contention and potential lack of availability, effectively creating 
a DoS situation [36], and impacting on users of the Cloud service who depend on its continuity.  
Legal issues 
Legal requirements include data protection and regulatory requirements. Issues also surround 
data being exchanged across multiple countries that have different laws and regulations 
concerning data traversal, protection requirements, and privacy laws. Examples of such risks 
include, but are not limited to: risks resulting from possible changes of jurisdiction and the 
31 
liability or obligation of the vendor in case of loss of data and/or business interruption [37]. 
There are also geographical requirements for healthcare data being stored.    
2.2  Cloud computing  
Cloud computing has emerged as a way to enable content providers to meet their application 
needs through either Cloud development environments or through outsourced CSPs.  There are 
a variety of business models for Cloud infrastructure but they generally vary depending upon 
the business requirements. The infrastructure is both physical in the form of processing, as well 
as software that meets the needs of the user. An advantage of Cloud computing is that the 
enterprises using the services do not need heavy investment in capital equipment.  Software 
services are provided by a vendor and paid for by a subscription or on the basis of the amount 
of use. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines five essential 
characteristics of Cloud computing [38]: 
 On-demand self-service: A user should be able to acquire or release resources without 
requiring outside human interference. 
 Broad network access: Resources should be available over the network. 
 Resource pooling: Resources are pooled to serve disparate customers on the same or 
different physical machines. Resources can by dynamically assigned according to 
customer demands; examples of resources include storage, processing, memory, 
network bandwidth, and virtual machines (VMs). 
 Rapid elasticity: Users can acquire, release, and scale resources in an elastic manner, 
making the available resources appear unlimited from the client’s point of view. 
 Measured service: The Cloud management layer constantly monitors, controls, and 
reports resource use to both the provider and client, providing a metering capability. 
CSPs usually build up large scale data centres and provide Cloud users with computational 
resources in three delivery models, distinguished by their level of resource abstraction [27] 
which are Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS).  
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 SaaS – CSP hosts applications and makes them available to the user over the Internet. 
 PaaS – CSP provides a platform for customers to develop, manage, and run applications 
without the need to own the physical infrastructure. 
 IaaS – CSP provide virtualised computing resources over the Internet. 
Security is a major concern in Cloud adoption; the focus on cybercrime at a global level has 
led to “as-a-service” models for illegal activity. The cybercrime market now affords potential 
criminals with a multitude of services, which means that deep technical expertise is not a 
prerequisite [39]. Critical security issues include data integrity, user confidentiality, and trust 
among providers, individual users, and user groups. Additionally, availability issues and real 
world impact would be the main concern for providers of critical infrastructure, depending 
upon the operations or services they are hosting [7], [40]. There are security issues at each level 
of the Cloud computing paradigm; the application level, virtual level, and physical level.  
The application level comprises SaaS, in which enterprises host and operate their applications 
over the internet so the customers can access them. One benefit of this model is customers do 
not need to buy any software licences or any additional equipment for hosting the 
application(s). The virtual level includes PaaS and IaaS. PaaS provides a platform for building 
and running customer applications. Enterprises can build applications without installing any 
tools on their local systems and can deploy them with relative ease. IaaS provides a convenient 
option for organisations by migrating the ICT infrastructure to the Cloud provider. This means 
it is the responsibility of the CSP to tackle the issues of ICT infrastructure management, such 
as configuring servers, routers, firewalls, to name a few. The physical level refers to the 
infrastructure upon which Clouds are deployed.  
Cloud deployment models include public, private, community, and hybrid: 
 A public Cloud is available to the general public or large industry group, owned by an 
organisation selling Cloud services. A third party provides infrastructure, platform and 
software. The management, operational, and security requirements are provisioned and 
shared between users and providers with an SLA [41]. 
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 A private Cloud operates for a single organisation [41]. The infrastructure can be 
located in the organisational unit or in a third party unit's data centre. Private Clouds 
grant complete control over how data is managed and what security measures are in 
place. There are two types of private Cloud: 
o On-premise: A Cloud integrated into an organisation’s ICT process. These 
Clouds are better suited for organisations which desire greater configurability 
and control over their data infrastructure. 
o External private Cloud: A Cloud platform that is hosted by an external Cloud 
provider, but with the guarantee of privacy.  
 A community Cloud is shared by several organisations, supporting a specific 
community. The infrastructure is placed in more than one organisation in the 
community or third party's data centre. Management and operational tasks are split 
between the data centre owner, organisations and third party [42]. 
 A hybrid Cloud is a combination of more than one Cloud deployment model, as 
previously described. All the infrastructure, platform and software are portable and can 
switch between the deployment models in the hybrid architecture [43]. 
 
The adoption of this innovative architecture may introduce a number of additional threats that 
vendors may not have considered. While there are many benefits to migrating to the Cloud 
computing paradigm, there are security requirements and threats associated with each of its 
service levels. Table 2.2 conveys these based on a survey of the literature performed in [41], 
detailing the type of service user, requirements for this service and highlights examples of 
associated threats.  
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Table 2.2: Cloud computing security threats per service level 
Level Service level User Security requirements Vulnerabilities 
Application 
level 
Software as a 
Service (SaaS) 
End client applies to 
a person(s) or 
organisation(s) who 
subscribes to a 
service offered by a 
Cloud provider and 
is accountable for 
its use. 
 Access control 
 Application 
security 
 Communication 
protection 
 Data protection 
from exposure 
(remnants) 
 Privacy in 
multitenant 
environment 
 Software security 
 Service availability  
 Data interruption  
 DDoS 
 Disrupting 
communications 
 Exposure in network  
 Impersonation 
 Interception 
 Modification of data 
at rest and in transit 
 Privacy breach 
 Programming flaws 
 Session hijacking 
 Software 
modification 
 Software 
interruption 
 Traffic flow analysis 
 
Virtual 
level 
Platform as a 
Service (PaaS) 
 
Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) 
Developer: 
Moderator applies 
to a person(s) or 
organisation(s) that 
deploys software on 
a Cloud 
infrastructure. 
 Access control 
 Application 
security 
 Communication 
security 
 Cloud 
management 
control security 
 Data security 
(Data in transit, 
data at rest, data 
remanence) 
 Secure images 
 Virtual Cloud 
protection 
 Connection flooding 
 DDoS 
 Defacement 
 Disrupting 
communications 
 Exposure in network 
 Impersonation 
 Programming flaws 
 Software 
interruption 
 Session hijacking 
 Traffic flow analysis 
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Physical 
level 
Physical data 
centre 
Owner applies to a 
person(s) or 
organisation(s) that 
owns the 
infrastructure upon 
which Clouds are 
deployed. 
 Hardware security 
 Hardware 
reliability 
 Legal not abusive 
use of Cloud 
computing 
 Network 
protection 
 Network resources 
protection 
 Connection flooding 
 DDoS 
 Exposure in network 
 Hardware 
interruption 
 Hardware theft 
 Hardware 
modification 
 Misuse of 
infrastructure 
 Natural disasters 
 Network attacks 
 
Based on the problem at hand, it is evident that sufficient security metrics need to be developed 
for protecting the sensitive data being stored in the Cloud environment.  The ability to clearly 
identify, authenticate, authorise, and monitor who or what is accessing the assets of an 
organisation is essential for protecting an information system from threats and vulnerabilities. 
The distributed and open structure of Cloud computing and services becomes an attractive 
target for potential cyber-attacks by intruders. In the Cloud environment, where massive 
amounts of data are generated due to high network access rates, an IDS must be robust against 
noise data and false positives. Since Cloud infrastructure has enormous network traffic, 
traditional IDSs are not efficient to handle such a large data flow. Due to the large data sets, 
classification techniques require a huge amount of memory and central processing unit (CPU) 
usage. 
2.3  Cloud federations 
Cloud computing hides resource availability issues, making this infrastructure appealing to 
users with varying computational requirements: from storage applications to processing 
intensive tasks. Large-scale parallel simulations often require computing time on high 
performance computing machines and clusters. In a Cloud environment, resources are often 
shared among multiple users, and the number and nature of the workload presented by these 
users can vary over time. A Cloud federation is an association among different CSPs with the 
goal of sharing resources and data [8].  
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In order to cope with the resource capacity limits of a single CSP, the concept of federating 
multiple heterogeneous organisations is receiving increasing attention. The effects of an attack 
on such an infrastructure can span from the loss of some data, to the potential isolation of parts 
of the federation [41]. Protecting the federated Cloud against cyber-attacks is a key concern, 
since there are potentially significant economic consequences [44]. 
Federated Clouds are a logical evolution of the centralised approach, they can enhance 
reliability through physical partitioning of the resource pool and also to address communication 
latency issues by binding clients to the nearest datacentre [45]. Furthermore, federated Clouds 
are an interesting alternative for those companies who are reluctant to move their data out of 
house to a service provider due to security and confidentiality concerns. By operating on 
geographically distributed data centres, companies could still benefit from the advantages of 
Cloud computing by running smaller Clouds in-house, and federating them into a larger Cloud. 
A Cloud federation allows final users to transparently access resources and services, distributed 
among several independent CSPs [52]. However, in the Cloud computing context there are a 
lot of different interpretations for this idea, e.g. it is completely different if access must be given 
for federated resources to a final user, as opposed to a Cloud application developer as there are 
many actors involved in the federation.  
The work of Rak el al. [46] identifies the following actors as key players in this scenario: 
 Final Users: common users which access the Cloud and uses the Cloud services. 
 Service Providers: acquire resources and services from the Cloud in a transparent way, 
and offer them to Final Users. 
 Service Developers: develop applications using the Cloud’s resources. Sometimes they 
also use services developed by other parties. 
 CSPs: Offer Cloud resources and services. 
Cloud federations introduce new avenues of research into brokering policies such as those 
techniques based on ensuring the required quality of service level or those aiming at optimising 
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energy efficiency [47]. The goals of brokering methods and policies in federated Clouds can 
be found in different domains but the key goals are listed as follows [47]: 
 Cost-effectiveness: federated Clouds provide a larger amount of resources, which may 
help improve cost-effectiveness. These include improvement for both the user and the 
provider such as, for a given cost, reducing the time to completion, increasing the 
system throughput or optimising the resource utilisation. 
 Acceleration: Cloud resources can be used to exploit an additional level of parallelism 
by offloading appropriate tasks to Cloud resources. 
 Conservation: federated Clouds can be used to conserve allocations, within the 
appropriate runtime and budget constraints. 
 Resilience: federated Clouds can be used to handle unexpected situations such as an 
unanticipated downtime, inadequate allocations, or failures of working nodes. 
Additional Cloud resources can be requested to ease the impact of the unexpected 
situations. 
 Energy efficiency: federated Clouds can facilitate optimising the energy efficiency of 
Clouds as multiple objectives can be combined as needed. An example is combining an 
acceleration objective with a resilience objective.  
By providing security services from within the CSP infrastructure, enterprises are able to 
deploy security policies and rules between each VM or between VM centres. A feature of the 
CSP infrastructure is that enterprises can maintain corporate security policies and the data 
collected about them with the VMs. This allows them to enforce security services in the 
enterprise and the Cloud provider consistently [48]. 
Many issues need to be addressed in federated Cloud resource management with respect to 
adaptability, flexibility, and standardisation. Performance metrics, such as bandwidth 
overhead, security, and quality of experience, have to be considered while designing a resource 
management or monitoring scheme for such environments. Intelligent computational and 
cognitive software agents may provide flexible and adaptable services. Human reasoning can 
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be embedded in agents by using cognitive models and may provide better performance metric 
values than traditional classical approaches [49]. 
Each interface can present specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious entities to 
perform cyber-attacks: 
 Cloud users,  
 Service instances,  
 CSPs.  
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates these attack interfaces within a Cloud federation. 
 
Figure 2-1: Attack interfaces in a Cloud federation 
The interface between a service instance and a user can be considered as a client-to-server 
interface, that is vulnerable to all types of attacks that are possible in common client-server 
architectures, including SQL injection, buffer overflow, privilege escalation, SSL certificate 
spoofing, phishing attacks, and flooding attacks [50]. The interface between a service instance 
and a CSP is vulnerable to all attacks that a service instance can run against its hosting Cloud 
systems, such as DDoS, and Cloud malware injection. In the same way, a malicious CSP of the 
Cloud Federation may perform several attacks towards service instances running on it.  
DDoS is a serious and growing problem for corporate and government services doing business 
on the Internet [51]. Targets for DDoS attacks include the computational resources, the memory 
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buffers, the application processing logic, the communications bandwidth, and the network 
protocol, whereas their effects on the target system are the denial or degradation of provided 
services [46] [52]. Resource management to prevent DDoS attacks is receiving attention, as in 
these Cloud federations the IaaS architecture effectively supports the attacker as when the 
Cloud system observes the high workload on the flooded service, it provides more 
computational resources in order to cope with it. DDoS attacks are performed with the intention 
of interrupting or suspending the communication capability of any networked device or service 
by saturating the memory or bandwidth of the target device [34].  
Haggerty et al. [53] define a DDoS attack as: 
𝑥 distinct packets matching 𝑠 signatures in 𝑦 seconds to ℎ host. 
They also convey that it is the mass of all packets directed at a victim that poses the threat, 
rather than the packets themselves. For example, if resource management is not in place, a 
compromised VM could allow an attacker to starve all of the other VMs within that Cloud of 
their needed resources. By using resource management, a compromised VM can only affect 
itself and none of the other VMs within the Cloud [54]. If the Cloud system notices the lack of 
availability, it could move the affected service instances to other servers of the Cloud 
federation. This results in additional workload for such servers, and thus the flooding attack 
can propagate and spread throughout the whole Cloud federation [46], [47].  
The effects of attacks can span from the loss of some data to the potential isolation of parts of 
the federation. This could pose a substantial risk which is a great concern for critical 
infrastructure vendors. Protecting the federated Cloud against cyber-attacks is a key concern, 
since there are potential significant economic consequences. It is clear that Cloud federations, 
and the CSPs present, will benefit significantly if there is a comprehensive IDS that evolves 
based on their requirements. The security of applications and services provided in the Cloud, 
against cyber-attacks, is hard to achieve for the complexity, heterogeneity, and dynamic nature 
of such systems [44].  The collaboration of threat knowledge about both known and unknown 
threats among collaborative peers within the enterprise network or with other Cloud services 
providers will contribute to better incident detection and prevention. This will in turn enhance 
Cloud security providing faster and more effective incident response. 
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Cross-domain data leakage of applications and the internal configurations of a Cloud member 
need to be addressed to enable third-party monitoring and unified monitoring of federated 
environments. Currently no monitoring data of a single or federated Cloud environment is 
publicly available, and no workload traces of the monitoring solutions themselves exist to 
analyse the data by statistical tools to acquire more insight into the monitoring process. An 
autonomous monitoring tool for validation and performance measuring of heterogeneous 
application sets deployed in a federated Cloud environment is required [49]. 
2.4  Summary 
In this chapter, details on critical infrastructure and Cloud computing have been presented, in 
addition to their evident security challenges. Important to note for this utilisation is overall 
redundancy, data availability, authenticity, secure access, and low latency network connectivity 
are typically higher than in commercial applications. Critical infrastructure imposes much 
stronger requirements for security, reliability, and resilience on Cloud computing 
environments. Issues also surround data being exchanged across multiple countries that have 
different laws and regulations concerning data traversal, protection requirements, and privacy 
laws. Examples of such risks include, but are not limited to, risks resulting from possible 
changes of jurisdiction and the liability or obligation of the vendor in case of loss of data and/or 
business interruption.  
As evident, the joining of Cloud computing and critical infrastructure will provide many 
benefits in the form of scalability, improved performance, reachability, and will be cost 
effective for organisations and infrastructure vendors. However, the distributed and open 
structure of Cloud computing and services becomes an attractive target for potential cyber-
attacks. Despite security issues slowing its adoption, Cloud computing has become a persistent 
force; thus, security mechanisms to ensure its secure adoption are an immediate need. In this 
scenario, conventional issues become even more sensitive and critical when dealt with in the 
Cloud environment. For example, data security becomes more critical and difficult to deal with 
because of the absence of administrative control of the data owner [55]. 
The complexity and scale of critical infrastructures, their strong security requirements and 
increasing costs require comprehensive methodologies for provisioning cost effective 
distributed IDSs. In the next chapter, a survey of existing work on detecting intrusions in the 
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Cloud environment is detailed, and existing approaches for protecting the Cloud environment, 
and for detecting intrusions are compared. Challenges in this area will be highlighted, and from 
this, an observation of the area and requirements will be apparent.  
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Chapter 3 
Related work  
This chapter focuses on critically analysing existing work and solutions, by outlining their 
merits and highlighting their shortcomings. It aims to provide evidence to emphasise the 
inadequacies of existing approaches and therefore justify the motivation behind this research. 
We provide an overview of the existing frameworks, techniques, and approaches for detecting 
intrusions in Cloud computing environments in Chapter 3.1. We assess the challenges 
addressed by existing work and identify the limitations of the various proposed solutions 
throughout. Based on the aims and objectives of the research, this exploration helps recognise 
the research challenges as detailed in Chapter 3.4, and the identification of requirements for 
collaborative intrusion detection in Cloud environments in Chapter 3.5.   
3.1  Intrusion detection and intrusion prevention  
The aim of this research is to create a Cloud-based solution capable of facilitating collaborative 
intrusion detection and autonomous sharing of information within a Cloud federation. In order 
to facilitate this, it is necessary to understand what techniques currently exist in similar research 
areas and to determine their inadequacies when applied to a Cloud federation. This Chapter 
will review and analyse intrusion detection techniques from various research domains within 
computing.  
Intrusion detection is defined as the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer 
system or network and analysing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or 
imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies or standard 
security practices [56].  Figure 3-1 conveys a high level view of different attributes associated 
within the area of intrusion detection, and these will be explored in the subsequent subsections. 
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Figure 3-1: Intrusion detection and associated attributes 
Computers control national infrastructure components such as the water grid and power grid.  
The integrity and availability of all these systems have to be protected against an increasing 
number of threats. The field of ICT security has become vitally important to the safety and 
economic well-being of society as a whole.  Moreover, to expose privacy breaches, security 
needs powerful intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDPSs) [56] and organisational 
policies and procedures in place.  
An IDS is a device or software application that monitors a network and/or information system 
for malicious activities or policy violations. They respond to suspicious activity by warning the 
system administrator, displaying an alert, and logging the event. An IDS can be defined as a 
function that maps the data input into a normal or an attack event X either by means of absence 
of an alert (0) or by the presence of an alert (1) respectively and is given by: 
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IDS : X →{0, 1}.     (3.1) 
To detect attacks in the incoming traffic, the IDS is typically parameterised by a threshold 𝑇. 
It uses a theoretical basis for deciding the thresholds for analysing the network traffic to detect 
intrusions. Changing this threshold allows the change in performance of the IDS. If the 
threshold is very low, then the IDS tends to be very aggressive in detecting the traffic for 
intrusions. However, there is a potentially greater chance for the detections to be irrelevant 
which results in large false alarms. A large value assigned to the threshold on the other hand 
will have an opposite effect; as being conservative in detecting attacks may lead to some being 
missed [57]. The most common IDS shortcomings include their low detection efficiency, high 
false positive rate and their vulnerability to attack based on centralised hierarchical structure 
(depending on their configuration) [58]. 
An intrusion prevention system (IPS) operates the process of performing intrusion detection 
and attempting to prevent the detected incidents. An IPS is a device or software application 
that has all the capabilities of an IDS and can also attempt to stop certain incidents. IPSs provide 
security at all system levels, from the operating system (OS) kernel to network data packets.  
IPSs also have the ability to prevent known intrusion signatures, besides the unknown attacks 
originating from the database of generic attack behaviours. IDSs and IPSs typically perform 
extensive logging of data that is related to detected events which can be used to confirm the 
validity of alerts, investigate incidents, and correlate events between the IDS and other logging 
sources [59].   
3.1.1 Data source 
Differentiating IDSs based on their data sources can be classified as host-based, network-based, 
or a hybrid (which is a combination of both data sources). Host-based IDSs provide local 
intrusion detection and support by monitoring user behaviour over an application layer 
protocol, such as the client-server protocol [60].  They run on an individual host or device on 
the network, monitor the inbound and outbound packets from that device only and alert the 
user or administrator if a suspicious activity is detected [61]. Network-based IDSs provide 
global intrusion detection, where they provide level monitoring of traffic flowing through the 
network and detect intrusions based on the nodes’ behaviour over the network. A network-
based IDS observes strategic points within the network to monitor traffic to and from all 
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devices on the network [61]. Hybrid IDSs combine network and host-based monitoring in order 
to achieve maximum coverage, however there is an increase in system and security logs to 
analyse and an increase in system accounting.  
Much of the proposed academic research on IDSs in the Cloud environment has focused on 
providing security mechanisms for specific security problems [62]–[94], while others adjust to 
the differing statistics available depending upon their data source [71-77]. Hamad and Al-Hoby 
[74] implemented the network-based Cloud Intrusion Detection Service (CIDS), which can be 
deployed by CSPs to enable clients to subscribe with the IDS in a service-based manner. It is 
a re-engineered version of Snort, which is an open source signature-based network IDS [75]. 
The model outperforms currently used solutions for service-based IDSs but at the same time 
provides minimal overhead to the case of traditional IDS deployment for single network 
protection. While it appears to be based on a network-centric approach, there are no details 
provided on how this approach can scale with an increasing Cloud environment. The option of 
a security service in a service-based manner is a future direction for CSPs so this approach is 
insightful. 
Dhage et al. [76], convey that when there is only one IDS in the entire network, the load on it 
increases as the number of hosts increases. They highlight the challenge monitoring network 
based actions in the Cloud environment, in addition to actions on each of the hosts present in 
the network. An architecture in which mini IDS instances are deployed between each user of 
the Cloud and the CSP is proposed. As a result, the load on each IDS instance will be less than 
that on a single IDS and for this reason, the small IDS instance will be able to do its work in a 
more efficient way. By proposing a model in which each instance of IDS has to monitor only 
a single user, an effort has been made to create a coordinated design, which will be able to 
gather appropriate information about the user, thus enabling it to classify intrusions in a better 
way. The issue with such an approach is the mass of alerts that would be generated by all of 
the monitoring entities, so a clearer information hierarchy and communication structure is 
evidently needed. 
Alsafi et al. [77] propose an integrated intrusion handling model for Cloud computing, which 
combines anomaly-based and signature-based detection. Their focus is on stopping an attack, 
rather than detecting it. Actions which their proposed method should take include terminating 
the user session that is being used during the attack, and blocking access to the target from the 
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offending user account, IP address, or other attacker attribute. Their integrated model uses 
signature matching with normal traffic profiling to enhance attack detection. They propose to 
deploy their IDS in the VM itself as well as the virtual network in order to monitor the activities 
within the system. 
Additionally, the use of multi-agents to increase the accuracy and scalability in network IDS is 
a thriving area [44] [78] [79] [80] [81]. It is suggested by Jansen et al. [82] that mobile agent 
technology can be beneficial in achieving the ideal behaviour desired in an IDS. The deficiency 
of a centralised IDS leads to the idea of multi or mobile agents. In an agent-based IDS there is 
no central point of failure and agents can detect and take predefined actions against malicious 
activity. The benefits of using a distributed model based on a mobile agent platform was 
highlighted by Patil et al. [58] where the key attributes were overcoming network latency, 
reducing network load, and being able to scale considerably. One challenge that would affect 
the application of an agent-based system is the application of ground truth for dynamic agent 
training [83], whereby training data and predefined information is needed for the functioning 
of agents. 
Molina et al. [84] propose ‘Distributed Architecture for Resource manaGement and 
mOnitoring in CloudS’ (DARGOS), which is a monitoring support system for Cloud 
environments which is built upon a data-centric publish/subscribe paradigm. DARGOS’s 
distributed architecture is based on two entities called Node Monitor Agent (NMA) and Node 
Supervisor Agent (NSA). NMAs are responsible for gathering monitoring data from the local 
node and delivering these data to interested nodes. NSAs are responsible for collecting 
monitoring data from remote hosts and making them available to final system administrators 
through DARGOS local application programming interface (API) and visualisation tools.  
As highlighted, there has been an increase in intrusion detection and intrusion prevention 
methods for the Cloud environment [85-90]. Desired characteristics include optimised 
performance, minimum error and maximum protection [86]. The ability to adapt to changes in 
user behaviour and system behaviour over time is also anticipated. An IDPS should be part of 
normal services and not affect the operation of the Cloud environment in any way. Many 
solutions can only detect specific attacks, not unknown ones, and this is deterring the utilisation 
of the environment. A hybrid IDPS is needed for protecting the Cloud environment from attack 
with optimised performance and protection with a minimum error [86]. A hybrid approach 
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combines two or more network intrusion detection techniques; signature-based detection, 
anomaly-based detection, and soft computing techniques. Using a hybrid approach can improve 
the accuracy of the IDS when compared to individual approaches.  
3.1.2 Data processing 
Regardless of whether they operate at the network, host, or application level, both IDSs and 
IPSs use one of two detection methods to classify and process data; anomaly-based or 
signature-based (also known as misuse detection) detection.  
Anomaly-based IDSs detect abnormal patterns that deviate from what is considered to be 
normal behaviour [56]; examples include methods that are statistics-based [87], profile-based 
[88], or model-based [89]. While they can come in the form of different approaches, the overall 
method of detecting anomalous actions or behaviours is consistent. Anomaly detection does 
not require prior knowledge of intrusion and can detect new intrusions.  However, a drawback 
of this is that they may not be able to describe what an attack is and may have a high false 
positive rate. Two problems that contribute to the large numbers of false positives produced 
include: 
1) The decision whether an event should be classified as anomalous or as normal is made in a 
simplistic way. Anomaly-based IDSs usually contain a collection of models that evaluate 
different features of an event. These models return an anomaly score or a probability that 
reflects the ‘normality’ of the event according to their current profiles. However, the system 
is faced with the task of aggregating the different model outputs into a single final result 
[90].  
2) They cannot distinguish between anomalous behaviour caused by unusual but legitimate 
actions and activity that is the manifestation of an attack. This leads to the situation where 
any deviation from normal behaviour is reported as suspicious, ignoring potential 
additional information that might suggest otherwise. 
Misuse detection, commonly determined via signature-based IDSs, uses known patterns of 
unauthorised behaviour to predict and detect subsequent similar attacks [91]. Examples of 
misuse detection include approaches such as rule-based [92], state transition [17], and data 
mining [72]. Signature-based IDSs monitor and analyse network packets and compare them 
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against the signature of the known threats. It is very effective in detecting known attacks or 
threats that are predefined in the database of IDS. Nonetheless, this systems main disadvantage 
that a new type of attack cannot be detected as its signature is not present [72]. Signature 
databases must constantly be updated, and IDSs must be able to compare and match activities 
against large collections of attack signatures. However, like anomaly-based detection 
approaches, false positives and false negatives are an issue. 
Machine learning techniques or artificial intelligence (AI) systems have been applied to 
increase the efficacy of IDSs, however the focus is on improving the classifiers used [26].  
Some of these techniques are neural networks, Linear Genetic Programming (LGP), Support 
Vector Machine (SVM), decision trees, Bayesian networks, Multivariate Adaptive Regression 
Splines (MARS) and Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS) [70]. Viewed as a machine-learning 
algorithm, a Gaussian process [75] uses lazy learning and a measure of the similarity between 
points to predict the value for an unseen point from training data. In a Gaussian process, every 
point in some continuous input space is associated with a normally distributed random variable. 
Moreover, every finite collection of those random variables has a multivariate normal 
distribution, i.e. every finite linear combination of them is normally distributed.  
The control centre models each malicious event as a Gaussian process, realised by a collection 
of random variables representing event features, such as the number of defective devices, and 
malicious authentication ratio. It uses the collected reports as observations to form the prior 
beliefs of the Gaussian process. Using the prior beliefs and observations, it computes the 
posterior probability distributions of the process through regression [93]. Gaussian processes 
are powerful nonparametric distributions over continuous functions that can be used for both 
supervised and unsupervised learning problems.  
Many supervised and unsupervised learning approaches from the field of machine learning and 
pattern recognition have been using supervised learning approaches to classify their data. This 
involves using labelled samples to train a classifier, but obtaining sufficient labelled samples 
can be difficult, and requires the efforts of collaborative partners or expert connections. In 
contrast, unlabelled samples can easily be obtained for many real world scenarios. Compared 
to supervised learning approaches, semi supervised learning addresses this issue by considering 
a large number of unlabelled samples together with the labelled samples to build a better 
classifier [94].  
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In Mahmood and Agrawal [95], the focus is on ‘Principal Component Analysis Neural Network 
Algorithm’ (PCANNA) which is used to reduce the number of computing resources, both 
memory and CPU time required to detect an attack. Feature reduction is used to remove useless 
information from the original high dimensional database of Cloud traffic data. A back 
propagation algorithm is applied on reduced Cloud traffic data for classification. Their 
contribution shows that dimensional reduction techniques help compact similar alerts and 
correlate alerts coming from heterogeneous platforms on several sites to detect intrusions that 
are more complex. 
3.1.3 Architecture  
Many IDSs employ a centralised architecture and detect intrusions that occur in a single 
monitored system and/or network.  Yet, centralised processers are not able to process collected 
data from massive network or distributed attacks, as currently more and more attacks appear to 
use a distributed architecture [59]. In centralised IDSs, the analysis of data is performed on a 
fixed number of locations, whereas in distributed IDSs analysis of data is performed on a 
number of locations that are proportionate to the number of available systems in the network. 
Within Figure 3-2 these different architectures and differing ways information is aggregated 
throughout are conveyed.  
 
Figure 3-2: Comparison of communication architectures for detection systems 
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The scale of the data found in Cloud computing environments makes the application of existing 
techniques unfeasible, as they are unable to carry out analysis within reasonable temporal 
constraints. Table 3.1 presents a comparison between centralised and distributed IDS and their 
key attributes [72]: 
Table 3.1: Comparison between centralised and distributed IDS desired characteristics  
 
Characteristic Centralised Distributed 
Run continually A relatively small number of 
components need to be kept running. 
Harder because a larger number of 
components need to be kept running. 
Reliable The state of the IDS is centrally stored, 
making it easier to recover it after a 
crash. 
The state of the IDS is distributed, making it 
more difficult to store in a consistent and 
recoverable manner. 
Resist subversion A smaller number of components need 
to be monitored. However, these 
components are larger and more 
complex, making them more difficult to 
monitor. 
A larger number of components need to be 
monitored. However, because of the larger 
number, components can crosscheck each 
other. The components are also usually smaller 
and less complex. 
Minimal overhead Impose little or no overhead on the 
systems, except for the ones where the 
analysis components run, where a large 
load is imposed. Those hosts may need 
to be dedicated to the analysis task. 
Impose little overhead on the systems because 
the components running on them are smaller. 
However, the extra load is imposed on most of 
the systems being monitored. 
Configurable Easier to configure globally, because of 
the smaller number of components. It 
may be difficult to tune for specific 
characteristics of the different hosts 
being monitored. 
Each component may be localised to the set of 
hosts it monitors, and may be easier to tune to 
its specific tasks or characteristics. 
Adaptable By having all the information in fewer 
locations, it is easier to detect changes 
in global behaviour. Local behaviour is 
more difficult to analyse. 
Data are distributed, which may make it more 
difficult to adjust to global changes in 
behaviour. Local changes are easier to detect. 
Scalable The size of the IDS is limited by its 
fixed number of components. As the 
number of monitored hosts grows, the 
analysis components will need more 
computing and storage resources to 
keep up with the load. 
A distributed IDS can scale to a larger number 
of hosts by adding components as needed. 
Scalability may be limited by the need to 
communicate between the components, and by 
the existence of central coordination 
components. 
Graceful 
degradation of 
service 
If one of the analysis components stops 
working, most likely the whole IDS 
stops working. Each component is a 
single point of failure. 
If one analysis component stops working, part 
of the network may stop being monitored, but 
the rest of the IDS can continue working. 
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Dynamic 
reconfiguration 
A small number of components analyse 
all the data. Reconfiguring them likely 
requires the IDS to be restarted. 
Individual components may be reconfigured 
and restarted without affecting the rest of the 
IDS. 
 
The greater scalability and larger size of Clouds compared to traditional service hosting 
infrastructure involve more complex monitoring systems, which have to be more scalable, 
robust, and fast. Such systems must be able to manage and verify a large number of resources 
and must do it effectively and efficiently. This has to be achieved through short measurement 
times and fast warning systems, able to quickly sport and report performance impairments or 
other issues, and to ensure timely interventions such as the allocation of new resources. 
Therefore, monitoring systems must be refined and adapted to different situations in 
environments of a large scale and highly dynamic like Clouds [96]. 
Cloud computing pushes to the extreme the concept of resource sharing in an environment that 
is inherently highly dynamic and with loads that are difficult to predict. Clouds are sometimes 
deployed in many data centres and clusters of servers, each of them possibly equipped with 
different characteristics and capabilities, i.e. in the same Cloud there could be clusters for CPU 
intensive computation, such as media transcoding and data indexing, while others will be 
optimized for input/output (I/O) throughput, such as media storage. As such, a Cloud 
monitoring system should be aware of logical and physical groups of resources and should 
organise monitored resources according to certain criteria so as to separate and to localise the 
monitoring functions. 
Another crucial issue is system scalability in terms of processing and bandwidth overhead: for 
instance, medium-size Clouds data centres typically include hundreds of physical hosts and 
thousands of VMs; whereas larger ones can include thousands of physical hosts with multiple 
VMs (equipped with physical and logical sensors) for collecting monitoring data. These 
frameworks can eventually generate a great amount of network traffic that consumes precious 
network bandwidth; hence, the monitoring should be as least intrusive as possible by adopting 
lightweight processing and communication solutions that limit additional overhead. It also 
must assure timely monitoring data delivery. 
A more network-centric approach is proposed by [68], in which they propose a distributed 
architecture for high speed intrusion detection involving the deployment of classification 
52 
techniques to detect suspicious traffic patterns at the network layer. Moreover, the work of 
Bakshi and Yogesh [97] takes an innovative approach to securing the Cloud from DDoS attacks 
using an IDS in a VM. They propose the use of a virtual server to examine the security risks 
associated with the Cloud environment, and attempt to offer emergency response by identifying 
the source IP addresses involved in the DDoS attack. The virtual server would aim to respond 
to the attack by transferring the targeted applications to VMs hosted in another datacentre. 
While anomaly-based network intrusion detection capabilities are becoming available and new 
schemes being explored [79], as with traditional IDS many key issues still remain to be solved 
[58], [59], [98]–[100] . Key research challenges in IDS include reduction of false positives and 
avoidance of false negatives, handling encrypted traffic, algorithms for effective content 
matching, deep packet inspection at wire-speed, performance improvement, latency reduction, 
behaviour-based detection, and environment awareness [101]. Decentralised network 
architectures allow participating nodes to share workload with others and thus avoid 
bottlenecks and single points of failure which are common weaknesses of centralised network 
architectures. 
3.1.4 Reaction 
An IDS, depending on the response system, is classified as either passive or active. Passive 
response is further divided into notification and manual response, whereas active response is 
considered automatic. By contrast, in a manual response system a predefined set of response 
options exists and is triggered by a security controller with the detection of an intrusion [102]. 
Intrusion responses are a series of actions and countermeasures when an intrusion is detected. 
In order to guarantee the security of computer networks, these actions and measures can prevent 
further attacks or restore the system to a normal state. These actions may come from human 
intervention or from computers.  
According to the level of automation, current intrusion response systems can be categorised as 
notification systems, manual response systems, and automatic response systems. Notification 
systems mainly generate alerts about the intrusion which is then used by the system 
administrator to select an intrusion response [103]. A manual response system allows the 
administrator to manually launch countermeasures against a detected intrusion by selecting 
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actions from a predetermined set of responses. In these two systems, the time duration within 
the detection and response activation opens an opportunity for attackers. 
These systems rely on predefined datasets of normal and abnormal behaviour definitions. Also, 
many approaches rely on training data which can be classified through the use of appropriate 
data classifiers. These can be applied pre and post processing and can improve the accuracy of 
determining outliers from the data sets, but for real time monitoring can often have false 
positives and false negatives, as they often do not adjust well to the real time system.  
The work of Lee [104] proposes a multi-level IDS and log management method based on 
consumer behaviour for applying IDS effectively to the Cloud system. They assign a risk level 
to users’ behaviour depending on analysis of their behaviour over time. By applying differing 
levels of security to the users, in theory this would increase usage of resources as it would be 
based on the user behaviour over a period of time. Their method proposes the classification of 
generated logs by anomaly levels. This is so that the system administrator analyses logs of the 
most suspected users first. 
Lo et al. [105] present a cooperative IDS framework for Cloud computing networks. They 
deploy an IDS in each Cloud region, and each entity cooperates with each other through the 
exchange of alerts to reduce the impact of DDoS attacks. A Snort-based IDS is implemented 
and the three main modules are plugged into the system: block, communicate, and defence. A 
cooperative agent is used to receive alerts from other IDSs, and they are analysed using a 
majority vote in order to determine the accuracy of results. If deemed as a legitimate alert, the 
blocking rule is implemented. By cooperative operation among these agents, an early detection 
and prevention technique is implemented. Therefore, IDSs deployed in Cloud computing 
regions except the victim one could prevent this kind of attack. 
Distributed systems need to maintain a balance between communication overhead and the 
addition of process power, as resources can become constrained. Since Cloud computing 
supports a distributed service oriented paradigm, multi-domain and multi-users administrative 
infrastructure, it is more prone to security threats and vulnerabilities, such as data breaches, 
data loss, service hijacking, DDoS attacks and malicious insiders, to name a few [35].  
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3.2   Collaborative monitoring 
Benefits of a collaborative monitoring scheme include greater efficiency and increased 
monitoring accuracy, which are a result from the collective pooling of resources for a single 
purpose. The structure of an IDPS is based upon two types: individual and collaborative. An 
individual arrangement of IDPS is achieved by physically integrating it within a firewall. A 
collaborative IDPS consists of multiple IDPSs over a large network where each one 
communicates with each other. Each IDPS has two main functional components: detection 
element and correlation handler. Detection elements consist of several detection components, 
which monitor their own sub-network or host individually and generate low-level alerts. The 
correlation handler transforms the low level alerts into a high level report of an attack [86]. 
For multi-tenant deployments, the monitoring system must also verify different requirements 
in terms of information granularity, accuracy, and update frequency. The monitoring 
infrastructure should be flexible enough to accommodate heterogeneous application-related 
requirements and to harmonize various tenant needs [84]. 
A further challenge identified is the ability to detect the threat to the domain of origin, and alert 
the user to their part in the attack, as it occurs or after the event. If DoS or spoofed traffic is 
originating from a VM within a CSP, then they would be charged for the excess traffic. This is 
an eDoS attack, due to the financial implications associated — the actual costings of such an 
occurrence are beyond the scope of our work. It is not always easy for the victim to determine 
that they are being attacked, or where it is coming from; as such, a Cloud-based monitoring 
system with the ability to trace the source and improve resilience to attacks within Cloud 
federation is essential. 
The work of Calheiros et al. [106] conveys an InterCloud project through the use of agents 
called Cloud Coordinators, and allows for an increase in performance, reliability, and 
scalability of elastic applications. The architecture proposed for such a Cloud Coordinator 
could be applied to the intrusion detection domain. The Cloud Coordinator is the element that 
has to be present on each data centre that wants to interact with InterCloud parties. The Cloud 
Coordinator is also used by users and brokers that want to acquire resources via InterCloud and 
do not own resources to negotiate in the market.  
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In [107], Chen et al. aim to develop a new collaboration system to integrate a well deployed 
Unified Threat Management (UTM) via the Collaborative Network Security Management 
System (CNSMS). Such a distributed security overlay network coordinated with a centralised 
security centre leverages a peer-to-peer communication protocol used in the UTM’s 
collaborative module and connects them virtually to exchange network events and security 
rules. The CNSMS also has a huge output from operation practice, i.e. traffic data collected by 
multiple sources from different vantage points, and operating reports and security events 
generated from different collaborative UTMs. As such, data is huge and not easy to analyse in 
real-time, and it needs to keep them archived for further forensic analysis.  
The work of Wang et al. [108] proposes the use of D-S’s theory of evidence to fuse local 
information. In the process of applying D-S in IDS, firstly, each agent collects information in 
its respective domain, and then the identification of some proposition is generated, which 
serves as evidence. Based on these, the degree of confidence is assigned on each proposition. 
As a basic probability assignment function (BPAF) and its corresponding frame of discernment 
are called a body of evidence, each sensor therefore corresponds to a body of evidence. The 
essence of multi-sensor data fusion is that within the same frame of discernment, different 
bodies of evidence, depending on fusion rules, are fused into a resultant BPAF, upon which the 
system makes the final decision based on decision rules.  
Arachchilage et al. [109] convey the importance of collaborative parties having an established 
guarantee about the type of information they will be sharing in order to protect sensitive 
information. Their research focuses on the development of a taxonomy which can be applied 
to trust domains, aimed at managing trust related issues in information sharing schemes. The 
development of measurable trust characteristics is targeted at supporting collaboration and data 
exchange within and across multiple organisations. 
While progress has been made on the problem of collaborative monitoring, there still remain a 
number of open problems that need to be addressed, such as [99]:  
 Expressiveness – How to balance the trade-off between expressiveness of the 
correlation algorithm and corresponding computational complexity during alert 
correlation.  
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 Scalability – How to remove the need for a central controller in a Cloud-based IDS, 
without sacrificing the overall performance.  
 Accuracy – How to improve the detection accuracy, i.e. how to balance the trade-off 
between the detection rate and false alarms.   
3.3   Placement of solutions 
Intrusion detection and prevention solutions are assessed on their capability to protect securely 
in large-scale networks, but the placement of such a solution can affect how it monitors the 
network. Non-intrusiveness is one of the key attributes for a monitoring entity, but monitoring 
large scale Cloud environments requires strategic planning and engagement. Considerations 
based on the size and the complexity of the architecture include: mobility of monitoring 
entities, no central points, constrained bandwidth of links, and limited resources. Some of the 
challenges remaining include questions on how to reinforce the intrusion detections and 
response elements to cope with intrusion and response in parallel, in addition to the 
coordination of information between monitoring entities, and management of multiple nodes. 
Attacks and failures are inevitable; therefore, it is important to develop approaches to 
understanding the Cloud environment under attack. Investigation into the appropriate points in 
the Cloud to deploy monitoring and attack detection functionality is imperative [85]. 
The four areas considered for deployment are in the VM, in the hypervisor or host system, in 
the virtual network, or in the traditional network.  
 In the VM: Deploying a solution in the VM allows you to monitor the activity within 
the system, and detect and alert on issues that may rise. 
 In the hypervisor or the host system: Deploying a solution in the hypervisor allows you 
not only to monitor the hypervisor, but anything travelling between VMs on that 
hypervisor. It is a more central location for intrusion detection, but there may be 
performance issues or dropping of some information if the amount is too large. 
 In the virtual network/virtual local area network (VLAN): Deploying a solution to 
monitor the virtual network allows you to monitor the network traffic between VMs on 
the host, as well as traffic between the VMs and host. This 'network' traffic never hits 
the traditional network. 
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 In the traditional network: Deploying a solution here allows you to monitor, detect, and 
alert on traffic that passes over the traditional network infrastructure. However, this is 
quite problematic as virtual traffic as it is encrypted may be missed. 
Xin et al. [65] present their innovative approach in the form of an intrusion detection 
mechanism for the Cloud computing environment. They propose a new intrusion detection 
mechanism based on Cloud computing called “IDCC”, and it is designed to support wide 
networks, offering high availability. Whereas, Montes et al. [110] implemented GMonE 
“Global Monitoring systEm", a Cloud monitoring tool which is capable of being adapted to 
different kinds of resources, services and monitoring parameters. GMonE performs the 
monitoring of each element by means of GMonEMon, which abstracts the type of resource 
(virtual or physical). GMonEMon service monitors the required parameters and then it 
communicates automatically with the monitoring manager (GMonEDB) to send it the 
monitored data. This communication is done through a standard Java Remote Method 
Invocation (RMI) process.  
Zhang et al. [111] propose a hierarchical IDS framework with a distributed monitoring 
architecture. In their framework, an IDS module is distributed along the network on key 
services, i.e. on control centres, community gateways and smart meters. The IDS module is 
comprised of two components: classifier and recorder. The IDS module at the bottom layer 
accepts raw input data from smart meters; the module at a higher layer accepts input from the 
IDS module at the immediate lower layer invoking a hierarchical communication scheme 
which in turn would reduce network latency and throughput associated with monitoring large 
scale networks. As such, if an attack is detected by an IDS module, an alarm will be invoked 
on the corresponding layer. If a detection decision cannot be made at a certain layer it will be 
left for the upper to make it, since the upper layer has a wide scope of knowledge.  
The optimal deployment location recognised is on the virtual network/VLAN. To communicate 
between VMs, they talk over a virtual network. This would be a suitable place for an IDPS as 
communicating occurs through this point, and it would be easier to build a nominal profile of 
activities and behaviours. Additionally, the use of a module that uses signature analysis of 
captured attack statistics, which also utilises a behaviour module to determine if the detected 
occurrence is actually an attack, could be beneficial. This could in turn improve efficiency over 
current methods that only utilise one method [85]. 
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3.4   Research challenges 
This chapter provides sufficient information to understand the challenges that are currently 
faced in relation to collaborative intrusion detection within Cloud federations. This section will 
summarise these research challenges. 
 The first main challenge is due to the size and dynamic nature of the Cloud 
environment, namely the architecture and structure, which poses problems for the 
application of existing solutions. As Cloud environments, and Cloud federations, are 
large scale, it is essential that any potential solution should scale alongside the 
environment and have the potential to expand and scale considerably without any issues 
or performance implications. As every Cloud service delivery model is different from 
other similar service models, IDS techniques used for each Cloud service model also 
differ [27].  
 The second main challenge is the issue of system scalability. The accuracy and 
efficiency of detection is important, but ensuring the solution is scalable and can deal 
with large volumes of logs from different sources is problematic. Having a solution 
with the ability to adapt to varying computational and network loads, in order to not be 
invasive, is essential. It is difficult, however, to achieve a good balance between IDS 
security level and system performance. Detecting intrusion patterns in the Cloud 
environment involves looking for behavioural changes. This process could involve 
anomaly-based detection for DoS/DDoS attacks, which must be robust against noise 
data, false positives and false negatives produced.  
 A further challenge is that existing federation models are designed for static 
environments where priori agreements among the parties are needed to establish the 
federation [112]. Security vendors may not exchange information, e.g. malware 
reported from their customers, with other vendors because of privacy issues and 
competition. Providing prompt updates against the latest threats is important to 
dominate the market. Isolated antiviruses cannot obtain malware samples of zero-day 
threats to be analysed and may fail to protect their customers. However, from the 
customers’ perspective, if diverse security vendors collaborate with each other, by 
means of providing feedback regarding the legacy of suspicious files, they may achieve 
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even better accuracy [113]. It is with this in mind, that the benefits of security vendor 
collaboration, in our case, CSPs could benefit all parties involved.  
3.5   Requirements for collaborative intrusion detection in Cloud environment 
By using the information identified from the background research, it is possible to create a set 
of requirements which define the characteristics that potential collaborative intrusion detection 
solutions for the Cloud environment must possess - they combine the strengths and strive to 
eliminate the weaknesses of the work discussed previously. These requirements can therefore 
be used to assess the suitability of existing solutions, help to ensure the success of the proposed 
solution, and to provide a useful mechanism to evaluate the solution at a high level. These 
requirements were devised by examining the attributes of IDSs, monitoring schemes and their 
application to Cloud environments.  
These attributes are as follows: 
 Accurate: It must produce low levels of detection errors. 
 Adaptable: It must be able to adapt to changes that occur within the underlying 
virtualised infrastructure, with considerations to roles, functionality, and structure. 
 Collaborative: It should be able to exchange information and alerts within the 
infrastructure in an autonomous manner, without the need for human intervention. It 
should be able to take information and share it among key entities, receive and exchange 
relevant information when polled. 
 Configurable: Each component may be localised to the set of hosts it monitors, and 
easier to tune to its specific tasks or characteristics. 
 Dynamics: It must be able to cope with the adjusting behaviour and adaptive nature of 
the underlying virtualised infrastructure in order to formulate an accurate 
understanding. 
 Efficient: Systems must operate seamlessly in real-time, and be able to manage and 
verify a large number of resources, and do it effectively and efficiently. 
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 Graceful degradation of services: If one analysis component stops working, part of the 
network may stop being monitored, but the rest of the monitoring schema can continue 
working. 
 Low maintenance: It must not require much human intervention or offline maintenance 
to ensure accuracy or operation. 
 Lightweight: It must be lightweight in terms of its resource and storage requirements 
(e.g. behavioural profiles, signature databases, and access lists). 
 No prior knowledge: The operation of the solution should not depend on prior 
knowledge relating to the system and behaviour, due to the dynamic nature of the 
underlying environment and information may become outdated.  
 Novel threats: It must possess the ability to detect novel threats, as due to the 
interconnected nature of Cloud federations, attacks may propagate from within the 
federation. 
 Reliable: It must be able to operate constantly, have a high level of availability, and 
maintain an acceptable level of accuracy and efficiency. It must be able to recover from 
faults and ensure information is stored in a consistent and recoverable manner. 
 Scalable: It must be able to automatically scale alongside the expansion of the 
underlying virtualised infrastructure, in order to adapt for its constantly changing needs. 
These requirements will guide the research in terms of analysing the suitability of existing 
techniques, and developing a solution that satisfies the identified criteria. Table 3.2 provides a 
summary of the techniques discussed within this section, along with the benefits and drawbacks 
when considering their application for detecting intrusions within a Cloud federation.  
Table 3.2: Intrusion detection techniques summary 
Technique Basic concept Sub techniques Benefits Drawbacks 
Anomaly 
detection-
based 
Detect abnormal 
patterns that 
deviate from what 
is considered to 
be normal 
behaviour. 
1. Statistic based 
2. Distance based 
3. Rule based 
4. Profile based 
Ability to detect novel 
threats. 
No prior knowledge 
about infrastructure 
activity needed. 
Cannot describe what 
the attack is. 
Can result in high false 
positive or false 
negative results. 
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5. Model based  Accurate when deviance 
matches profiles. 
 
Signature 
detection-
based 
Use of known 
patterns of 
unauthorised 
behaviour to 
predict and detect 
subsequent 
similar attacks. 
 
1. Misuse detection 
2. Rule based 
3. State transition 
4. Data mining 
5. State model 
6. Expert system 
7. String matching 
It is very effective in 
detecting known attacks 
or threats that are 
predefined in the 
database of IDS.  
 
Cannot detect novel 
attacks. 
If malicious activity 
appears like normal 
traffic to the system it 
will never send an 
alarm to administrator, 
so like anomaly based 
detection, false 
positives and false 
negatives is an issue. 
Signature databases 
must constantly be 
updated, and IDSs 
must be able to 
compare and match 
activities against large 
collections of attack 
signatures.  
Machine 
learning based 
Intelligent and 
adaptive 
classification of 
complex and 
uncertain 
behaviour. 
1. Neural networks 
2. LGP 
3. SVM 
4. Decision tree 
5. Bayesian 
networks 
6. MARS 
7. FIS 
8. Clustering and 
data outliers 
Designed for complex 
environments. 
Tolerates incomplete 
data. 
Can adapt to the 
behaviour of the 
monitored environment. 
Dependent upon 
knowledge of 
infrastructure 
boundaries and goals. 
Requires extensive 
training of data and 
classifiers. 
Over classifying can 
skew the results. 
Higher resource 
consumption. 
Host-based 
monitoring  
Provide local 
intrusion 
detection and 
support by 
monitoring user 
behaviour over an 
application layer 
protocol. 
 
 
Host based 
monitoring can be 
applied either on the 
VM or on the host 
machines. 
Host based monitoring 
has access to a greater 
spectrum of data sources 
covering the OS, as well 
as incoming and 
outgoing traffic. 
As host based IDS use 
system logs containing 
events that have actually 
occurred, they can 
determine whether an 
attack occurred or not 
with greater accuracy 
and fewer false positives 
than a network-based 
system. 
It is unable to match 
the speed of network 
monitoring. 
Incurs resource and 
performance 
overheads. 
Suited to individual or 
isolated 
systems/infrastructures. 
Attacks can be 
identified by looking at 
log files, which often 
gives the attacker time 
to remove evidence of 
an attack. 
Network-
based 
monitoring 
Examines and 
analyses the 
traffic to and from 
Can detect different 
types of attacks in 
VMs and hypervisor. 
Easy to deploy and does 
not affect existing 
Network-based 
monitoring cannot 
62 
all the devices on 
the network.  
It can scan all 
inbound and out- 
bound traffic and 
detect various 
types of instances. 
 
systems or 
infrastructures. 
Once the attacks have 
been detected from this 
method the active 
system immediately 
takes necessary actions 
to tackle the attacks. 
Network-based IDS use 
live network traffic and 
perform real time 
intrusion detection. 
Therefore, the attacker 
cannot remove evidence 
of attack – this data can 
be used for forensic 
analysis. 
detect the attacks inside 
virtual networks.  
Also the network traffic 
within and outside of 
the Cloud environment 
cannot be decrypted to 
analyse the network 
traffic. 
Generate many false 
positives because of the 
very fact that it detects 
malicious packets in 
real time and some of 
these packets could be 
from a trusted host. 
Cannot give 
information about 
system activities, 
whereas host based 
monitoring can detect 
policy breaches, 
abnormal user activity, 
user account 
modification, etc. 
Agent-based 
monitoring 
Agent-based 
monitoring use 
the independent 
and autonomy 
characteristics of 
agents to increase 
system scalability, 
and improve the 
problems caused 
by failure of 
single point, 
improve the 
system's fault 
tolerance. 
1. Multi-Agent 
Distributed IDS 
(MAIDS) 
2. Autonomous 
Agents For 
Intrusion 
Detection 
(AAFID) 
3. Intrusion 
Detection Agent 
System (ADI) 
4. Intelligent Mobile 
Agents for 
Intrusion 
Detection System 
(IMA-IDS) 
Agent-based monitoring 
utilises multiple agents 
to achieve different 
modules of each 
intrusion detection unit.  
Each agent can 
communicate with each 
other, mutual 
cooperation. 
There is no central point 
of failure and agents can 
detect and take 
predefined actions 
against malicious 
activity.   
Scalability - agents 
reduce the computational 
load on the system by 
dividing it into hosts. 
Need a clearly defined 
monitoring hierarchy 
and roles for agents. 
Centralised 
monitoring 
architecture 
Data collected 
from single or 
multiple hosts.  
All data shipped 
to a central 
location for 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
A smaller number of 
components need to be 
monitored. However, 
these components are 
larger and more 
complex, making them 
more difficult to 
monitor. 
 
Single point of failure. 
Impose little or no 
overhead on the 
systems, except for the 
ones where the analysis 
components run, where 
a large load is imposed. 
Those hosts may need 
to be dedicated to the 
analysis task 
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Hierarchical 
approaches are 
encouraged as they 
scale better than the 
centralised approach. 
Distributed 
monitoring 
architecture 
A distributed IDS 
consists of 
multiple IDSs 
over a large 
network, all of 
which 
communicate with 
each other, or 
with a server that 
facilitates 
advanced network 
monitoring, 
incident analysis, 
and instant attack 
data. 
 
 
 
N/A 
Ability to detect attack 
patterns across an entire 
corporate network, with 
geographic locations 
separating segments by 
time zones or even 
continents.  
This could allow for the 
early detection of a well-
planned and coordinated 
attack. 
Impose little overhead 
on the systems because 
the components 
running on them are 
smaller. However, the 
extra load is imposed 
on most of the systems 
being monitored. 
Network data rates are 
very high. 
Encryption of network 
traffic is becoming 
more popular. 
 
 
  
Table 3.3: Comparison of existing techniques against collaborative intrusion detection requirements 
 
 
 
 
Requirements met 
Requirements not met 
Requirements partially met  
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Table 3.3 compares the existing techniques discussed in this chapter against the requirements 
established in Chapter 3.4. Taking the existing techniques, we identify if they: meet the 
identified requirements, do not meet the requirements, or partially meet the requirements. 
Partial requirements met would indicate that the technique could be tailored depending upon 
the user requirements. 
 
3.6   Threshold algorithms 
While conducting the requirements analysis collaborative monitoring has been identified as the 
most suitable technique for detecting intrusions in Cloud federations. It can be a highly 
effective approach but relies on accuracy of its set-up, and the predefined threshold parameters 
used to detect anomalous activities within the network. 
The threat-awareness capability provides a key opportunity for an IDS to improve its detection 
rate. It can be inferred that as the use of Cloud in organisations grows, so will the rate of DoS 
attacks. These attacks against the Cloud are launched to deny service availability to end users. 
While DDoS attacks tend to generate a lot of fear and media attention, they are by no means 
the only form of DoS attack. Asymmetric application level DoS attacks take advantage of 
vulnerabilities in web servers, databases, or other Cloud resources, allowing a malicious 
individual to take out an application using a small attack payload – in some cases less than 100 
bytes long [114].  
For detecting such attacks there are a range of approaches considered in the literature [26], 
[45], [62], [72], [102], [115]–[119]. Algorithms for detecting attacks in the Cloud environment 
include adaptive threshold [115], Random Early Drop (RED) [120], RRED, and CUSUM. Each 
of these is used by a variety of solutions in the area of network and Cloud security, but each 
has differing benefits and drawbacks.  
The adaptive threshold algorithm [115] detects anomalies based on violations of a threshold 
that is adaptively set, based on recent traffic measurements. Seasonal variations and trends are 
taken care of by using an adaptive threshold whose value is set based on an estimate of the 
mean number of packets under consideration or the rate, either of which is computed from 
recent traffic measurements.  
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RED takes a different approach, monitoring an average queue size and dropping packets based 
on statistical probabilities. If the buffer is almost empty, all incoming packets are accepted. As 
the queue grows, the probability for dropping an incoming packet grows too. When the buffer 
is full, the probability has reached 1 and all incoming packets are dropped. In comparison, 
RRED was proposed to improve the TCP throughput against DDoS attacks, particularly low 
rate DDoS (LDDoS) attacks. Experiments have confirmed that the existing RED-like 
algorithms are notably vulnerable under LDDoS attacks due to the oscillating TCP queue size 
caused by the attacks. The RRED algorithm can significantly improve the performance of TCP 
under LDDoS attacks [121]. 
LDDoS attacks reduce network service capabilities by periodically sending high intensity pulse 
data flows. For their concealed performance, it is more difficult for traditional DoS detection 
methods to detect LDDoS attacks; at the same time the accuracy of the current detection 
methods for LDDoS attacks is relatively low. 
Many algorithms, such as random sampling, do not take into account traffic dynamics. As a 
result, they cannot guarantee the sampling error falls within a prescribed error tolerance level.  
How to discover the evolving process of the network traffic and how to improve the accuracy 
of real-time detection is problematic. For services in the Cloud environment, the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data is of utmost importance. Our Service-
based intrusion detection framework will facilitate collaborative intrusion in a Cloud 
federation, protecting the Cloud environment from DDoS attacks, as these attacks can threaten 
the availability of Cloud functionalities and/or the services within. 
CUSUM [122] involves the calculation of a cumulative sum. Samples from a process pt are 
assigned weights Wt, and summed as follows: 
𝑟0 = 0      (3.1) 
 
𝑟𝑡+1 = max (0, 𝑟𝑡 +  𝑝𝑡 −  𝑤𝑡)   (3.2) 
 
When the value of r exceeds a certain threshold value, a change in value has been found. The 
formula only detects changes in the positive direction. 𝑡 refers to a period of time.  
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There are preventive measures in place to protect against such attacks, but they seem to be 
focusing on generic DDoS, where the characteristics mimic previous attacks of such nature. 
However, the rise in high volume and low rate DDoS is a problem. They could be spread out 
over a period of time, and have random high bursts, which can confuse the preventative 
measures. Algorithms for detecting DDoS attacks in the Cloud environment often sample the 
packets and drop any deemed to be malicious – these can often be false positives. 
The use of algorithms for detecting attacks in the Cloud environments has the following 
weaknesses:  
 Sample packets are often inaccurate 
 Vulnerability to unknown types of DDoS attacks 
 Does not always ensure the accuracy of estimation and tends to over sample at peak 
periods when efficiency and timeliness are crucial 
 Random sampling does not take into account traffic dynamics 
 Inefficient on LDDoS attacks 
 Prone to error on high rate DDoS attacks 
There is an emerging need for the traffic processing capability of an IDS to match the high 
throughput of today’s high-bandwidth networks. Recent research has shown that the vast 
majority of security solutions deployed today are inadequate for processing traffic at a 
sufficiently high rate to keep pace with the network’s bandwidth [123]. Existing sampling 
algorithms are poorly suited for this task, especially because they are unable to adapt to the 
trends in network traffic. Satisfying such a criterion requires a sampling algorithm to be capable 
of controlling its sampling rate to provide sufficient accuracy at minimal overhead [123]. The 
adaptive threshold algorithm and CUSUM algorithm appear to be the most applicable for 
detecting attacks in the Cloud environment. Algorithms based on change point detection, such 
as CUSUM, can exhibit robust performance over a range of different types of attacks, without 
being more complex.  
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3.7   Decision making algorithms 
There are many decision making algorithms available in the literature, however by adopting a 
vector-based voting solution the failure rate can be significantly reduced compared to non-
vector voting by about 50% [124]. If a voter is a yes/no decision maker, its output space is 
binary; and if the output of a vote can be any value, its output space is infinite. The majority 
vote produces an output among variant results, where at least (𝑛 + 1)/2 variant results agree. 
The plurality voter is the relaxed form of majority voting, and implements m-out-of-n voting, 
where it is less than a strict majority (e.g., 2-out-of-5 or 3-out-of-7 voting) [124].  
The disadvantage of the widely used majority vote, as well as the plurality, is that they may 
agree on incorrect variant results, where there is a consensus on identical incorrect inputs. In 
other words, these voters cannot distinguish between agreed correct and agreed incorrect 
variant outputs. The majority vote is often inaccurate, especially in automated approaches.  
For example: assume a voter with 11 inputs received from software versions for which the 
output space is binary (0, 1). Five versions have reliability 0.99 (type A versions), and six 
versions have reliability 0.95 (type B versions). For a given notional correct input, the A-
versions output 0, and the B-versions produce 1. According to the majority voter, the correct 
result is estimated to be 1. However, if the reliability information of variants is taken into 
account in estimating the output, a more accurate output may be obtained [124]. 
This shows the benefit of using the extra information from variants during the voting process, 
with the ultimate aim of having a more accurate result. A group of voters, which differ from 
generic voters, use extra information such as the reliability level of variants, online diagnosis 
information of modules, or various probabilistic information to improve voting performance, 
which is known as a ‘hybrid voter’ [124]. This type of approach would generate a more accurate 
output compared with the aforementioned voting algorithms.  
D-S theory of evidence is an example of such an approach, and can solve the problem of 
collaborative intrusion detection in the federated Cloud environment. The D-S theory offers an 
alternative to the traditional probabilistic theory for the mathematical representation of 
uncertainty. D-S applications range from expert decision support systems to multi-attribute 
decision-making and data fusion [125]. The main advantage of this algorithm is that no a priori 
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knowledge of the system is required, thus making it suitable for anomaly detection of 
previously unseen information [126]. A further point for decision making is the aspect of time 
criticality, which includes both the responsiveness aspect of the system and the timeliness of 
any related data being delivered within its designated time period.  
3.8   Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence 
D-S theory of evidence in the context of distributed intrusion detection can demonstrate the 
theory’s usefulness. Cooperative decision making is made after aggregating evidence using 
this approach. As mentioned, some work in this area [105] uses a simple majority vote to reach 
a decision when combining evidence, where the final decision is a binary decision. D-S 
produces a judgement value between 0 and 1 that reflects the degree of belief in that judgement 
[127]. The computational complexity of D-S increases exponentially with the number of 
elements in the frame of discernment (θ). If there are 𝑛 elements in Θ, there will be up to 2n-1 
focal elements for the mass function. Furthermore, the combination of two mass functions 
needs the computation of up to 2n intersections. The D-S rule of combination is the procedure 
to aggregate and summarise a corpus of evidences.  
D-S theory is a probabilistic approach, which implements belief functions which are based on 
degrees of belief or trust. Probability values are assigned to sets of possibilities rather than 
single events [60]. In the decision making process, the uncertainty existing within the network 
often leads to failure of intrusion detection or low accuracy. D-S was introduced as a 
mathematical framework for the representation of uncertainty and analysing it in a quantitative 
way. D-S theory introduces the concept of assigning beliefs and plausibilities to possible 
hypotheses of each decision maker and provides a combination rule to fuse multi-modal 
information. This theory allows each source to incorporate information with different levels of 
evidence. This property provides a significant benefit, in that, it assigns a possibility mass to a 
subset or interval; hence, the D-S theory based fusion approaches can efficiently address both 
probabilistic (or objective) uncertainty and epistemic (or subjective) uncertainty [128].  
Other methods such as using Bayesian and learning based approaches cannot provide these 
benefits. They are dependent upon knowledge of infrastructure boundaries and goals, which 
leads to extensive training of data and classifiers. The Bayesian approach requires complete 
knowledge of both prior and conditional probabilities, which might be difficult to determine in 
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practice. Prior probabilities are often estimated from empirical data, or, in the absence of 
empirical data, the assumption is that they are uniform or some other distribution. The Bayesian 
approach is not well equipped to handle states of ignorance [127].  
Collaborative intrusion detection has been considered in several contributions where data 
provided by heterogeneous intrusion detection monitors is fused. Conversely, there is a trade-
off between accuracy and efficiency while the decisions are made in an IDS. Cognitive 
algorithms, such as neural networks, have good adaptability but require a lot of training data, 
which is hard to capture in a real network environment [129]. The main advantage of D-S is 
that no priori knowledge of the system is required, i.e. state transition matrix or training data, 
thus making it suitable for anomaly detection of previously unseen information [126].   
Within the domain of intrusion detection, comparison of the performance of voting and 
decision algorithms is complex for two reasons. Firstly, the large number of environmental 
parameters that have a direct impact on the voter output, e.g. input data profile, fault/error type, 
error probability distribution, reliability level of variants, number of variants, and the value of 
acceptance thresholds. Secondly, the selection of an appropriate metric for the evaluation. 
Furthermore, the metrics are application dependent; for example, where the output space of a 
system is large and the probability of producing identical incorrect redundant results is low, 
the number of agreed results, during a specific running time, is a suitable metric. Whereas if 
the cardinality of voter output space is small and identical, incorrect redundant results are 
probable, then the number of agreed and correct results is a suitable metric.  
In other applications, the ratio of correct results to agreed results may be the most suitable 
measure. Inevitably, the ranking of voter performance may change when using different 
metrics. Examples of typical metrics used include the error detection ratio, false alarm ratio, 
the number of normalised benign outputs, the number of normalised catastrophic outputs, and 
the probability of producing a correct voter output [124]. 
According to Chen and Aickelin, the computational complexity of D-S increases exponentially 
with the number of elements in the frame of discernment (Θ). If there are n elements in Θ, there 
will be up to 2n-1 focal elements for the mass function. The combination of two mass functions 
needs the computation of up to 2n intersections. The D-S rule of combination is the procedure 
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to aggregate and summarise a corpus of evidences. However, through literature [124], [126], 
[136] and implementing our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection solution, the 
limitations shown below are evident: 
 Associative: for rule combination, the order of the information in the aggregated 
evidences does not impact the result. A non-associative combination is necessary for 
many cases. 
 Non-weighted: rule combination implies all evidences are trusted equally. However, in 
reality, trust on different evidences may differ, which means various factors should be 
considered for each evidence.  
3.9   Problem analysis 
Anomaly-based IDSs are a principal focus of research and development in the field of intrusion 
detection [56]. It is clear there are two main weaknesses in present-day IDS techniques [101]. 
One weakness is that they do not take into consideration the threat exposures in the network 
while detecting intrusions, resulting in obtaining alerts for all types of events, many or most of 
which may not be relevant to the operating environment. In the context of dynamic network 
environments such as WSNs or Cloud networks, this approach may lead to a huge number of 
unnecessary alerts. Depending on the frequency of changes to the network environment, this 
may in turn affect the efficacy of the IDS or detection method itself. 
A second weakness of present-day IDS techniques is that they are not devised to handle 
dynamic network environments, as they use a stringently predefined set of signatures and 
anomaly detection thresholds to detect intrusions. Furthermore, they are quite ignorant of any 
changes to the operating environment that may eliminate or introduce vulnerabilities and threat 
exposures. Due to this weakness, the monitoring technique may miss critical attacks and detect 
intrusions that are not relevant due to changes to the environment. Hence, introducing a threat 
awareness capability provides a key opportunity for an IDS to improve its detection rate [101].  
From our analysis, it is clear that Cloud computing deteriorates the perception of perimeter 
security. It has become impossible to place a virtual moat around an organisation’s castle, as 
an abundance of services have been outsourced [15]. Security should be implemented in every 
layer of the Cloud application architecture. It is important to note that the existing approaches 
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in this area do not tackle the protection of services migrating to the Cloud environment 
efficiently. In current solutions, they provide theoretical intrusion methods for the Cloud 
infrastructure, or for network protection, but these are not sufficient for our protection problem. 
The distributed nature of the Cloud model makes it an even more attractive target for intruders.  
The deployment of WSNs and mobile ad-hoc networks in applications such as emergency 
services, warfare and health monitoring poses the threat of various cyber hazards, intrusions 
and attacks as a consequence of these networks’ openness. Among the most significant research 
difficulties in such networks’ safety is intrusion detection, whose target is to distinguish 
between misuse and abnormal behaviour so as to ensure secure, reliable network operations 
and services. Intrusion detection is best delivered by multi agent system technologies and 
advanced computing techniques. To date, diverse soft computing and machine learning 
techniques in terms of computational intelligence have been utilised to create IDPSs, yet the 
literature does not report any reviews investigating the performance and consequences of such 
techniques solving wireless environment intrusion recognition issues as they gain entry into 
Cloud computing [80].  
According to Zuech et al. [130], improvements to intrusion detection could be achieved by 
embracing a more comprehensive approach in monitoring security events from many different 
heterogeneous sources. The associated benefits of such an approach could offer a more holistic 
view and greater situational awareness of cyber threats. The key problem being tackled is that, 
as cyber-attacks have evolved and grown in sophistication, monitoring an ever increasing 
number of event sources has grown in complexity. Intelligence awareness is a growing method 
which is the capability of automated intelligence sharing and alerting across a myriad of 
security systems, and a benefit is the ability to adapt, based on contextual or situational 
awareness.  
A monitoring system that can run in a non-intrusive and transparent manner to any underlying 
virtualised infrastructure is an evident requirement within this area. Additionally, possessing 
the ability to adapt to behavioural changes (i.e. resource related parameter changes) within the 
system without the need for re-contextualisation each time. Design of a collaborative Cloud-
based framework that focuses on detecting intrusions within an interconnected infrastructure, 
in combination with decision making and/or fusion algorithms is a must. As identified, one of 
the key issues identified is the lack of communication between entities monitoring the systems, 
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or the sharing of information. Through efficient communication and exchanging threat 
information, a threat could be prevented from propagating throughout a network.  
3.10 Summary 
This chapter has provided a summary of related work and existing approaches for detecting 
intrusions in the Cloud environment. It has reviewed the identified techniques, providing an 
overview and outlining the benefits and drawbacks when considering application to a Cloud 
federation. This exploration has identified that there is a consensus in existing work on the need 
for improved approaches for protecting infrastructure services in the Cloud environment, and 
in Cloud federations [51], [74], [131]–[133]. This is a challenging and complex problem and 
environment, as the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data can have high 
socioeconomic implications as there are more and more infrastructure services migrating to 
this environment. Information in the Cloud environment comes from many sources and in 
many formats.  
During the literature review, each of the requirements identified in Chapter 3.5 were examined, 
and it can be concluded that there are no currently defined methods that properly fulfil the 
requirements for collaborative intrusion detection for Cloud federations. The review identifies 
solutions that could be built upon and scaled to deal with the dynamic nature of the Cloud 
environment. This chapter justifies why a novel approach and novel techniques are essential to 
addressing the issue of protecting critical infrastructure services in the Cloud environment via 
collaborative intrusion detection and autonomous sharing of information. The inadequacies of 
existing solutions provide both the motivations and aims for the solution proposed in this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework 
In this chapter, we provide the design of our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection 
framework and the technical challenges that we address. The contents of this chapter are 
structured as follows. An overall overview of our solution is presented in 4.1. A high level 
overview of the framework is presented in 4.2, and a detailed explanation of the architectural 
attributes. The algorithms used for threshold adaptation and belief generation are presented in 
4.3 and 4.4, and the collaborative decision making process is highlighted in 4.5 - with the 
extended D-S fusion process in 4.6. Lastly, 4.7 provides a summary of the framework.   
In Chapter 3, we identified that there is a consensus in existing work on the need for improved 
approaches for protecting infrastructure services in the Cloud environment, particularly in 
Cloud federations. As such, Cloud defence strategy needs to be distributed so that it can detect 
and prevent the attacks that originate within the Cloud itself and from the users using the Cloud 
technology from different geographic locations. As the popularity of the services provided in 
the Cloud environment grows rapidly, the exploitation of possible vulnerabilities grows at the 
same pace [134].  
It is obvious from Chapters 1-3 that there is a need for a new and capable collaborative intrusion 
detection method to cope with the challenging structure, dynamic nature and scale of the Cloud 
computing and Cloud federation environment. The literature review and survey of related work 
in Chapter 3 has shown that there are no entirely suitable solutions, and has detailed the 
limitations of existing solutions and the shortcomings of such techniques. Therefore, a novel 
approach is required to establish autonomous intrusion detection in a Cloud federation via the 
collaborative interconnected domains. CSPs within a Cloud federation are represented as 
interconnected domains, and based on the proposed monitoring structure, the infrastructure is 
dynamically provisioned to react and facilitate autonomous sharing of threat information via 
Cloud brokerage and the hierarchical monitoring entities. This approach needs to adhere to the 
aims and objectives established in Chapter 1.2 and the requirements outlined in Chapter 3.5.  
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This chapter proposes a novel approach to the problem through Security as a Service using our 
Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework. Our approach is proactive and 
looks to identify patterns of traffic and behaviour, and through collaborative intrusion detection 
conveys a security posture rather than purely alerting to attacks. The main requirement of our 
solution is to provide protection for critical infrastructure services being hosted in the Cloud 
environment, in particular within Cloud federations, through novel intrusion detection 
techniques. Our solution encompasses the use of dynamic and multi-threshold-based 
algorithmic approach, and autonomous sharing of information to improve resilience to Cloud 
attacks.  
4.1  Overview of Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework  
So far, this thesis has discussed in detail the extent of the limitations of existing solutions and 
the challenges faced for collaborative intrusion detection within Cloud federations. In order to 
resolve this, a novel solution has been devised called Service-based collaborative intrusion 
detection framework, providing “Security as a Service” for Cloud federations [135]-[136]. A 
high level overview of the key attributes and functionality of the solution includes an 
autonomous information sharing schema by the monitoring entities, whereby collaborative 
intrusion detection is facilitated.  
It has been designed to ensure it fulfils the requirements established in Chapter 3.5 and that it 
is non-invasive and transparent to the underlying virtualised infrastructure. It operates by 
monitoring the live behaviour of the network in real-time, utilising pre-calculated CUSUM 
profiles for network thresholds. These profiles and their calculated values are discussed in 
Chapter 4.2. These algorithms are used to cope with the dynamic nature of the Cloud 
environment, and by utilising adaptive thresholds, attacks can be identified. Our solution 
generates high level application metrics dynamically at runtime by aggregating and grouping 
low level metrics.  
Our solution conveys knowledge acquisition in dynamic Cloud environments through 
collaborative cooperation. Collaborative intrusion is achieved via the generation and exchange 
of beliefs – detailed in Chapter 4.5 – based on observations of events within the network. Via 
the use of a broker, the ability to collaboratively make a system wide decision and propagate 
this through the interconnected domains is achieved.  
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4.2  Service-based collaborative intrusion detection architecture 
CSPs within a Cloud federation are represented as interconnected domains, and based on the 
monitoring structure, dynamically provision the infrastructure to react and facilitate 
autonomous sharing of threat information via a Cloud broker. Brokering functions in federated 
Clouds at the IaaS layer can be decomposed into two aspects: resource provisioning and 
resource adaptation. In resource provisioning, the most appropriate mix of resource classes and 
the number of nodes of each resource class are estimated so as to match the requirements of 
the application and to ensure that the user objectives and constraints – i.e. throughput, precision 
and efficacy – are satisfied [47].  
It is necessary to continuously monitor the application execution and adapt resources to ensure 
these objectives and constraints are fulfilled. Resource adaptation is responsible for 
provisioning resources dynamically and at runtime. Examples of such provisioning are 
assigning more physical CPUs to a given VM to speed up an application, or migrating VMs in 
order to reduce the resource sharing or optimise the energy efficiency.  
With a Cloud federation, it is a requirement that each CSP has to share Cloud-related 
information with the federated Cloud providers. With this in mind, in our architecture, this 
sharing of knowledge in our approach would involve security information about malicious 
activities, new signatures, and suspicious IP addresses (with an SLA detailing such a 
requirement). Our architectural knowledgebase encompasses a hybrid approach that combines 
network intrusion detection techniques: signature-based detection, anomaly-based detection, 
and soft computing techniques.  
Using a hybrid approach can improve the accuracy of the IDS when compared to individual 
approaches. Our Security as a Service entity would be deployed in the virtual network in each 
CSP domain, and Figure 4-1 illustrates such a model. Conceptually, the architecture is 
structured into the components presented in Table 4.1.   
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Figure 4-1: Service-based collaborative intrusion detection in a Cloud federation 
 
Within our architecture, time criticality includes both the responsiveness aspect of the system 
and the timeliness of any relevant data being delivered in its designated time period. The 
autonomous sharing of information within the Cloud federation promotes that resilience is a 
worthwhile and obtainable attribute.  
Figure 4.1 shows how the key attributes are connected:  
 Cloud broker 
 Monitoring Nodes (MNs),  
 Local coordinators (Super Nodes - SNs),  
 Global coordinators (Command and Control server - C2).  
 
The C2 provides management of SNs and MNs, responses to attacks detected and reported by 
SNs and/or the broker, and cooperates with adjacent domains when polled. Characteristics of 
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each entity are detailed in Chapter 4.3.1 – 4.3.4, in addition to flowcharts illustrating their 
interactions. 
Table 4.1: Notations for Figure 4-1 
Icon Attribute 
 
Cloud Broker with database server of 
signatures: 
 Black list 
 Grey list – local to each C2 
 White list 
 
Command and Control server (C2) 
 
Super Node (SN) 
 
Monitoring Node (MN) 
 
Due to resource limitations in our test environment, a smaller amount of attributes were 
included to demonstrate proof of concept but this distributed monitoring schema can be scaled 
considerably. As stated in Chapter 2, Cloud environments and Cloud federations are large 
scale, it is essential that any potential solution should scale alongside the environment and have 
the potential to expand and scale considerably without any issues or performance implications 
– this is achieved by the architectural design of our Service-based collaborative intrusion 
detection solution. 
The ‘Security as a Service’ inspired architecture operates by monitoring the actions of the 
Cloud network in real time against pre-defined behavioural threshold profiles that take into 
consideration adaptations in performance. CUSUM is used for monitoring change detection 
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[120], detailed in Chapter 4.3. Additionally, in conjunction the EWMA can be determined, 
which is a statistic for monitoring the process that averages the data in a way that gives less 
and less weight to data as they are further removed in time. By comparing live network 
behaviour against these profiles, attacks against the network can be quickly detected and pre 
alarms generated based on the frequency of occurrence.  
4.3  Threshold calculation algorithms – CUSUM and EWMA 
Within our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection architecture, network-based 
intrusion detection is used to provide global intrusion detection, where it provides level 
monitoring of traffic flowing through the network and detects intrusions based on the node 
behaviour over the network. Related work within this research uses signature-based detection 
schemes to detect violations within their networks but due to the dynamic nature of the Cloud, 
an approach which considers fluctuations within this defined ‘norm’ is more appropriate. 
Adjusting thresholds based on these fluctuations would improve the accuracy and efficiency of 
our methodology, and lower the number of false positives and false negatives. 
CUSUM is a sequential statistical analysis technique, which is used to monitor and detect 
changes within any sequence of quantitative observations in some experiment, i.e. monitoring 
for any sudden increase or decrease in the number of incoming messages or traffic fluctuations 
[137].  
CUSUM takes samples p𝑡 from a process and assigns weights W𝑡  to these values, which is 
summed as follows: 𝑟0 = 0 
𝑟𝑛+1 = max (0, 𝑟𝑡 +  𝑝𝑡 −  𝑊𝑡)    (4.1) 
 
When the value of r exceeds a certain threshold value, a change in value has been found. The 
traffic threshold is given by:  
(α+1)μ      (4.2)  
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Where:  
 𝑡: a period of time 
 𝛼: alpha  
 μ: is the measured mean rate 
 
Unlike the adaptive threshold algorithms [115], [117], which consider only violations of the 
threshold, the CUSUM algorithm considers the excess volume sent above the normal volume, 
hence accounts for the intensity of the violations. 
There have been attempts to determine the optimal level of each threshold but the best 
performing approach is to use the standard deviation 𝜎 of the whole sequence. CUSUM is a 
recursive equation, meaning that a new CUSUM value is dependent on the previous CUSUM 
values. After a new input value to the sequence of the observations is obtained, it will be used 
to find a new CUSUM value. CUSUM is computed according to the following equation: 
𝐶𝑖 =  𝑂𝑖 − (𝜇o + 𝑍 +  𝜎) +  𝐶𝑖−1     (4.3) 
Where: 
 𝐶𝑖: is the most recent CUSUM value to be computed 
 𝑂𝑖: is the most recent observation value 
 𝜇0: is the overall observations mean value 
 𝐶𝑖−1: is the previous CUSUM value 
 
𝑍 is the reference value and is chosen about halfway between the target 𝜇𝑡−1and the control 
value of the mean 𝜇1. 𝑍 is calculated by: 
          𝑍 =  
𝛿 .𝜎
2
                  (4.4) 
       𝛿 =  
|𝜇𝑡− 𝜇𝑡−1|
𝜎
        (4.5) 
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If the shift was expressed by the standard deviation units, then 𝑍 is one-half the magnitude of 
the shift and it is given by [137]:   
     𝑍 =  
|𝜇𝑖− 𝜇𝑖−1|
2
                (4.6) 
As CUSUM computes the differences between the values and the average, it is able to detect 
and plot small changes in a sequence of quantitative observations, so it can be employed for 
detecting DDoS as it can detect any sudden or subtle changes in the incoming traffic [137].  
An alarm is signalled when the accumulated volume of measurements 𝑔𝑡  that are above a 
traffic threshold, exceeds the aggregate volume threshold ℎ. The threshold is set adaptively 
based on recent measurements of the mean rate. The classic CUSUM formulation is effective 
in change detection, however in an anomaly detection scheme there is no interest in the change 
itself, focusing instead on the intensity of the anomaly. Depending on the sensitivity imposed 
to the algorithm, it might result in many false positives [138].  
Used in combination, CUSUM and EWMA have demonstrated an acceptable performance in 
detecting different shifts from the process mean which could help account for intensive attacks 
[138]. The EWMA chart plots the moving averages of data and assigns weights that decrease 
exponentially from the present to the past. As a result, the average values are influenced more 
by recent data points than older points. Equation 4.7 conveys this, illustrating how the relevant 
information for detecting a change lies in the value of the log-likelihood ratio and its current 
minimum value.  
Where:  
 ?̅?𝑡: is the estimated mean rate 
 𝛽: is the EWMA factor 
 ?̅?𝑡−1: is the mean rate estimated from measures prior to 𝑡 
 𝐹𝑡: is the number of packets in the specified time interval 
 
 ?̅?𝑡 =  𝛽?̅?𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽)𝐹𝑡,     (4.7) 
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If 𝐹𝑡  ≥ (∝  +1) ?̅?𝑡−1 then the alarm is signalled at time 𝑡 where (∝ > 0) is a parameter that 
indicates the percentage above the mean value that considers the indication of anomalous 
behaviour. However, including this as an indicator of anomalous actions would include a high 
number of false positives as indicated by Siris et al. [116], whereby a modification that can 
improve its performance is to signal an alarm after a minimum number of consecutive 
violations of the threshold.  
Equation 4.7 is adapted to take into consideration the tuning parameters of the CUSUM 
algorithm, which are the amplitude percentage parameter ∝, the alarm threshold ℎ, the EWMA 
factor 𝛽, and the length of the time interval over which traffic measurements are taken [116].   
It returns a vector of the EWMA of an input vector 𝑔𝑡, computing the known variance from the 
input vector and the cumulative sum over the input: 
𝑔𝑡 = [𝑔𝑡−1 +  
𝛼?̅?𝑡−1
𝜎2
 (𝐹𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡−1 −  
𝛼?̅?𝑡−1
2
)]+   (4.8) 
 
Where: 
 𝑔𝑡: is the input vector 
 ∝: is an amplitude percentage parameter, which intuitively corresponds to the most 
probable percentage of increase of the mean rate after a change (attack) has occurred. 
 ?̅?𝑡: is an estimate of the mean rate at time 𝑡 which is computed using an EWMA as in 
equation 4.7. 
 𝜎: is the standard deviation 
 𝐹𝑡: is the number of traffic packets in the n
th time interval 
 
One of the key research challenges is owing to the size and dynamic nature of the Cloud 
environment, namely the architecture and structure, which poses problems for the application 
of existing solutions. CUSUM and EWMA in combination are appropriate threshold 
calculation and adaptive monitoring approaches for detecting small shifts within a sequential 
quantitative observation and its application for DDoS attacks is suitable as it constantly adapts 
its value based on continuous measurements and remains insensitive to the normality 
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assumption [137]. This combination of algorithms helps the system adapt to the behaviour of 
the underlying infrastructure and have more accurate detections, in comparison to a strict 
threshold based scheme. 
4.3.1 Monitoring Nodes 
MNs try to deal with issues on a local level and communicate with their neighbouring nodes 
regarding systems states and signatures, via the use of the gossip protocol as its premise is to 
manage a large, unreliable resource pool without any central coordinator. The exchange of 
information throughout the network is rampant, but messages and alerts need to be delivered 
with high probability. These nodes contain a black and white list, and a local grey list.  A pre-
alarm is triggered when a predefined threshold is violated, in utilisation with CUSUM and 
EWMA as detailed in Chapter 4.3. 
If there are 𝑀  nodes and each node gossips to log(M) + c other nodes on average, the 
probability that everyone gets the message converges to e−e
−c
, which is very close to 1 without 
considering failures – where 𝑐 is a fixed parameter determined by the number of nodes, and 
structure of the network topology, within the domain. The number of communications 
necessary to spread global workload information to all the mapping nodes respects 
log(M) /log (log(M)), which shows that it takes at most a logarithmic number of steps to reach 
every mapping node [139].  
With the gossip protocol [140] each node chooses a neighbour randomly to transmit a message. 
Suppose that the node 𝑖 chooses node 𝑗 with probability 𝑃𝑖𝑗, where zero probability implies that 
the two nodes are not within their communication range, and are therefore not neighbours. It 
can be shown that the communication delay of disseminating a message from a single node in 
the network to all M nodes in the network is Ο(log M/∅), where ∅ is the conductance of the 
network, given by: 
∅ = min
S:|S|≤M/2 
∑ Piji∈S,j∈Sc
|S|
        (4.9) 
Where: 
 ∅: conductance of the network 
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 S: energy required to transmit the data 
 M: nodes in the network 
 𝑖: network node 
 𝑗: network node 
 𝑃𝑖𝑗: probability that the two nodes are within their communication range 
 
The gossip protocol can have widespread broadcasting in an asynchronous style, but the 
communication is quite random [119]. Using this approach however there is a need to ensure 
that intrusions are detected fast and that information can disseminate throughout the federation 
quickly. Using this approach to communicate pre alarms through the network would cause an 
increase in network overhead, and a basic role of a monitoring entity is to be non-intrusive. In 
order to deal with the scale of the Cloud environment, introducing hierarchy via the role of the 
SN and local views is a more suitable approach.   
The role of the SN, detailed in Chapter 4.3.2, to observe the pre-alarms generated by the MNs 
could compliment the gossip based approach and improve the speed of message coverage. 
Broadcasting the pre-alarms in this way would reduce the network throughput and associated 
latency as, if every node in the network was to receive and forward the alarm packet, this would 
consume a lot of energy. Specifically, a pre-alarm is sent when the observed value is compared 
with a global threshold, such as using CUSUM for traffic volume dynamics – CUSUM is a 
widely used anomaly detection algorithm that has its foundations in change point detection 
[116].  
In particular, an alarm is signalled when the accumulated volume of measurements 𝑔𝑡 exceeds 
an aggregate volume threshold. When a pre-alarm is sent, monitoring nodes add it to their local 
grey list. 
Let a monitored value 𝑥𝑖 on the MN 𝑖 at time 𝑡 be: 
xi (t), i ∈ [1, M],     (4.10) 
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Where 𝑀 is the number of MNs involved in the monitoring task.  
Given the global threshold 𝑇, the state at time t can be considered to be abnormal and trigger a 
state alert if: 
∑ xi  (t)
M
i=1 > T,     (4.11) 
which is referred to as a global violation [141]. 
𝑇 can be decomposed into a set of local thresholds 𝑇𝑖 for each MN 𝑖 such that: 
∑ Ti ≤
M
i=1 T.      (4.12) 
As a result, as long as the monitored value at any node is lower or equal to its local threshold, 
the global threshold cannot be exceeded, i.e.  
xi(t) ≤ Ti , ∀i ∈ [1, M]    (4.13) 
This is as:  
∑ xi(t) ≤  ∑ Ti ≤
M
i=1 T
M
i=1 .    (4.14) 
In this case, MNs do not need to report their local values to the SN. In order to report a local 
violation, MN 𝑖 sends a message to the SN with the value 𝑥𝑖(𝑡). The value of 𝑇𝑖  is decided 
depending upon the local CSP but is calculated using the CUSUM algorithm where threshold 
calculation is detailed in Chapter 4.3. Each MN is independent and treated equally to ensure 
fair and accurate monitoring, and improve the reliability and efficiency of the monitoring 
schema. Each entity has a level of trust and is acting in a trustworthy manner – this is 
established in the assumptions identified in Chapter 5.1.  
There is likely a case where ∑ xi  (t)
M
i=1 < T but a particular 𝑥𝑖 (𝑡) exceeds 𝑇𝑖 so it is important 
to ensure the monitoring infrastructure can adapt to changes within the underlying 
infrastructure to gather local and global information that is accurate to the domain under 
observation – this is achieved using CUSUM and EWMA algorithms detailed in Chapter 4.3. 
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Figure 4-2 shows a flowchart conveying what operations the MN executes – beginning from 
initial start-up and showing the flow of information for detecting anomalous actions within the 
network.  
 
Figure 4-2: Monitoring node flow chart 
After adding to the local grey list, the MNs role loop back to the initial start-up in order to 
adjust threshold algorithms to deal with the dynamic nature of the underlying Cloud 
infrastructure. In addition, the MN deals with communications from other MNs, as a local node 
may send a pre-alarm for them to add to their local grey list - this can occur during any stage 
at run-time. For values that are already present in the local grey list the score is incremented 
due to frequency of occurrence. 
4.3.2 Super Node 
A SN has a parent/child relationship with MNs under its management. The SN effectively 
communicates upstream with the C2 to query any suspicious actions. In order to address the 
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problem of scale and network latency with centralised monitoring schemes, a hierarchical 
scheme with clearly defined roles and communication structure is utilised. The hierarchy of 
communication means network latency and throughput is reduced, and communication occurs 
only when essential, or when thresholds are violated. The SN, based on the number of MNs in 
its subnet, observes the generated alarms. When the pre-alarm count is more than or equal to 
the threshold based on the number of MNs, a belief is formed that there is an attack.  
Based on 𝑥𝑖 at time 𝑡, a belief is applied to the value: 
Bel(ID, timestamp, BPA)    (4.15) 
Where Bel contains all the information associated to the observed occurrence, ID is an identifier 
unique to 𝑥𝑖, timestamp corresponds to time 𝑡, and the BPA (Basic Probability Assignment) 
which is a positive number between 0 and 1, and exists in the form of probability. For example, 
a belief value of 0.8 corresponds to the belief that there is an attack, and the corresponding 
hypotheses set information is detailed in Table 4.7 in Chapter 4.5. The SN then sends this belief 
to the C2, who queries the broker .  Beliefs can be formed based on the belief function 
established and the associated hypothesis set.  
Depending on established thresholds the belief generations could be associated with the 
conditions below: 
 ba:  the belief that there is an attack – 0.7-1.0 
 bn:  the belief that there is not an attack – 0-0.3 
 bna: the belief expressing an ambiguity between attack and no attack – 0.4-0.6  
 
Figure 4-3 shows a flowchart conveying what operations the MN executes and how the SN 
interacts and performs its tasks. 
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Figure 4-3: SN flow chart 
If the amount of pre-alarms is not more than or equal to the alert threshold the SN goes back to 
observing the MN alerts. However, if the amount of pre-alarms are more than or equal to the 
defined alert threshold then BPA occurs – which is forwarded to the C2. 
4.3.3 C2 
The C2 is located within its designated domain and is a domain management node. The key 
services that the C2 provides are the management of SNs and MNs, responses to attacks 
detected and reported by SNs and/or the broker, and cooperation with adjacent domains when 
polled. When a threat is detected in its domain, a belief is formed that an attack is underway. 
The C2 queries the broker about the generated belief, to see if it is legitimate or not (as quite 
possibly information on it could be known but the information might not have been propagated 
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yet). C2s possess black lists and white lists comprised of blocked IP addresses, and local grey 
lists provided by the SN and MN which contain ambiguous observations. Figure 4-4 is a 
flowchart illustrating how components and operations between the C2 and broker interact. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: C2 and Broker flow chart 
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The C2 receives a query and associated belief hypothesis from the SN, and queries the broker 
with this information. The broker checks if it possess information on the value in its databases 
and returns the stored information to the C2 if present. Otherwise, the broker queries C2s in 
other domains to check their grey lists and return a BPA based on their stored value, return a 
BPA based on the queried value, or returns 𝑏𝑛𝑎 which is the belief expressing an ambiguity 
between attack and no attack. 
4.3.4 Cloud broker 
There is a need for secure communication in a Cloud-based collaborative environment. The 
question is then how to secure the intra-Cloud and inter-Cloud communications between the 
collaborative services deployed in the Clouds. Management from a Cloud broker is important 
as they provide the interoperability and portability of applications across multiple Cloud 
environments. A Cloud broker may enhance, combine, or integrate services from multiple 
CSPs in order to create new and value-added service offerings [135].  
Currently, Cloud brokers offer tools to manage applications across multiple CSPs. In the future, 
Cloud brokers will offer services based on their knowledge of the CSPs’ infrastructure [142]. 
In our solution, this information is used to offer Cloud CSPs “Security as a Service”, where the 
broker uses the knowledge base of Cloud attacks and behavioural profiles to identify threshold 
violations. The broker with its database server of signatures contains a black list, white list, and 
grey list.  
The black list contains signatures of traffic and behaviour blocked from the Cloud federation; 
the white list contains signatures of permitted actions; and the grey list is a local list to each C2 
that is used to store ambiguous observations with frequency of occurrence – the grey list is a 
function mapping signatures to beliefs. Publish-subscribe is used to propagate this information 
from the broker to adjacent C2s in order to reduce overhead and network latency.  
Publish-subscribe models have been widely for tasks such as event notification and mobility 
support services. Each subscriber maintains a local database that contains the latest values of 
each topic instance and can locally perform query operations without generating any network 
traffic. Using a data-centric approach decouples data sources and consumers: publishers and 
subscribers share the same data model for data (topics) and can build distributed architectures 
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where the local application logic is decoupled from the data model. In the context of 
collaborative intrusion detection, when a participant detects a possible attack in its monitored 
sub-network, it generates an alert, which is reported to the higher entity which is known as 
subscription [99].  
When queried with a belief value about suspect actions, the broker invokes a global poll 
procedure when a decision cannot be made. The broker then queries the C2s in adjacent 
domains, and asks them to generate their own beliefs based on the presented information. They 
check their local grey lists to see if they have encountered the suspect actions previously. Each 
C2 generates their own belief, and the broker uses D-S to fuse the different beliefs and to create 
a system wide decision. 
This collaborative approach and sharing of information in turn can improve resilience to attack, 
as within Cloud federations, system vulnerability Vs is increased due to the interdependent 
services and multi tenants. Additionally, the data and services stored may have high availability 
requirements. Within a system s, vulnerability V is the maximum vulnerability level over a set 
of scenarios represented by 𝐷: 
𝑉𝑠 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑉(𝐷))          (4.16) 
Whereby, scenario vulnerability is defined by: 
  𝑉(𝐷) = {𝑉(𝑑1), 𝑉(𝑑2) … … , 𝑉(𝑑𝐾)}   (4.17) 
Where 𝐾 is the number of scenarios to be evaluated; and d is an individual scenario. 
The vulnerability of a scenario 𝑉(𝑑) through an access point is evaluated to determine its 
potential damage using the weighted sum of the potential damages over a set 𝑢. Liu [143] 
describes scenario vulnerability as: 
 𝑉(𝑑) = ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝛾𝑗𝑗∈𝑢                        (4.18) 
Here, 𝜋𝑗  is the steady state probability that the system is attacked through a specific access 
point 𝑗  which is linked to the system [143]. The damage factor 𝛾𝑗  represents the level of 
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damage on the system if the service is removed, and in the case of critical infrastructure data, 
this would be availability of data and services. The data range for this can differ depending on 
the scenario but for probability based approaches a value between 0 and 1, where 0 represents 
no vulnerability and 1 represents catastrophic failure, but these can be established with the use 
of risk logs or risk graph modelling. Within Cloud federations the benefits of resource 
balancing and sharing outweighs the potential vulnerabilities, but the concern is that a 
vulnerability could propagate throughout a federation based on the many access points 
identified in equation 4.11. 
The Cloud broker is an elastic scaling mechanism, but for the purposes of diagrams and testing 
there is one broker within explanations. In the real world one broker would be a single point of 
failure. As such, there would be multiple brokers which would sit behind a load balancer, 
sharing a repository of information, and using the resources of the Cloud to adapt to workload 
changes by provisioning and de-provisioning resources in an autonomic manner. 
4.4  Collaboration 
The size of the IDS is limited by its fixed number of components. As the number of monitored 
entities grows, the analysis components will need more computing and storage resources to 
keep up with the load. A distributed IDS can scale to a larger number of hosts by adding 
components as needed. Scalability may be limited by the need to communicate between the 
components, and by the existence of central coordination components. Distributed 
collaboration among heterogeneous components within and across independent domains has 
been indicated in recent literature [48], [63], [99], [113], [134], [144]. Collaboration among 
agents in agent-based systems is commonplace, but applying this information exchange could 
lead to increased situational awareness in interconnected infrastructures. 
The cooperation of threat knowledge, both known attacks and unknown threats, among peers 
within the enterprise network or with other CSPs will contribute to better incident detection 
and prevention, enhancing Cloud security and providing more effective incident response 
[145]. Information sharing in this approach is autonomous, which is conceived to be an 
important aspect of this approach. Collaboration among CSPs in the federated Cloud could 
offer holistic security to those CSPs in this agreement.  
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Decision making processes involve differing hierarchical structures, and varying roles for the 
members within. The organisation of such structures varies widely, but each has been 
considered greatly for our solution. The democratic-style and centralised-style both have 
merits, as such has been determined that a combination of both would be the most beneficial 
and meet the design requirements in Chapter 3.5. In a democratic-centralised-style structure 
there is a leader member who relies upon the other members for information when making a 
decision.  
This hierarchical communication schema is conveyed in Figure 4-5, which outlines how 
detection and correlation elements would communicate. Within such an approach, data is 
distributed, which may make it more difficult to adjust to global changes in behaviour, whereas 
local changes are easier to detect. The subordinate organisation members have limited power 
in the decision-making process but interact with each other fully. Information exchange is more 
structured and timely following this approach. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Hierarchical communication schema 
Figure 4-5 shows how detection elements and correlation handlers work with regards to the 
entities presented within the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection architecture. 
Figures 4-2 – 4-5 show the execution of the workflow and present the flow of information 
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within the structural design. Detection elements consist of several detection components which 
monitor their own sub-network or host individually and generate low level alerts. Then the 
correlation handler transforms the low level alerts into a high level report of an attack [86]. The 
biggest challenge in employing a sampling algorithm on a given network is scalability. For 
intrusion detection algorithms, sampling costs are of paramount importance. Within our 
approach, the communication architecture takes this into consideration and uses levels of 
hierarchy for information sharing conveyed in Figure 4-5. The generation of alerts has to 
exceed an expected threshold before this information is passed upwards to a superior attribute 
in the scheme.  
Figure 4-6 visualises the levels of communication occurring between each entity in our 
solution. The hierarchical structure within our solution conveys how key entities exchange 
information with one another, and how the information flows. For illustration purposes, a small 
scale of entities is used but there can be more than one C2 within each domain — the 
relationship between SNs and MNs is as described in Chapters 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. The solution 
can scale considerably and based on the democratic-centralised communication style, entities 
can be added with ease to their role. 
 
Figure 4-5: Levels of communication 
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4.5  Belief generation using Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 
For collaborative intrusion detection, an extended D-S fusion algorithm is utilised. Via the 
broker, D-S executes as a main fusion node, an entity with the role to collect and fuse the 
information provided by the monitors, taking the final decision regarding a possible attack. In 
the decision making process, the uncertainty existing in the network often leads to the failure 
of intrusion detection or low detection rate. The D-S theory of evidence in data fusion has 
solved the problem of how to analyse the uncertainty in a quantitative way [146]. 
The key attributes of D-S theory of evidence include: 
The frame of discernment: 
The frame of discernment is a completable set which describes all the sets in the hypothesis 
space. Generally, the frame is denoted as θ, which is similar to a state space in probability 
[129]. The elements in the frame must be mutually exclusive, and while the number of the 
elements is 𝑛, the space will be 2n.  
Basic probability assignment: 
BPA is a positive number between 0 and 1, and exists in the form of probability. For a particular 
event 𝐴  in 2θ  (which is the hypothesis space), 𝑚(𝐴)  characterises the degree of BPA 
supporting or refuting evidence. 
Belief function: 
For 2θ ∈ [0,1], 
Since 𝑚(𝐴) measures the belief that one commits to the set 𝐴 exactly and not to any proper 
subset of 𝐴, to obtain the total belief committed to 𝐴, one must add to 𝑚(𝐴) the quantities 
𝑚(𝐵)  for all proper subsets 𝐵  of 𝐴 . Given a mass function 𝑚 , a belief measure and a 
plausibility measure can be uniquely determined to obtain a total BPA committed to a particular 
proposition. The belief function 𝐵𝑒𝑙 is defined as [128]: 
Bel(A) = ∑ m(B)B⊆A      (4.19) 
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where all 𝐵 ⊆ 𝐴;  𝐴 ∈  2θ . 𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝐴)  indicates the total evidence or belief that the element 
belongs to the set 𝐴 (𝑥 ∈ 𝐴) as well as to the various subsets of 𝐴. 
Plausibility function: 
The plausibility Pl(A) is the sum of all the masses of the sets B that intersect the set of interest 
A: 
𝑝𝑙(𝐴) =  ∑ 𝑚(𝐵)𝐵|𝐵∩𝐴≠∅     (4.20) 
The belief function and plausibility function are related by Bel(A) ≤ Pl(A). This is as D-S 
allows for belief about propositions to be represented as intervals, bounded by two values, 
belief (or support) and plausibility. Then calling [Bel(A), Pl(A)] the Belief Range. 𝑃𝑙(𝐴) is the 
mass of A and the mass of all sets that intersect with A, i.e. those that could transfer their mass 
to A or a subset of A [108].   
Belief generation:  
For pre-emptive warning, beliefs are generated and assigned to all subsets of possible outcomes 
based on the established CUSUM thresholds defined using equation 4.8.   
Based on an occurrence and monitored value 𝑥𝑖  at time 𝑡 , a belief is assigned with the 
information: 
Bel(ID, timestamp, BPA)    (4.21) 
Where:  
 Bel: contains all the information associated to the observed occurrence 
 ID: is a unique identifier to 𝑥𝑖  
 timestamp: corresponds to time 𝑡 
 BPA: is a value from 0 to 1 - the associated hypothesis sets are within the Table 4.2. 
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Mass, Belief and Plausibility based on the equations 4.19 and 4.20 are presented. Belief in a 
hypothesis is comprised by the sum of the masses of all sets enclosed by it. A belief measures 
the strength of the evidence in favour of a proposition 𝑝 , ranging from 0 (indicating no 
evidence) to 1 (denoting certainty). Plausibility is 1 minus the sum of the masses of all sets 
whose intersection with the hypothesis is empty. Or, it can be obtained as the sum of the masses 
of all sets whose intersection with the hypothesis is not empty. The universal hypothesis 
“Either” will always have a belief and plausibility assignment of 1.0 (having 100% belief and 
plausibility) because this value is always true. For simulation purposes in Chapter 5, threat 
values associated with each belief value are included also, and these reflect the range from 0-
100 correlating with belief values between 0 and 1. 
Table 4.2: Hypothesis sets of values for Belief values between 0 and 1. 
Threat Value Hypothesis Mass Belief Plausibility Belief Value 
100 Attack 1.0 1.0 1.0  
1.0  No Attack 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Either 0.0 1.0 1.0 
      
90-99 Attack 0.9 0.9 0.95  
0.9  No Attack 0.05 0.05 0.1 
 Either 0.05 1.0 1.0 
      
80-89 Attack 0.8 0.8 0.9  
0.8  No Attack 0.1 0.1 0.2 
 Either 0.1 1.0 1.0 
      
70-79 Attack 0.7 0.7 0.8  
0.7  No Attack 0.2 0.2 0.3 
 Either 0.1 1.0 1.0 
      
60-69 Attack 0.6 0.6 0.7  
0.6  No Attack 0.3 0.3 0.4 
 Either 0.1 1.0 1.0 
      
50-59 Attack 0.5 0.5 0.7  
0.5  No Attack 0.3 0.3 0.5 
 Either 0.2 1.0 1.0 
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40-49 Attack 0.4 0.4 0.6  
0.4  No Attack 0.4 0.4 0.6 
 Either 0.2 1.0 1.0 
      
30-39 Attack 0.3 0.3 0.4  
0.3  No Attack 0.6 0.6 0.7 
 Either 0.1 1.0 1.0 
      
20-29 Attack 0.2 0.2 0.7  
0.2  No Attack 0.3 0.3 0.8 
 Either 0.5 1.0 1.0 
      
10-19 Attack 0.1 0.1 0.4  
0.1  No Attack 0.6 0.6 0.9 
 Either 0.3 1.0 1.0 
      
0-9 Attack 0.0 0.0 0.5  
0.0  No Attack 0.5 0.5 0.0 
 Either 0.5 1.0 1.0 
 
Using equations 4.1 – 4.8, threshold calculation algorithms such as CUSUM and EWMA are 
used to determine when a local threshold has been violated. As described Chapter in 4.3.2 – 
4.3.4, belief generation occurs and this information is propagated to the relevant monitoring 
entities.  
Based on the assigned threat score, the associated hypothesis sets are associated. Within an 
intrusion detection based system that monitors the underlying virtualised infrastructure, there 
are four clear variables that would involve detecting violations. These variables would have a 
BPA of { }, {attack}, {no attack}, and {attack, no attack}. { } represents an empty subset with 
a value of 0, that corresponds to “no solution”. Whereas {attack, no attack} represents 
uncertainty, i.e. it could be either.  
The monitors, based on the local detection algorithms, produce a single belief for each focal 
element and these would identify violations of local thresholds: 
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 ba:  {attack}- threat value in the range of 0.7-1.0 
 bn:  {no attack}- threat value in the range of 0-0.3 
 bna: {attack, no attack}- threat value in the range of 0.4-0.6 
 
D-S combination rule: 
D-S utilises orthogonal sum to combine the evidences, where ⨁ is the combination operator 
[129]. The belief functions are defined, describing the belief in a hypothesis 𝐴 , as 
Bel1(A), Bel2(A); then the belief function after the combination is defined as: 
 Bel(A) = Bel1(A)⨁Bel2(A)     (4.22) 
The mass function after the combination can be formulated as: 
m(A) = DSK−1. ∑ m1(Ai)Ai∩Bi=A m2(Bj)      (4.23) 
Here, 𝐷𝑆𝐾 is the Orthogonal Coefficient, and it is defined as: 
DSK = ∑ m1(Ai)Ai∩Bi≠∅ m2(Bj)    (4.24) 
D-S combines the beliefs expressed by monitors to produce a single combined belief that is 
finally compared with a set accumulative sum 𝑞 of beliefs. If the combined belief is greater 
than 𝑞, an alarm is raised as this would indicate an attack [120]. If the output of a local detection 
algorithm is close to ℎ, where ℎ is the detection threshold, 𝑏𝑛𝑎 increases to express a higher 
belief on the uncertainty of an attack or normal operation.  
D-S proposes the concepts: belief and plausibility, which can aid the theory to analyse the 
“incomplete” or “missing” information quantitatively. In this way, the inference can guarantee 
the accuracy of the decision. Evidence is fused to reach the goal that can determine the current 
state of the network. A further step could include fitting time distribution curves, and this can 
improve detection engine efficiency and applicability [129]. D-S’s theory of evidence can be 
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regarded as the expansion of Bayesian inference, whereas Bayes requires priori knowledge as 
the foundation of inference.  
Fusing beliefs based on equation 4.22, with reference to Table 4.2 conveys how belief, mass, 
plausibility and threat values could aid collaborative intrusion detection.  
Scaling equation 4.22 to consider more beliefs would be represented by:  
Bel(A) = Bel1(A)⨁Bel2(A)⨁Bel3(A)    (4.25) 
Examples of the scaling of this algorithm to perform equation 4.25 are as below:  
Take three monitor values - m1, m2 and m3. 
The belief that the proposition is true for state Attack which is 0.8 and the values for m1 No 
Attack = 0.1 with m1 Either = 0.1 
Assessments m2 and m3 have the belief values with m2 Attack = 0.6, m2 No Attack = 0.3 and 
m2({Either}) = 0.1 
m3  associated values include Attack = 0.0, m3 No Attack = 0.5 with m3 Either = 0.5  
Based on equation 4.23, the mass function after the combination can be formulated as: 
m1,2,3(A) = (1/1-K) m1({Either})m2({Either}) m3({Either}) with: 
DSK = m1({Attack}) m2({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m2({Attack}) + m1({Attack}) 
m3({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m3({Attack}) + m2({Attack}) m3({No Attack}) + m2({No 
Attack}) m3({Attack}) = 0.8*0.3 + 0.1*0.6 + 0.8*0.5 + 0.1*0.0 + 0.6*0.5 + 0.3*0.0 = 1 
So m1,2,3(A) = (1/1-1) *0.1*0.1*0.5 =  n/a - cannot divide by 0 
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A further example would be: three monitor values - m1, m2 and m3. 
The belief that the proposition is true for state Attack which is 0.5 i.e. m1 Attack = 0.5 and 
similarly m1 No Attack = 0.1 with m1 Either = 0.1 
Assessments m2 and m3 have the belief values Attack = 0.6, m2 No Attack = 0.3 with m2 Either 
= 0.1 
m3  associated values include Attack = 0.9, m3 No Attack = 0.05 with m3 Either = 0.05  
Based on equation 4.23, the mass function after the combination can be formulated as: 
m1,2,3(A) = (1/1-K) m1({Either})m2({Either}) m3({Either}) with: 
DSK = m1({Attack}) m2({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m2({Attack}) + m1({Attack}) 
m3({No Attack}) + m1({No Attack}) m3({Attack}) + m2({Attack}) m3({No Attack}) + m2({No 
Attack}) m3({Attack}) = 0.5*0.3 + 0.1*0.6 + 0.5*0.05 + 0.1*0.9 + 0.6*0.05 + 0.3*0.9 = 0.63 
So m1,2,3(A) = (1/1-0.63) *0.1*0.1*0.05 = 0.001351 
 
4.6  Extended D-S theory of evidence fusion process  
Assume two BPAs 𝑚𝑎 and 𝑚𝑏 represent the beliefs about values of a state within a specific 
frame 𝜃. The use of the orthogonal coefficient in Equation 4.23 and normalisation in Equation 
4.24 conveys that Dempster’s rule is mathematically possible only if 𝑚𝑎 and 𝑚𝑏  are not 
conflicting, i.e. if there is a focal element 𝑦 of 𝑚𝑎 and a focal element 𝑧 of 𝑚𝑏 satisfying the 
intersection (∩) of the two sets, (𝑦 ∩ 𝑧) ≠  ∅, such that they have no elements in common.  
Merging two belief masses with the conjunctive rule defined above produces a sub-additive 
basic belief assignment, meaning that the sum of belief masses on focal elements can be less 
than one, in which case it is assumed that the missing or complement belief mass gets assigned 
to the empty set. If desirable, the normality assumption m(∅) = 0 can be recovered by dividing 
each belief mass by a normalization coefficient [147]. 
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This rule is associative, and the normalisation in D-S’s rule redistributes conflicting belief 
masses to non-conflicting ones, and tends to eliminate any conflicting characteristics in the 
resulting belief mass distribution. This rule of combination can be applied to avoid this 
particular problem by allowing all conflicting belief masses to be allocated to the empty set. 
For rule combination, the order of the information in the aggregated evidences does not impact 
the result, however a non-associative combination is necessary for many cases. 
Cooperative decision making is made after aggregating these evidences using D-S. The 
integration of the decisions coming from different IDSs has emerged as a technique that could 
strengthen the final decision. Sensor fusion can be defined as the process of collecting 
information from multiple and possibly heterogeneous sources and combining them to obtain 
a more descriptive, intuitive and meaningful result [53]. However, rule combination implies all 
evidences are trusted equally and that all sources have the same level of trust. However, in 
reality, the trust on different evidences may differ, which means various factors for each 
evidence should be considered.  
Based on the identified limitations of the normalisation stage and weighted belief generation, 
D-S for autonomous sharing of information for detecting intrusions has application limitations 
as explained in Chapter 3.8. D-S when applied in an autonomous collaborative environment 
should apply a weight of confidence when the belief generation occurs. If there are three CSPs 
and one generates belief of an attack with a value of Ba 0.7, while the two remaining CSPs vote 
Bna 0.5, based on the D-S combination in Equation 4.25, the combined decision would be that 
there is no attack.  
The issue here is that the CSP that generated the belief of attack can see there is clearly evidence 
of an attack but this value has been deemed legitimate. There should be a way to overrule the 
decision based on the strength of the associated trust or confidence value associated with the 
decision, or to deal with it locally but to warn globally of the pre-emptive threat.  
This situation requires a two stage fusion process. Post belief generation processing is needed 
for application to this area to facilitate information exchange for defence. Via the inclusion of 
confidence values when belief generation occurs, the accuracy of decisions can be improved. 
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate how D-S can provide collaborative intrusion detection, however 
there may be cases where the decision may be inaccurate. 
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When fusing the beliefs the group consensus may be that it is not an attack, but it would be 
illogical for the domain of origin to not take action against the malicious occurrence. It could 
be an attack to the domain that generated the belief, but one that is not currently exceeding 
thresholds in other domains. While it is an issue in one, the others deem it not something 
currently applicable to them.  
With the extended D-S theory of evidence fusion process, the CSP would deal with the threat 
locally if the domain is under attack, based on confidence values if there are conflicting 
decisions. 
Let 𝑃(𝑎) = [𝑃1
(𝑎) … 𝑃𝐾𝑎
(𝑎)] denote the 𝐾𝑎 possible confidence values G associated with choosing 
𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 at time 𝑡𝑑.  
The assigned confidence level 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃(𝑎) associated with deciding 𝑎 after waiting for a period 
of 𝑡𝑐 =  𝑡𝑑 +  𝜏 is given as [148]: 
𝑝 = 𝑃1
(𝑎)
 when 𝐿(𝑡𝑐) ∈ [𝐺𝑖−1,
(𝑎) 𝐺𝑖
(𝑎)],    (4.26) 
where 𝐺0
(𝑎) =  − ∞ and 𝐺𝐾𝑎
(𝑎)
 = ∞  for each 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 , and the value 𝜏  is known as the inter-
judgement time.  
The remaining confidence parameters:  
𝐺(𝑎) = [𝐺1
(𝑎) … 𝐺𝐾𝑎−1
(𝑎) ] 
are chosen such that 𝐺𝑖−1<𝐺𝑖 for each 𝑖 ∈ {1 … … , 𝐾𝑎 − 1}. 
 
Adding a degree of confidence to each generated belief can improve the overall efficiency, and 
deal with the issue of conflicting beliefs during fusion. Pre-emptive warning in a Cloud 
federation could protect the local services of the CSP but proactively warn others of the 
potential threat.  
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If the fused decision is “No Attack” but the belief of origin has a high confidence value, then 
the domain of origin would take action against the suspect observation and send the belief value 
to the broker to store in its local Grey list. Should an adjacent CSP query the broker regarding 
the suspect IP in the future, the information from the origin CSP is present. 
4.7  Summary 
In this chapter, the design of the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection solution is 
presented; a collaborative intrusion detection framework that can detect and prevent intrusions 
in Cloud federations and/or collaborative domains in real-time via the autonomous sharing of 
information. This features a novel application of the D-S theory of evidence algorithm to detect 
intrusions and fuse generated beliefs for collaborative intrusion detection, and an extension of 
D-S. The extended D-S approach aims to tackle the issue of conflicting decisions within 
interconnected infrastructure, but used in combination with other computing techniques has the 
ability to improve decision making schemas. 
Within the solution, the Cloud broker coordinates attack responses, both within the domain 
itself, and with other domains, and is facilitating inter-domain cooperation to improve upon the 
Cloud security contribution. This cooperation between CSPs ensures that the scalable defence 
required against DDoS attacks is carried out in an efficient way; aiming to improve the overall 
resilience of the interconnected infrastructure. The D-S theory of evidence is used to facilitate 
this autonomous sharing of information, and to fuse the generated beliefs to form a system-
wide decision. The design of the solution is tailorable to different Cloud environments and has 
ability to scale considerably. Comparing the solution for distributed systems could involve 
adapting the hierarchical C2/MN/SN structure to the working of master/slave architecture 
model of distributed computing architecture where the master node has unidirectional control 
over one or more slave nodes. In this instance, the task(s) are distributed by the master node to 
the configured slaves and the results are returned to the master node. Distributed systems and 
Cloud computing environments slightly refer to different things, however the underlying 
concept between them is same. In the next chapter, an implementation of this solution is 
presented and a scenario to simulate events for a proof of concept.  
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Chapter 5 
System Implementation 
In the previous chapter, the design of the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection 
architecture was presented; comprising four tiers; Cloud broker, C2, SNs and MNs. Using our 
“Security as a Service” method, collaborative intrusion detection is possible in a federated 
Cloud environment. The system uses a Cloud broker to propagate information to the C2 entities 
in each CSP domain – this is in the form of Black lists and White lists. MNs are used to observe 
changes or suspicious activities in local domains, which are values stored in a grey list of 
ambiguous observations. In order to keep communication latency reduced, SNs monitor the 
alerts produced by MN and an alert is generated when a threshold based on the number of MNs 
within their subnet is triggered. 
In order to evaluate the success of our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection 
framework, it is essential that a working implementation is used. This allows us to validate that 
our solutions meets the aims, objectives and requirements affiliated with this development. 
This chapter presents the implementation of a prototype of our Service-based collaborative 
intrusion detection framework for infrastructure services in a federated Cloud environment. 
The prototype enables the design presented in the previous chapter to be tested.  
Collaborative security between CSPs in a Cloud federation can offer holistic security to those 
in this scheme. Information sharing in this scheme is automated which is an important aspect 
of the approach. For proof of concept, a lower number of entities are used but for future work 
these will be expanded and the solution scaled. Dividing the system into domains makes the 
system more scalable, and belief generation and sharing of threat information could be used as 
a warning of an imminent attack. 
Assumptions made: 
 Each CSP present in the federation has an SLA specifying the sharing of information – 
in this case it is of generated belief values, threat scores, and suspect IP addresses. 
 Each entity has a level of trust and is not acting maliciously. 
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 Resource starvation and DDoS can propagate throughout the network; the performance 
issues are explored, not the financial implications. 
 
5.1  Environment 
Using Riverbed Modeler 18.0 [12], attributes of our Service-based collaborative intrusion 
detection architecture were implemented. Riverbed Modeler is a large and powerful software 
tool which enables the simulation of heterogeneous networks with various protocols. Riverbed 
Modeler consists of a high level user interface, which is constructed from C and C++ source 
code. One specific benefit of using this simulator is that all processes contain code to record 
performance metrics, which is favourable for observing both local and global statistics in our 
solution.  
Riverbed Modeler allows multiple scenarios to be created and compared during parallel 
simulation, enabling comparisons between changes in the environment. As previously 
mentioned, our federated Cloud environment can be represented as interconnected domains 
which are dependent upon each other for operation. One of the key issues with Cloud 
federations is that a fault within the network can propagate throughout the federation, effecting 
key services of the CSPs present, so collaborative intrusion detection can benefit all parties 
within the federation.  
The network topology for the solution was implemented using the Object Palette which has 
models, objects, and hardware ready for deployment; an empty scenario was created and 
populated with the required devices and objects. Within the network, CSPs are represented by 
interdependent domains named “Server Domain”, “Domain 1”, “Domain 2”, “Domain 3”, and 
“Broker”, which are all connected to “node_0” which represents an IP Cloud connection. Each 
of these CSPs is connected to sub-networks which contain the end users, routers and servers 
necessary for the network topology. Hierarchy in a network topology is achieved using subnets 
— which represent identical constructs in an actual network — allowing us to simulate end 
users of the CSP, and how malicious actions from one could affect the interconnected domains. 
These entities are connected via PPP_DS3 links which are used to connect nodes running IP 
protocols, as conveyed in Figure 5-1. The background is not a geographical representation but 
is a standard image used within the simulation package. 
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Figure 5-1: Overview of Cloud Federation topology 
The Cyber Effects configuration module provided within Riverbed Modeler was enabled and 
tailored to our scenario in order to introduce cyber effects and attacks into our scenarios – this 
is shown in Figure 5-2. The DDoS attack profile was utilised, in addition to cyber effect scripts 
and remedy profiles.  
 
Figure 5-2: Cyber effects configuration 
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The Cloud broker, within the Broker realm, is depicted as an Ethernet workstation with cyber 
effects remedy profiles configured, which is interconnected within the federation. Figure 5-3 
illustrates this configuration. The broker sends information to the C2s in the adjacent domains 
when it is necessary to scan and clean the network. 
 
Figure 5-3: Cloud broker realm 
Within each sub-network in the federation there are end users which can access the Cloud 
resources. Within each realm a C2 is present and they monitor the devices within their subnet. 
These devices represent legitimate users, and each of these devices has a range of infection 
probabilities when the simulation is running.  
 
Figure 5-4: CSP 2 domain 
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These workstations are connected to a domain server and a gateway router, which are then 
connected to the Cloud IP in the main federation. These connections are illustrated in Figures 
5-4 and 5-5. 
 
Figure 5-5: CSP 3 domain 
Within the network an attacker entity was introduced. In order to determine the effects of a 
DDoS attack within the federation, the cascading effects an attacker within the network would 
have on the other devices present was modelled.  
The attacker domain is illustrated in Figure 5-6. The attacker has an attack profile — DDoS 
attack — which is configured to start between 100 and 110 seconds into the simulation. When 
the attack begins a script is sent to all nodes within the federation with the cyber effects profiles 
enabled (in this case it is workstations within each sub-network), in an attempt to infect the 
devices. A message is returned back to the attacker indicating whether the infection was 
successful or not, as a code excerpt shows in Figure 5-7.  
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Figure 5-6: CSP 1/Attacker Realm 
 
 
Figure 5-7: Return infection status code excerpt 
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Once this occurs, another script is sent to the infected nodes to start sending traffic to the server 
in an attempt to flood this node with traffic, affecting availability of the device as shown in 
Figure 5-8.  
 
Figure 5-8: Send traffic to destination code excerpt 
The server has been set with an IP address of 192.102.100.1, so this is where the infected 
devices would send their requests. The attributes of these attack parameters can be changed by 
modifying the device attributes, or adding profiles into the cyber effects configuration manager. 
Currently the characteristics for the server are that it has an infection probability of 80%; this 
parameter can be adjusted throughout to compare the effects within the network, as illustrated 
in Figure 5.9. The server under attack domain is shown in Figure 5-10.  
 
 
Figure 5-9: Infection probability adjustment 
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Figure 5-10: Server under attack domain 
The broker node has a remedy profile configured, and this profile is also present with the C2s 
in adjacent domains. The “Scan and Clean” script scans the network for infected devices and 
cleans them, reducing the amount of traffic being sent to the Server – as shown in Figure 5-11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Scan and clean script excerpt 
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Those nodes that are successfully cleaned will stop attacking the Server, and regain normal 
operations within the federation. Through the Discrete Event Simulation (DES) the infected 
device count can be analysed and visualised via the use of graphs.  
From Figure 5-12, an exploratory phase where the attacker is scanning the network can be seen, 
followed by a large spike in infected devices, and then there is a gradual decrease in infected 
devices once the cleaning phase has initiated, leading to a complete cleanse occurring by the 
11 minutes 45 second mark. This occurs due to the cyber effects script which sends and receives 
confirmation of device infection, then device cleaning.  
 
 
Figure 5-12: Infected Devices Count 
While Figure 5-12 shows how the infected devices count fluctuates during the DES, statistics 
collected on the infected devices are presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Cyber effects infected devices count 
Zone 0 
Statistic Cyber Effects Infected Devices Count 
Length 117 
Number of values 117 
Horizontal, min     0 
Horizontal, max 706.64 
Vertical, min 0 
Vertical, max 32 
Initial value 0.0 
Final value 1.0 
Expected value 24.33 
Sample mean 8.75 
Variance 110.20 
Standard deviation 10.49 
 
Figure 5-13 illustrates the ethernet delay that occurs during the scanning and cleaning of the 
Cloud federation. Note that the spike in delay occurs two minutes into the simulation which is 
when the DDoS attack begins. Ethernet delay within the federation is evidently affected by the 
scanning and cleaning of the network during infection, and the abuse of resources as the attack 
uses devices within the networks.  
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Figure 5-13: Ethernet delay within Cloud federation 
5.2  Co-simulating scenarios 
The links between critical infrastructures can be either dependent or interdependent. 
Dependency is a unidirectional relationship whereas interdependency is a bidirectional 
relationship where the capabilities of one infrastructure influence the state of another [149]. In 
the case of Cloud federations, it could be argued that both of these relationships are evident, 
but for the purpose of simulation the focus is on bidirectional interdependency. Each of the 
CSPs need to be robust and resilient to random or unplanned faults/attacks, and keep the effects 
of cascading failure in an interdependent network to a minimum.  
In order to show proof of concept, a normal scenario of a federated Cloud environment was 
implemented, and then compared to the same environment under duress. One of the CSPs 
within the federation was flooded with traffic, which would cause the associated SN to generate 
a belief that there is an attack underway.  
Figure 5-14 illustrates the co-simulation of the single monitoring entity (Broker without C2s 
monitoring their subnets) vs our hierarchical structure (Broker and C2s). It is important to 
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analyse the effects of the monitoring entities on the network performance, and also the 
hierarchical structure that is adopted.  
Riverbed Modeler 18.0 facilitates this by performing co-simulation of two scenarios and allows 
the user to select comparative metrics.  
 
Figure 5-14: Co simulation of single monitoring entity vs hierarchical structure 
 
Within Figure 5-14, the DES manager shows how there are two scenarios that will be run under 
the same simulation conditions but have been adjusted to test differing architectures. Two 
scenarios, run in parallel, will compare how they react and are affected by the attacker within 
the network, and react to the attack via scanning/cleaning/communicating with the monitoring 
entities. The co-simulation measured the effects of having one single monitoring entity on the 
network (one central C2 with the responsibility of monitoring the whole network), compared 
to having a more hierarchical based approach whereby there were C2s throughout the 
federation in adjacent domains with defined roles and responsibilities.  
Figure 5-15 shows the Ethernet delay in comparison to the two scenarios within the simulated 
environment. With the communication structure adopted, the Ethernet delay was greatly 
affected by the Broker and C2s due to the increased communications, in comparison to the 
single monitoring entity.  
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Figure 5-15: Ethernet delay comparison of co-simulation of single monitoring entity vs hierarchical structure 
 
As the parameters of the attack were the same and how the monitoring structure was affected 
was a focus, it was evident how the attack propagated and targeted the server. The threshold 
for the scenarios was determined by running the scenario number of runs necessary to achieve 
a good estimate of a confidence level and the set of parameters that reflected the behaviour of 
the system. Device infection probability was set to 80%, and the infected devices were set to 
flood IP 192.102.100.1 (which is the server in the Server domain in both scenarios). The server 
is set to an availability percentage of 90%, which corresponds to a SLA level of 90 % 
uptime/availability. 
Figure 5-16 shows how the traffic against the server increased with the Broker and C2s 
architecture, as opposed to one C2, due to the increase in entities within the scenario. 
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Figure 5-16: Ethernet traffic against Server 
In contrast, as shown in Figure 5-16, the Server under attack receives less traffic with the single 
monitoring entity compared to our hierarchical structure. The statistics from the co-simulation 
are detailed in Table 5.2. Introducing the hierarchical monitoring via splitting the C2s into the 
differing domains allows the C2s to scan and remedy the device infections as they would notice 
these deviations quicker as they are closer to the sources.  
Table 5.2: Comparison of Server statistics in co-simulation 
 Latest Version-Broker and C2s-DES-1: 
Server Domain.Server 
Realm.Server.Ethernet.Traffic Received 
(packets/sec) 
Latest Version-Broker without C2s 
monitoring their subnets-DES-1: Server 
Domain.Server 
Realm.Server.Ethernet.Traffic Received 
(packets/sec) 
Length 29 29 
Number of values 29 29 
Horizontal, min: 0 0 
Horizontal, max:  1008 1008 
Vertical, min: 0.083 0.083 
Vertical, max: 2,939.88 2,710.11 
Initial value: 0.08 0.08 
Final value:  3.67 13.06 
Expected value: 435.07 414.02 
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Sample mean: 435.07 414.02 
Variance:  947,150.32 838,386.17 
Standard 
deviation: 
973.22 915.64 
 
Looking at the comparison of the server statistics in Table 5.2, there is a large standard 
deviation in both scenarios. As the server was under attack it is understandable that the statistics 
would be intensified but the DES provides a rudimentary analysis for the device. 
At this stage of the simulation, the main purposes were to analyse: 
 The role a broker could have with autonomous sharing of information 
 The role of a single monitoring entity on the entire federation vs the C2s monitoring 
their own sub domains 
 How an attack within a Cloud federation could affect the interdependent services 
present 
 The associated throughput and delay 
 What the DDoS attack effects are on the server. 
Note: determining the role of monitoring entities on the federation is very much dependent on 
the scale of the federation concerned. The scale of the simulated federation explores this matter, 
but may not be appropriate in answering the question in general due to resource constraints. 
5.3  Collaborative intrusion detection application 
Next, the actions to be taken in the simulation, from the point where an intrusion is believed to 
have been detected are shown. The integration of the decisions coming from different IDSs has 
emerged as a technique that could strengthen the final decision. Sensor fusion can be defined 
as the process of collecting information from multiple and possibly heterogeneous sources and 
combining them to obtain a more descriptive, intuitive and meaningful result [57]. Related 
work in the field of sensor fusion has been carried out mainly with one of the methods like 
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probability theory, evidence theory, voting fusion theory, fuzzy logic theory, or neural network 
theory in order to aggregate information.  
A major concern on studying information in a distributed system containing autonomous 
entities is how to model an adversarial threat. Most traditional solutions have a common 
assumption that all entities are well disciplined to follow the protocol properly, with the only 
exception that an adversary may keep a record of all intermediate computation. It is difficult to 
determine if an entity has the capability to change its input database or deviate from the protocol 
in real world applications. Anomaly-based IDSs detect anomalies beyond a set threshold level 
in the features they detect, whereas using threshold bounds gives more freedom in steering 
system properties. Any threshold within the bounds can be chosen depending on the preferred 
level of trade-off between detection and false alarm rates.   
Figure 5-17 shows the runtime flowchart of our D-S fusion proof of concept which runs from 
the point where a belief is generated about an observation. Implemented in C#, belief 
generation and data fusion by the broker is conveyed, in addition to hypothesis tables and 
associated belief information, i.e. belief value, mass, and plausibility. The flowchart is from 
the perspective of a suspicious observation within a domain. When the program runs you 
initially identify the domain you currently reside in, then enter an IP address. Based on the 
entered value the program checks the entered value against the domain white, black, and grey 
lists to determine if a value is known. If the value is on the white list then access is granted. If 
the value is on the black list then access is denied. If the value is presently on a grey list then 
the threat level is incremented, the associated value associated is returned, and if the value is 
more than or equal to a defined threshold (in our simulation this value is 70), this information 
is passed to the C2. 
The C2 receives a query and associated belief hypothesis from the SN, and queries the Broker 
with this information. The broker checks if it possess information on the value and returns the 
stored information to the C2 if present. Otherwise, the broker queries C2s in other domains to 
check their grey lists and return a BPA based on their stored value, return a BPA based on the 
queried value. The broker fuses the generated beliefs and makes a system decision – relevant 
lists are updated based on the score.  
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Figure 5-17: Runtime flowchart 
121 
Our implementation of our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection methodology has 
three stages. For proof of concept, a lower number of entities are used to convey how 
communication occurs and the information would be exchanged within the infrastructure; 
future work would involve expanding this solution to cope with a larger scale.  
Stages 1-3 
Initially, the user is prompted to identify which C2 domain they are present in. Then an IP 
address is entered into the program and the value is compared to the Black list, Grey list and 
White list to see if the value is present. The actions are as below: 
 
 
Figure 5-18: Enter Domain and IP address 
 
Stage 1 - Value on Black list 
When compared against the lists, if the IP address is in the Black list then the user is ‘Blocked’. 
 
Figure 5-19: Blocked user key return 
Stage 2 - Value on White list 
The IP is entered and the value is compared against the lists. If the IP address is present on the 
White list then the user is ‘Permitted Access’. The console outputs the other values from the 
white list, and this is also a separate file that can be viewed.  
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Figure 5-20: Value on white list 
Stage 3 - Value on Grey list 
If not present on either list, the value is stored in the Grey list and given a threat value (randomly 
generated numbers were used to determine this value – then the predefined threshold values to 
determine its location on the list) which are used to form the belief. Hypothesis sets based on 
all values between 0 and 1 are included within the program, as well as associated mass values 
and plausibility functions – these can be found in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4.5.  
 
Figure 5-21: Threat value ranges 
Figure 5-21 shows the threat value ranges used, and the ability to increase/decrease the 
associated risk due to occurrences on the list is also an option. Figure 5-22 shows the associated 
outputs to the console depending upon the assigned score. The threat ranges used are based on 
a maximum value of 100 and a minimum value of 0, and have been defined based on typical 
grading criteria. Increased occurrences could cause the risk score to increase, e.g. beginning on 
the white list, moving to the grey list, but then being promoted to the black list.  
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Figure 5-22: IP assigned to list depending on the range of score 
In Figure 5-23, a user has a threat score of 30. This user has been added to the grey list with a 
low risk assigned to it. If this IP address was to occur more frequently this assigned value could 
increase and this IP moved up the list. 
 
Figure 5-23: User added to grey list with low risk 
124 
For testing purposes a threshold of 70 was set to trigger belief generation and the associated 
hypothesis values output. In Figure 5-24, an entered IP has been assigned a threat score of 80 
as it is not presently on a list. 
 
Figure 5-24: Example hypothesis set generation for a threat score of 80 
This value is sent to the broker and compared against the Black and White lists, as this 
information may not have been published to the C2s within the federation. The broker then 
queries the adjacent monitoring entities and requests they generate a belief based on the original 
value.  Two examples of outputs from C2s are in the Figures 5-25 and 5-26 below.  
 
Figure 5-25: A belief generation of 0.6 
 
Figure 5-26: A belief generation of 0.0 
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The broker, using equation 4.25, takes the three belief values and fuses them together to make 
a system wide decision. Sample code for this is shown in Figure 5-27 below – all D-S proof of 
concept code is available in the Appendix: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Depending on the threshold established, this returned value would indicate if the belief is an 
attack or not an attack. This decision would be updated to the lists either white or black for 
each domain. Figure 5-28 illustrates belief fusion with an initial belief generation of 0.9, and 
the returned values from the CSPs in other domains. In Figure 5-29, belief combination occurs 
from an initial belief value of 0.7. 
 
Figure 5-27: D-S belief fusion code 
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Figure 5-28: D-S belief fusion from 3 CSPs 
 
 
Figure 5-29: D-S belief fusion from 3 CSPs 
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5.4   Summary 
This chapter has detailed the implementation of our Service-based collaborative intrusion 
detection solution and its subsequent attributes, as well as outlined how the collaborative 
intrusion detection is implemented. For proof of concept the attributes of our solution were 
simulated and the benefits and applicability of collaborative intrusion detection in federated 
Cloud environments illustrated. Application of D-S theory of evidence for collaborative 
intrusion detection has been implemented and its utilisation highlighted. The integration of the 
decisions coming from different IDSs has emerged as a technique that could strengthen the 
final decision. Federated Cloud environments are growing areas in terms of adoption by critical 
infrastructure vendors, and large corporations, so our “Security as a Service” facilitates this 
collaborative intrusion detection, and sharing of attack information among these different 
service providers. For simulation purposes an IP address as the indicator of suspicion was used 
but this is to demonstrate the application of the D-S algorithm for collaborative intrusion 
detection. Tailoring the methodology presented in Chapter 4 to include attack signatures or 
measurable profile information would expand the capabilities of our approach.
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Chapter 6 
Evaluation 
In the Chapter 5, the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework was presented, 
and collaborative intrusion in a federated Cloud environment was demonstrated. CSPs within 
a Cloud federation are represented as interconnected domains, and based on the monitoring 
structure, dynamically provision the infrastructure to react and facilitate autonomous sharing 
of threat information. This architecture relies on a four-tier detection strategy with the elastic 
Cloud facilitating inter-domain operation, the MNs and SNs reporting possible attacks in the 
domains, and the C2s collaboratively issuing a response via the involvement of the Cloud 
broker, and the D-S theory of evidence.  
Within this chapter the solution is evaluated against the initial aims and objectives identified 
in Chapter 1.2, the design requirements established in Chapter 3.5, and compared to other work 
within this area. Particularly, when assessing the performance of our solution in a federated 
Cloud environment, it is important to note that within the Cloud, resources are not a problem. 
Resources can complement the speed of our autonomous information sharing scheme, so it is 
more suitable looking at the effectiveness and accuracy of our novel approach. However, the 
associated delay is an important issue that cannot be ignored, particularly when the federation 
scale/size is large. DDoS attacks aim to starve Cloud resources, so while there are plenty, the 
designed solution needs to ensure it can still function when resources may be constrained due 
to an attack – fault tolerance is conceived to be an essential design requirement. 
The effectiveness of an IDS is assessed on how capable the detection method is at making 
correct attack detection. According to the real nature of a given event compared to a prediction, 
four possible outcomes are shown in Table 6.1. These outcomes are known as the IDPS reaction 
matrix.  
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Table 6.1: Possible status for an IDPS reaction 
 Predicted 
Normal Attack 
Actual 
Normal True negative (TN) False negative (FN) 
Attack False positive (FP) True positive (TP) 
 
TNs and TPs correspond to a correct IDS operation; that is, events are successfully labelled as 
normal and attack. FPs refer to normal events predicted as attacks, while FN are attacks 
incorrectly predicted as normal events [80]. Most of the systems reviewed used the same 
evaluation metrics such as the detection rate and false alarm rate. While it is important to note 
these evaluative metrics, our approach uses the algorithms presented in 4.3 – 4.7 to calculate 
thresholds, generate pre-alarms and beliefs, and to make a system-wide decision.  
Our aims and objectives are to identify the collaborative exchange of information as a key 
deliverable. Using equation 4.25 a system-wide decision is made about a possible attack, but 
the group consensus may not reflect the true nature of the domain of origin that generated the 
belief – in other words, whilst it may be possible to force an FP in one domain, testing for 
system-wide FP has proved problematic. This may be deemed as an FN locally, but using 
equation 4.25 the information was fused and this was the collaborative decision. To deal with 
these conflicting beliefs, our extended D-S fusion process was formulated to reduce the issue 
with conflicting belief fusion locally. 
A high FP rate that seriously affects the system’s performance can be detected, and an elevated 
FN rate leaves the system vulnerable to intrusions. Both FP and FN rates ought to be minimised, 
together with maximising TP and TN rates simultaneously. Based on Equations 6.1 – 6.6 and 
the reaction matrix, a possible status for IDPS reaction is shown to quantify IDS performance 
[80].  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑇𝑁𝑅) =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃
=
𝑛𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑛𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠
                           (6.1) 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑇𝑃𝑅) or Recall (R) =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
=  
𝑛𝑜.  𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑛𝑜.  𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
           (6.2) 
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𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝐹𝑃𝑅): 
𝐹𝑃
𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃
= 1 −
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑁
              (6.3) 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝐹𝑁𝑅): 
𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
                 (6.4) 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑁+𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑁+𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁+𝐹𝑃
                  (6.5) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
                   (6.6) 
There is a trade-off between the two metrics: precision and recall. As the number of detections 
increases by lowering of the threshold, the recall will increase, while precision is expected to 
decrease. The recall-precision characterisation of a particular IDS is normally used to analyse 
the relative and absolute performance of an IDS over a range of operating conditions. 
6.1   System evaluation 
As the purpose of a monitoring structure is to be non-intrusive the theoretical design 
requirement aimed to meet this objective. The role of the C2s, belief generation, fusion of 
beliefs, and facilitation of actions via the broker, and communication exchange between 
monitoring entities, have been implemented in a proof of concept program written in C# 
conveying the benefits of collaborative intrusion detection. The system is being evaluated in 
terms of satisfying the aims and objectives as defined in Chapter 1.2, and through successfully 
accomplishing the design requirements identified in Chapter 3.5 – which defined the 
characteristics that collaborative intrusion detection solutions for the Cloud environment must 
possess. 
Summary of aims and objectives fulfilment 
Our initial project aim was the design of a collaborative Cloud-based framework that focuses 
on the monitoring and protection of the critical infrastructure services in the Cloud computing 
environment having identified the limitations within existing intrusion detection techniques. 
This was achieved throughout Chapters 2 and 3 during which existing work was reviewed and 
compared with the recent advancements in technology to define the desired requirements (in 
Chapter 3.5). These were used to tailor and motivate the research direction which formed the 
base knowledge for establishing Chapter 4 in the application of our Service-based collaborative 
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intrusion detection framework, providing “Security as a Service” for Cloud federations. This 
also directed the utilisation and extension of D-S to facilitate collaborative intrusion detection 
via autonomous sharing of information. 
Placement of monitoring solutions within Cloud environments were explored, and while 
optimal placement was deemed the virtual network, the solution can be tailored to differing 
Cloud services. The methodological monitoring solution and the associated attributes can be 
tailored to a diverse range of service models as these may comprise similar functionality but 
can differ depending on the services needed. Additionally, the Service-based collaborative 
intrusion detection framework supports robustness to attack via a distributed mitigation 
architecture, making sure the high value processes continue to function regardless of what is 
occurring elsewhere. 
With regards to our project objectives, achievement of these will be detailed subsequently. Our 
key objective was the design of a critical infrastructure protection framework that focuses on 
the monitoring and protection of the critical infrastructure services in the Cloud computing 
environment. This has been achieved by the development of our Service-based collaborative 
intrusion detection framework for CSPs within a Cloud federation which is detailed in Chapter 
4, outlining architectural components and collaborative decision making techniques for 
intrusion detection. Through this, the objective for demonstrating a solution and technique that 
can effectively monitor Cloud domains and reliably help to secure and block threats has been 
met. This has been achieved by the development of a collaborative intrusion detection scheme 
whereby attributes can communicate and exchange threat information before it could propagate 
throughout the network. 
A further objective was to create a technique to analyse attack data in multiple domains and to 
reach a decision on its importance, as to whether an anomaly has occurred. This has been 
fulfilled with the application of D-S theory of evidence being used for belief generation by 
monitoring entities, and data fusion by the Cloud broker to facilitate collaborative intrusion 
detection. Limitations of the application of D-S were identified following assessment of 
whether the methods proposed, and/or the combinations of selected methods, effectively 
address the issue of infrastructure service protection in the Cloud environment via collaborative 
intrusion detection. This assessment allowed us to fulfil our objective and has been achieved 
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via the comparison of our extended D-S fusion process to the works of Lo et al., and a high 
level assessment using our design requirements in Chapter 3.5. 
Summary of design requirements evidence 
Table 6.2 details the requirements for collaborative intrusion detection in Cloud environments 
identified in Chapter 3.5 and highlights evidence of fulfilment for each associated attribute. 
These requirements define the characteristics that collaborative intrusion detection solutions 
for the Cloud environment must possess. These requirements can therefore be used to assess 
the suitability of existing solutions, help to ensure the success of the proposed solution, and 
provide a useful mechanism to evaluate the solution at a high level. 
Table 6.2: Design requirements evidence 
Design Requirements Evidence of fulfilment 
Accurate Evidenced by D-S fusion in Chapter 4.5 and 
experimentation in Chapter 5. 
Adaptable Evidenced by application of theory developed in Chapter 4 
to implementation in 4.3.  
Collaborative Evidenced by implementation in Chapter 5.1-5.3 and 
supported by architectural design in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 
Configurable Evidenced by implementation in Chapter 5 and supported 
by architectural design in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2. 
Dynamics Evidenced by algorithm selection in Chapters 4.3-4.6. 
Efficient Evidenced by experiments in Chapters 5.1-5.3. 
Graceful degradation of 
services 
Evidenced by experimental analysis in Chapters 5.1-5.3, 
and supported by theoretical analysis in Chapter 4. 
Low maintenance Evidenced by experimental analysis in Chapter 5.1-5.3, 
architectural design in Chapter 4.2, and theoretical analysis 
in Chapter 4.4. 
Lightweight Evidenced by architectural design in Chapters 4.1-4.2, and 
demonstrated in experimental analysis in Chapter 5. 
No prior knowledge Evidenced by experimental analysis in Chapter 5.3 and 
application of D-S in Chapters 4.5-4.7. 
Novel threats Evidenced by theoretical analysis in Chapter 4.2 and 
supported by algorithm design in Chapters 4.3-4.6. 
Reliable Evidenced by experiment analysis in Chapter 5.2, 
architectural design in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2, and choice of 
algorithms from Chapters 4.3-4.6. 
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Scalable Evidenced by experimental analysis in Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 
architectural design in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2, and choice of 
algorithms from Chapters 4.4-4.7. 
 
The Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework – “Security as a Service” was 
designed with fulfilment of these attributes in mind, in order to achieve the key characteristics 
identified within the literature. Due to the dynamic nature of the Cloud environment it must be 
able to adapt to changes that occur within the underlying virtualised infrastructure, with 
considerations to roles, functionality, and structure – which was evidenced by application of 
theory developed in Chapter 4 and architectural implementation in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2. 
Graceful degradation of services, evidenced by experimental analysis in Chapters 5.1 – 5.3, 
and supported by theoretical analysis in 4.4, ensure that if one analysis component stops 
working, part of the network may stop being monitored, the rest of the monitoring schema can 
continue working. 
Collaboration was a key element also, as within Cloud federations association among different 
CSPs with the goal of sharing resources and data is essential. The solution was designed to 
facilitate the exchange of information and alerts within the infrastructure in an autonomous 
manner, without the need for human intervention. The entities within can take information and 
share it among key entities, receive and exchange relevant information when polled. Chapter 
4.4 highlights these considerations and details the attainment.  
The architectural design in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 convey how each component may be localised 
to the set of hosts it monitors, and tuned to its specific tasks or characteristics. Taking into 
consideration the requirements in Chapter 3.5, the ability to automatically scale alongside the 
expansion of the underlying virtualised infrastructure, in order to adapt for its constantly 
changing needs was understood and the architecture designed accordingly. It must be able to 
cope with the adjusting behaviour and adaptive nature of the underlying virtualised 
infrastructure in order to formulate an accurate understanding. The solution must operate 
seamlessly in real-time, and be able to manage and verify a large number of resources, and do 
it effectively and efficiently - which is evidenced by the experiments in Chapter 5.  
The solution must possess the ability to detect novel threats, as due to the interconnected nature 
of Cloud federations, attacks may propagate from within the federation – which is evidenced 
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by theoretical analysis in Chapter 4.2 and supported by algorithm design in 4.3 – 4.6. The 
operation of the solution should not depend on prior knowledge relating to the system and 
behaviour, due to the dynamic nature of the underlying environment and information may 
become outdated. This is achieved via the application of D-S theory of evidence and 
contribution examined further in Chapter 6.3.2. 
It can be concluded that our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework – 
“Security as a Service” has met all of the design requirements identified in Chapter 3.5. It must 
be noted that this evaluation reflects a high level evaluation of the attributes and configuration 
of the framework. Additionally, it meets the project aims and objectives identified in Chapter 
1.2.  
6.2   Dempster-Shafer  
Through simulation of the collaborative intrusion detection process, there have been some 
issues identified when performing in the evidence aggregation. Highlighted by Chen and 
Aickelin [126], two problems with the application of D-S for detecting intrusions are the 
computational complexity associated and the conflicting beliefs management. This study 
focuses on the computational complexity due to the increase of elements in the frame of 
discernment, but our issue focuses on non-weighted belief generation and the problem that all 
beliefs generated should have the same level of trust.   
However, when performing the belief calculations using two values, based on equation 4.22, 
the returned result is quite surprising. When comparing two high belief generations, the 
assumption is that the combined belief value would also be a high number, however it is a 
lower value. The correlation between high belief values and low fused outputs suggests that 
the lower the fused output, the higher the risk. The same is understood for two fused low belief 
values to generate a high fused output, which would be a low risk.  
It is not clear if this is due to our calculations but these metrics have been compared on 
numerous belief fusions and this is a similar occurrence. The mass value must be between 0 
and 1 but not inclusive as this seems to skew the calculations, e.g. using a value of 0 would 
render the combination calculation (m1, 2(A)) incalculable as you cannot divide by 0 which 
would be a pertinent value. A coefficient value of 1 would leave the combination calculation 
135 
having to divide by 0 (1/1-1) which is an impossible calculation. Also, having a coefficient of 
0 would give a negative risk output, which is also an unusable value. 
With reference to the hypothesis set in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4.5, further examples can be seen 
below: 
Two monitoring entities, based on observation A generate beliefs. Monitor 1s BPA include: 
Attack = 0.9, No Attack = 0.05, Either = 0.05. Monitor 2s BPAs include: Attack = 0.9, No 
Attack = 0.5, Either = 0.05.  
Based on equation 4.23 these beliefs are fused together and performed as below: 
M12 (A) = (1/1-0.09) x 0.05 x 0.05 = 0.002747252747252  
Where DSK is calculated by equation 4.24: 
DSK = 0.9 x 0.05 + 0.05 x 0.9 = 0.09  
The fused belief gives a value of 0.0027. The two BPAs for an attack were 0.9 so it is assumed 
that when combined, they would generate a value within a similar range. The normalisation 
phase distributes the weight and treats all evidences equally, so this is definitely a factor when 
considering application for detecting intrusions.  
A further example of D-S belief fusion is two monitoring entities, based on observation A 
generate beliefs. Monitor 1s BPAs include: Attack = 0.5, No Attack = 0.3, Either = 0.2. Monitor 
2s BPAs include: Attack = 0.5, No Attack = 0.3, Either = 0.02.  
Based on equation 4.23, these beliefs are fused together and performed as below: 
M12 (A) = (1/1-0.3) x 0.2 x 0.2 = 0.057142857142857  
Where DSK is calculated by equation 4.24: 
DSK = 0.5 x 0.3 + 0.3 x 0.5 = 0.3      
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The fused beliefs give a value of 0.057. The two BPAs for an attack were 0.5 so this fused 
value falls within the range expected based on the presented information.  
Two monitoring entities, based on observation A generate beliefs. Monitor 1s BPA include: 
Attack = 0.1, No Attack = 0.6, Either = 0.3. Monitor 2s BPAs include: Attack = 0.1, No Attack 
= 0.6, Either = 0.3.  
Using equation 4.24, beliefs were fused together and performed as below: 
M12 (A) = (1/1-0.12) x 0.3 x 0.3 = 0.10 
Where DSK is calculated by equation 4.25: 
DSK = 0.1 x 0.6 + 0.6 x 0.1 = 0.12      
The fused beliefs give a value of 0.10. The two BPAs for Attack were 0.1, so a low fused belief 
for attack was expected.  
When observing generated beliefs and evidences, various factors for each evidential 
circumstance should be considered. D-S when applied in an autonomous collaborative 
environment should apply a weight of confidence when the belief generation occurs. If 
everyone votes ‘no attack’, but there is clearly evidence of an attack on the domain of origin, 
there should be a way to overrule the decision based on the strength of the associated trust or 
confidence value associated with the decision. The algorithm is extended further to take this 
into consideration, and is detailed in Chapter 4.6.   
One further issue identified during our research is that of bandwidth consumption, which the 
IaaS model facilitates during an attack. While there are evident benefits of the utilisation of 
Cloud federations for CSPs, this interconnection effects the interdependent services within the 
federation. In the IaaS model, while under attack, it tries to scale out and share resources from 
other CSPs within the federation. The applicability of our “Security as a Service” mechanism 
can help limit the reachability of such an attack, and block the attack before it devastates the 
other CSPs.  
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The evidence from our research strongly suggests that D-S theory of evidence has grounds for 
facilitating autonomous sharing of information but there are limitations that need addressing. 
Our extended D-S approach aims to tackle the issue of conflicting decisions within 
interconnected infrastructure, but used in a combination with other computing techniques it 
could have the ability to improve decision making schemas. 
6.3   Comparisons to existing work 
Our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework – “Security as a Service” 
solution has been designed with the complexities of dynamic Cloud federations in mind by 
using the information identified from the background research to define the essential 
characteristics that potential collaborative intrusion detection solutions for the Cloud 
environment must possess. These requirements were devised by examining the attributes of 
IDSs and monitoring schemes and their application to Cloud environments. 
In order to highlight the progress made by this project within the field of collaborative intrusion 
detection for Cloud federations, it is imperative that the work conducted throughout this project 
is compared to that of our colleagues. Intrusion detection in some distributed environments, 
e.g. federated systems/services/applications, would share similar characteristics to Cloud 
federations from the intrusion detection point of view. Due to the constraints of our 
implementation, our comparison to existing work is qualitative. 
6.3.1 Cooperative intrusion detection 
A cooperative IDS framework for Cloud computing networks is proposed by Lo et al. [105], 
where they aim to provide secure and reliable services in a Cloud computing environment. One 
of the security issues identified is how to reduce the impact of DoS or DDoS attacks in this 
environment via federated defence. To provide such ability, IDSs are employed in each Cloud 
region and exchange their alerts with each other. Majority voting is used to determine if the 
alert is warning of an attack based on the number of alerts received by other IDSs. 
The majority vote rule is a decision rule that selects alternatives which have a majority, that is, 
more than half the votes. It is the binary decision rule used most often in influential decision-
making bodies, whereby the decisions of the numerical majority of a group will bind on the 
whole group [150]. They perform a threshold check, i.e. Threshold = μ + λ × σ, to determine if 
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traffic has exceeded a predefined value. Cooperative operation is used to receive alert messages 
delivered from other IDSs. After receiving these alerts, the cooperative agent makes a judgment 
by executing the majority vote. 
It is essential to understand that whilst the work undertaken in previous years was innovative 
and ahead of its time, the rapid advancements in technology require regular reviews of the 
systems designed to protect them – hence, it is imperative that our work is compared to that of 
preceding work. As such, the design review in Chapter 3.5 takes into consideration the existing 
approaches available to this research area and identifies their inadequacies for application to 
the nouveau domain of federated Cloud systems. While Lo et al. [105] support the idea of 
cooperative detection and sharing of information, their solution is elementary in nature when 
considered for application to federation defence. Our “Security as a Service” solution has 
adapted and tailored their ideology to a Cloud federation, taking into consideration the 
aforementioned design requirements. 
The work of Lo et al. [105] conveys a monitoring approach where their distributed IDS 
aggregates data by individual monitoring entities within their architecture. The proposed IDS 
is constructed of 3 modules: ‘Block’ – which blocks/drops bad packets, ‘Communication’ – to 
send alerts, and ‘Cooperation’ – to gather alerts and make a decision. An IDS sends an alert 
while suffering an attack and the premise of their collaborative aspect is to warn the other 
domains of the potential attack. However, there does not seem to be an action for the IDS under 
attack – “If the agent, finally, accepts these alerts, the system adds a new blocking rule into the 
block table against this type of packet on the Cloud computing regions. Therefore, by this new 
blocking rule, the Cloud computing regions except the victim one can avoid this type of attack.” 
Our approach in comparison to this has extended the D-S fusion process to include a two stage 
process to protect the domain of origin, when conflicting belief generation deems the 
aggregated decision erroneous.  
Their use of the adaptive threshold algorithms to detect traffic violations claims accuracy for 
DoS and DDoS attacks, but this algorithm considers only violations of the threshold which can 
be quite strict in nature. The Cloud environment is dynamic in nature and more adaptive 
algorithms have been determined more applicable for such a complex infrastructure. The use 
of CUSUM and EWMA to adapt to the underlying infrastructure shows how our approach 
considers the excess volume sent above the normal volume, accounting for the intensity of the 
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violations, and achieving higher accuracy as a combination of both algorithms calculates and 
re-establishes thresholds. 
Additionally, they do not use the resources of the Cloud to protect against these network 
attacks, but rather focus on their exchange of messages to cross domains. Cooperative agents 
send/receive alerts from IDSs within other Cloud regions but there is no clear information 
hierarchy. If there are 𝑛 sensors detecting intrusions, then 𝑛 𝑥 (𝑛 − 1) are exchanged and the 
associated communications costs would be high [63]. Chapter 4.4 details our hierarchical 
communication schema that utilises the resources and scale of the Cloud environment for 
improved communication exchange.  
6.3.2 D-S for intrusion detection 
Other comparable work within this area proposing the use of D-S within their research does 
not perform D-S belief fusion, rather they state the application and processes of the fusion 
stages. Alem et al. [151] in their work on belief functions attempt to improve the efficiency of 
IDS using D-S. They use D-S in combination with SVM and naïve Bayes classifiers, and fuzzy 
logic. While they present their results in terms of identifying attacks, their experiments do not 
detail how they use D-S in belief generation or for data fusion. Their use of training data, and 
naïve Bayes, is an alternative to the usual stance of no priori knowledge being required when 
using D-S. Their application of D-S is high level and our mathematical fusion or proof of 
concept application to Cloud federations cannot be compared with this approach. 
Nguyen et al. [152] propose approaches for dealing with conflicting mass values when 
combining beliefs, however this is mainly an issue when dealing with a large numbers of 
variables in a hypothesis set. Conflicting ratings occur due to the diversity of users, and this 
could occur when applying D-S to a wider range of possibility observations. D-S for intrusion 
detection would utilise BPAs of { }, {attack}, {no attack}, and {attack, no attack}. { } 
represents an empty subset with a value of 0, that corresponds to “no solution”. Whereas 
{attack, no attack} represents uncertainty, i.e. it could be either. The associated hypothesis sets 
for application for intrusion detection would include a smaller number of variables, and 
conflicting issues could be targeted by the inclusion of SLAs specifying levels of trust or 
reputation based schemas.  
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Hu et al. [129] convey applicability of D-S for intrusion detection. Like our reasoning, the 
choice of D-S is due to the fact that there is no need for state transition matrices and training 
data to make uncertainty inferences. However, they include “Detection uncertainty” in 
combination with D-S to accord for uncertainty or ignorance with an event. The objective 
uncertainty varies with the degree of detection and can affect the observational results in the 
combination module. While they present some experimental application of their approach, it is 
unclear how D-S solves the issue of uncertainty. They do conclude that D-S has a ‘great 
development prospect in the future’. They apply D-S in principle but have no mathematical 
application to support their methodology, as such our D-S arithmetic and extended D-S fusion 
process cannot be compared.  
Siaterlis et al. [153] propose the use of D-S’s theory of evidence as the underlying data fusion 
model for creating a DDoS detection engine. They state that the modelling strength of the 
mathematical notation as well as the ability to take into account knowledge gathered from 
totally heterogeneous information sources were some of the advantages of using D-S theory. 
They have demonstrated their idea by developing a prototype that consists of a Snort pre-
processor-plugin and a Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) data collector that 
provide the necessary input that through heuristics feeds the D-S inference engine.  
In terms of the comparison, it is clear that the application of D-S to the field of intrusion 
detection has its merits, however for the facilitation of collaboration among monitoring 
components the complexity is increased. D-S offers an alternative to the traditional 
probabilistic theory for the mathematical representation of uncertainty, and for collaborative 
intrusion detection its main attribute is data fusion. The main advantage of D-S is that no priori 
knowledge of the system is required, thus making it suitable for anomaly detection of 
previously unseen information, however including heuristics or neural networks or other 
machine learning techniques in order to improve the accuracy of results have been considered 
[62].  
Experimental results convey the evident benefits of D-S application to Cloud federations, but 
there are limitations due to weighted belief generation and the normalisation factor when 
combining the evidences – which can lead to conflicting beliefs. If the fused decision is “No 
Attack” but the belief of origin has a high confidence value, then the domain of origin would 
take action against the suspect observation and send the belief value to the broker to store in its 
141 
local Grey list. Our extended D-S theory of evidence fusion process takes this into 
consideration and conveys this. The inclusion of trust based schemes, or reputation based 
scoring inspired by WSN could be utilised also in this case [154], but these are considered for 
future works.  
6.4   Summary 
This chapter has evaluated the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection architecture and 
its fundamental components. As these results demonstrate, our solution facilitates collaborative 
intrusion detection for federated Cloud services. The overall system was tested for 
effectiveness and efficiency required by intrusion detection in Cloud environments. Our testing 
illustrates the benefits of collaborative intrusion detection, and in particular autonomous 
sharing of information. Our Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework – 
“Security as a Service”, used in conjunction with D-S and confidence values could be warning 
of an imminent attack with a Cloud federation.  
Additionally, how inter-domain cooperation for holistic security and improved resilience is 
achievable in our environment is conveyed. Federated Cloud environments are growing areas 
in terms of adoption by critical infrastructure vendors, and large corporations, so our Service-
based framework facilitates this collaborative intrusion detection, and sharing of attack 
information among this differing populace – which in turn can help improve the Cloud 
environments’ overall resilience to an attack. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and future developments 
Cloud computing has emerged as a way to enable content providers to meet their application 
needs through either Cloud development environments or through outsourced CSPs.  Adoption 
of Cloud computing services allows critical infrastructure vendors to benefit from dynamic 
resource allocation for managing unpredictable load peaks, storing of historical process data 
(either on site in a private Cloud, or sharing among other related vendors in a hybrid Cloud), 
federating into a larger Cloud, and large scale data analytics based on historical data of 
consumers, to name a few. 
Given the public awareness of critical infrastructure and their importance, the public wants to 
be assured that these systems are built to function in a secure manner and any technological 
utilisation are secure; maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and availability of their data or 
services. Cloud outages are unexpected events that occur within a Cloud infrastructure and 
consequently affect the operations and availability of services placed within the Cloud. Should 
this be critical infrastructure services, or important historical processes, this would be 
damaging for the reputation of the infrastructure vendor, or for the CSP. Recognising the signs 
of an attack quickly, and being able to limit the effect on operation is imperative. 
When cyber-attacks and cyber disruptions happen, millions of users are potentially affected. A 
cyber disruption in this context means a temporary or permanent loss of service, and users of 
the Cloud service who rely on its continuity are affected. Design of a collaborative Cloud-based 
framework that focuses on the monitoring and protection of the critical infrastructure services 
in the Cloud computing environment is the main contribution of our work. Collaboration 
among CSPs could ensure that they are up to date on different Cloud threats and emerging 
vulnerabilities, as they are interdependent upon each other at times within the federation, i.e. 
load balancing at peak times – one drawback from this interconnection is the increase in eDoS 
attacks. The effects of eDoS/DDoS attacks can span from the loss of some data, to the potential 
isolation of parts of the federation. Protecting the federated Cloud against cyber-attacks is a 
key concern, since there are potentially significant economic consequences. 
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The evidence from our research strongly suggests that using D-S’s theory of evidence for belief 
generation, in combination with the application of confidence values, can help improve the 
accuracy of generated observations for autonomous sharing of information. The application of 
D-S to Cloud federations and the inventive D-S extension presented in this thesis are 
encouraging and show that the area of collaborative intrusion detection in federated Cloud 
environments is worth pursuing further. The methodology and architectural monitoring 
structure presented could also be adopted and expanded for application in areas such as WSN, 
distributed systems, or the Internet of Things (IoT), as autonomous sharing of information is a 
promising area.  
Comparing the solution for distributed systems could involve adapting the hierarchical 
C2/MN/SN structure to the working of master/slave architecture model of distributed 
computing architecture where the master node has unidirectional control over one or more slave 
nodes. In this instance, the task(s) are distributed by the master node to the configured slaves 
and the results are returned to the master node. Distributed systems and Cloud computing 
environments slightly refer to different things, however the underlying concept between them 
is same. However for application to such interconnected domains where local views may vary, 
machine learning techniques may improve the accuracy of detection. 
Observations from different CSPs are correlated autonomously, in order to determine whether 
similar behaviour that is indicative of an attack or other issues has been observed in their 
domains. The integration of the decisions coming from different IDSs has emerged as a 
technique that could strengthen the final decision. Federated Cloud environments are growing 
areas in terms of adoption by critical infrastructure vendors, and large corporations, so our 
Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework facilities this collaborative intrusion 
detection, and sharing of attack information among these different CSPs. Future efforts to 
integrate assurance and auditing tools to ensure policy assurance among involved entities are 
needed also. 
7.1  Summary of novel contributions 
The research presented in this thesis presents the principles, techniques, and algorithms that 
can be adapted from other distributed computing paradigms to the development of a 
collaborative intrusion detection framework that can detect and prevent intrusion in 
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collaborative domains. This features a novel use of the D-S algorithm to detect intrusions and 
send alerts. To ensure our contribution, D-S evaluates evidence from multiple domains and 
fuses the beliefs to establish whether an attack is occurring, has occurred or will occur.  
The main novel contribution of this project is that it provides the means by which DDoS attacks 
are detected within a Cloud federation, so as to enable an early propagated response to block 
the attack, particularly by the interdependent CSPs within the federation. As such, this is 
effectively inter-domain cooperation as these CSPs will cooperate with each other to offer 
holistic security, and add to the defence in depth. The D-S theory of evidence is used to 
facilitate this autonomous sharing of information, and to fuse the generated beliefs to form a 
system-wide decision. 
Providing service-based collaborative intrusion detection – “Security as a Service” in a Cloud 
federation is achieved via the following novel contributions: 
 A collaborative intrusion detection framework that can detect and prevent intrusion in 
Cloud federations and/or collaborative domains in real-time via the autonomous sharing 
of information. This features a novel application of the D-S theory of evidence 
algorithm to detect intrusions and fuse generated beliefs for collaborative intrusion 
detection, and an extension of D-S to include confidence values for conflicting 
decisions. There is no current solution that can provide adequate protection for Cloud 
federations, or identified solution which implements the D-S algorithm and produces 
collaborative decisions in Cloud federations to improve upon the Cloud security 
contribution. 
 Within related work, the accuracy and efficiency of detection is important, but ensuring 
the solution is scalable and can deal with large volumes of logs from different sources 
is problematic. The Cloud Broker coordinates attack responses, both within the domain 
itself, and with other domains, and is facilitating inter-domain cooperation. D-S is used 
to fuse the generated beliefs and make a system-wide decision. This cooperation 
between CSPs ensures that the scalable defence required against DDoS attacks is in an 
efficient manner; aiming to improve the overall resilience of the interconnected 
infrastructure. 
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 CSPs within a Cloud federation are represented as interconnected domains, and can 
trace attacks back to their domain source by dynamically provisioning the infrastructure 
to react – CUSUM and EWMA algorithms are used for adaptive threshold calculation. 
A local propagation mechanism collects statistics at a local level via MNs, and in order 
to minimise detection delay and reduce the communication overhead, this is propagated 
among MNs using a gossip protocol. As Cloud environments, and Cloud federations, 
are large scale, it is essential that any potential solution should scale alongside the 
environment and have the potential to expand and scale considerably without any issues 
or performance implications. 
7.2  Thesis Summary 
In this section, an overview of the thesis and our research for the design of a collaborative 
Cloud-based framework that focuses on the monitoring and protection of the critical 
infrastructure services in the Cloud computing environment is presented, in addition to a 
summary of each of the thesis chapters.  
In Chapter 1, the research area and our motivation behind the work being undertaken is 
introduced. The aims, objectives, and novel contributions of the research are discussed, in 
addition to a high level overview of the solution. Publications that have resulted from the 
research undertaken are highlighted also. 
In Chapter 2, background on critical infrastructure and Cloud computing is provided, in 
addition to the evident security vulnerabilities and threats that need to be resolved is 
highlighted. Critical infrastructure and Cloud utilisation requirements are highlighted, and the 
need for Cloud-based protection mechanisms for services in Cloud federations. 
In Chapter 3, related works in this area are discussed. An overview of the different types of 
protection and preventative measures in place for intrusion detection in the Cloud environment 
is detailed. Existing approaches are analysed and an observation of their evident inadequacies 
presented. This information is used to determine specific requirements for proposing a novel 
solution for this area. 
Chapter 4 outlines the design and architectural details for the novel solution, in addition to the 
algorithms and methods utilised.  The entities present and their functionality are explained, and 
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requirements and considerations for the design are conveyed. The improved D-S two stage 
intrusion detection method is outlined. 
Chapter 5 outlines the implementation details of the intrusion detection framework for 
federated Cloud environments. Through the use of Riverbed Modeler 18.0, the effects of DDoS 
attacks to Cloud federations are conveyed and analysed, and collaborative intrusion detection 
using D-S theory of evidence is demonstrated using a proof of concept developed in C#.  
In Chapter 6, the novel solution is evaluated against the metrics we consider to be the most 
important for determining the efficiency of a collaborative IDS. The solution was evaluated 
using the requirements established in 3.5 which define the characteristics which collaborative 
intrusion detection solutions must possess, and the approach is also compared to related work 
within this research field. 
Conclusions and future work are presented in Chapter 7. Within this chapter, a thesis summary 
is provided, a summary of the project novelties, and some final concluding remarks. This 
chapter will also highlight how the work can be built on for future research projects. 
7.3  Further Work  
Further work would involve testing the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection 
methodology on a real Cloud-based test bed to compare. While the D-S algorithm has been 
deemed as a scalable algorithm, it would be advantageous to compare the flexibility of the 
algorithm and the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection framework to see how the 
effects of the information exchange affect the network. The complex nature of process models 
within Riverbed Modeler 18.0 meant the effects of the algorithm to the network couldn’t be 
modelled effectively, so using a Cloud-based test bed would be an interesting option.  
Adapting the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection architecture to focus on a wider 
range of attacks would be a further enhancement. For simulation purposes, our application of 
D-S for collaborative intrusion detection focused on demonstrating the applicability of the 
algorithm – IP addresses were used as the information that was exchanged. However tailoring 
the methodology to include attack signatures or measurable profile information would expand 
the capabilities of the approach. The main advantage of D-S is that no priori knowledge of the 
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system is required, thus making it suitable for anomaly detection of previously unseen 
information, however including heuristics or neural networks or other machine learning 
techniques in order to improve the accuracy of results has been considered.  
A further consideration for expansion is adapting the solution to make it a dual level IDS, where 
there is a personalised experience for both CSP and Cloud users. Access control can help tailor 
the IDS to suit their needs. Cloud consumers should not only have to depend on the CSPs’ 
security infrastructure. They need to be able to monitor and protect their own virtual existence 
by enforcing additional security methods with other network security technologies. Giving the 
user the ability to personalise their own security needs could be a beneficial enhancement via 
SLA negotiation.  
The methodology proposed could also be applied to WSN environments, or scaled considerably 
to tailor to the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT is a concept coined to cover the interconnected 
infrastructure and utilities that are increasingly occurring. IoT is the interconnection of 
uniquely identifiable embedded computing devices within the existing Internet infrastructure, 
from smart meters in homes, remote sensors for gas and oil utilities, interdependent system-of-
systems: but the key issue is the fundamental problem with the interconnection of this “Internet 
of Things”. They are creating a wider attack surface with billions of new devices. IoT inherits 
the same monitoring requirements from Cloud, but the related challenges are further affected 
by volume, variety, and velocity characteristics of IoT. Application of our Security of a Service 
methodology to the IoT environment could provide an interesting testbed for collaborative 
information exchange.  
The IoT does not replace the existing ICT or operational technology networks; rather, it 
enhances these networks and relies on them in many ways. Recognising all these aspects 
working together, cyber security and physical security solutions must also work together with 
a coordinated focus on threats. With an estimated number of 50 billion devices that will be 
networked by 2020, specific attention must be paid to transportation, storage, access, and 
processing of the huge amount of data they will produce [155]. Processing large quantities of 
IoT data will increase as a proportion of workloads of data centres, leaving providers facing 
new security, capacity and analytics challenges. Handling this data conveniently is a critical 
challenge, as the overall application performance is highly dependent on the properties of the 
data management service. 
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7.4  Concluding Remarks  
In this thesis, a novel method for detecting intrusions in a federated Cloud environment has 
been presented. In the related work section, an extensive survey of existing intrusion detection 
methods was conducted, identifying the limitations in their scalability and efficiency. From 
this, a methodology for detecting intrusions in the federated Cloud environment was 
constructed, improving upon the inefficiencies of current approaches, and tackling the problem 
with lightweight collaborative decision making. This inspired the design and implementation 
of the Service-based collaborative intrusion detection architecture where CSPs collaborate for 
holistic security. The “Security as a Service” entity is present in each CSP’s domain “as-a-
service” and automatically reacts to deviations from normal behaviour.  The design of this 
solution is small in scale for proof of concept but can embrace the resources and scale of the 
Cloud environment. Through experimentation, the solution and associated attributes have been 
validated, demonstrating that they can overcome the challenges for protecting critical 
infrastructure services in the Cloud environment through collaborative intrusion detection. The 
evidence from the research strongly suggests that fusion algorithms can play a key role in 
autonomous decision making schemes, however our experimentation highlights areas upon 
which improvements are needed before fully applying to federated environments. 
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Appendix 
Further statistics on simulation devices 
IP Processing Delay (sec) 
Rank Object Name Minimum Average Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
1, 2 Domain 1.Realm 1.R1 0.00002 0.000026 0.00014 0.00002289 
3 Domain 2.Realm 2.R2 0.00002 0.000023 0.00005 0.00000690 
4 
Domain 3.Realm 3.User 
Router 
0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00000077 
5 
Server Domain.Server 
Realm.Server Router 
0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00000055 
6 
Broker.Broker 
Realm.Broker Router 
0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00000057 
 
 
IP processing day (sec) 
 
 
 
0
0.00002
0.00004
0.00006
0.00008
0.0001
0.00012
0.00014
0.00016
Domain 1.Realm 1.R1Domain 2.Realm 2.R2Domain 3.Realm
3.User Router
Server
Domain.Server
Realm.Server Router
Broker.Broker
Realm.Broker Router
IP Processing Delay (sec)
Minimum Average Maximum Standard Deviation
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Ethernet Delay (sec) 
Rank Object Name Minimum Average Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Broker.Broker 
Realm.Broker 
0.00022 0.00022 0.00022 0.00000001 
2 Server Domain.Server 
Realm.infected_user_4 
0.00020 0.00020 0.00021 0.00000173 
3 Domain 3.Realm 
3.user_4                     
0.000072 0.00018 0.0003 0.00011022 
4 Domain 3.Realm 
3.user_2                     
0.000080 0.00018 0.0003 0.00011021 
5 Domain 3.Realm 
3.user_1                     
0.000077 0.00017 0.0003 0.00010979 
6 Server Domain.Server 
Realm.Server           
0.00015 0.00017 0.0002 0.00003755 
7 Server Domain.Server 
Realm.infected_user_19 
0.00016 0.00016 0.0002 0.00000192 
8 Domain 3.Realm 
3.Cybil                      
0.000067 0.00016 0.0003 0.00010845 
9 Domain 3.Realm 
3.user_3                     
0.00007 0.00015 0.0003 0.00010604 
10 Server Domain.Server 
Realm.C2_1   
0.00015 0.00015 0.0001 0.00000001 
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Ethernet delay (sec) 
 
Point to point throughput (bits/sec) 
Rank Object Name Minimum Average Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Server Domain.Server 
Realm.Server <-> Server 
Router [0] <-- 
60.000 2,661,335 18,366,169 6,059,989 
2 node_0 <-> Server 
Domain [0] --> 
66.667 2,355,094 15,793,123 5,356,568 
3 Domain 1.Realm 1.S1 <-
> R1 [0] --> 
0.000 2,051,798 14,099,491 4,698,868 
4 Domain 2.Realm 2.S3 <-
> R2 [0] -->                                 
0.000 1,429,394 9,604,800 3,260,290 
5 Domain 3.Realm 3.User 
Router <-> S2 [0] <-- 
0.000 802,289 5,352,178 1,811,553 
6 node_0 <-> Domain 3 [0] 
<-- 
50.000 789,493 5,273,106 1,785,675 
7 Domain 1 <-> node_0 [0] 
--> 
50.000 782,883 5,260,067 1,785,908 
0
0.00005
0.0001
0.00015
0.0002
0.00025
0.0003
0.00035
Ethernet Delay (sec)
Minimum Average Maximum Standard Deviation
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8 node_0 <-> Domain 2 [0] 
<-- 
33.333 782,863 5,260,067 1,785,471 
9 Server Domain.Server 
Realm.Server switch <-> 
Server Router [0] --> 
0.000 270,774 2,789,839 696,731 
10 Server Domain.Server 
Realm.Server <-> Server 
Router [0] -->                         
0.000 217,131 675,362 172,788 
 
 
 
 
Point to point throughout (bits/sec) 
 
  
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
Minimum Average Maximum Standard Deviation
Point to point throughout (bits/sec)
Server Domain.Server Realm.Server <-> Server Router [0] <--
node_0 <-> Server Domain [0] -->
Domain 1.Realm 1.S1 <-> R1 [0] -->
Domain 2.Realm 2.S3 <-> R2 [0] -->
Domain 3.Realm 3.User Router <-> S2 [0] <--
node_0 <-> Domain 3 [0] <--
Domain 1 <-> node_0 [0] -->
node_0 <-> Domain 2 [0] <--
Server Domain.Server Realm.Server switch <-> Server Router [0] -->
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Pseudo code for exchange in collaborative intrusion detection schema 
Within this section pseudo was written to determine the logic required for implementing the 
message exchange between the entities in our model. This is a faster way of determining logic 
prior to creating the final coded model.  
//IP comes into the network 
 
//if the IP is on black list 
if(on black list){ 
 block user 
} 
//if the IP is on grey list 
else if( on grey list){ 
 
 X = AssessActivity(); //determine what is being checked to assess the activity risk 
       //return a value which will equate to risk 
 //if percentage is over certain threshold - currently set to 70 
 if(x = suspiciousActivity){ 
  //if percentage is at a high threshold 
  if(suspiciousActivity = HIGH){ 
   if(at HIGH position on grey list){ 
    add to black list; 
    contact Broker; 
   } 
   //contact Broker about suspiciousActivity to check against other server 
lists 
   call Broker; 
   move to high position on grey list; 
  } 
  //if percentage is at a mid threshold 
  else if(suspiciousActivity = MEDIUM){ 
   move to a mid position on grey list; 
  } 
  //if percentage is at a low threshold 
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  else if(suspiciousActivity = LOW){ 
   move to a lower position on grey list; 
  } 
 } 
 if(non suspiciousActivity){ 
  //lower the IP's position on grey list (as their score is not currently suspicious) 
  lower position on grey list; 
 } 
} 
 
//if the IP is on white list 
if(on white list){ 
 
 AssessActivity(); 
 if(non suspiciousActivity){ 
  //allow IP into network 
  Allow access; 
 } 
 else{ 
  //do same checks which are in the grey list 
  //will be in a function to be easy to call 
  grey list checks; 
 } 
} 
//if the IP is not on a list yet 
else{ 
 AssessActivity(); 
 //if percentage is at a high threshold 
 if(suspiciousActivity = HIGH){ 
   //contact Broker about suspiciousActivity to check against other server 
lists 
   call Broker; 
   add to high position on grey list //while waiting for feedback 
 } 
 //if percentage is at a mid threshold 
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 else if(suspiciousActivity = MEDIUM){ 
  //contact Broker about suspiciousActivity to check against other server lists 
  call Broker; 
  add to mid position on grey list; //while waiting for Broker feedback 
 } 
 //if percentage is at a low threshold 
 else if(suspiciousActivity = LOW){ 
  add to low position on grey list //while waiting for Broker 
 } 
 else{ 
  //if the activity is not suspicious, add IP to the white list 
  add to white list; 
 } 
} 
 
/////// 
//if Broker requests a check of grey list ->receive a check list request 
 
check for IP on grey 
//if the ip is on grey list 
if(IP exists){ 
 //return the position on grey list 
 //(risk value and any related information on it) 
 return risk percentage (position on list) 
} 
else{ 
 //if the IP is not on the list 
 return no information known 
} 
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DS_ProofOfConcept Code  
Broker.cs 
 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace DS_ProofOfConcept 
{ 
    public class Broker 
    { 
        List<String[]> GreyList1; 
        List<String[]> GreyList2; 
        List<String[]> GreyList3; 
 
        double S1A; 
        double S1NA; 
        double S1E; 
 
        double S2A; 
        double S2NA; 
        double S2E; 
 
        double S3A; 
        double S3NA; 
        double S3E; 
 
        public Broker(String IP, double value) 
        { 
            Console.WriteLine("Retrieving Other Domain Belief Values..."); 
            //string _filePath = Path.GetDirectoryName(System.AppDomain.Current-
Domain.BaseDirectory); 
            //StreamWriter GreyFile = new System.IO.StreamWriter(_filePath + @"\Cur-
rentListData\S" + Server + "GreyList.txt"); 
            GetOtherServerValues(IP); 
            if (Program.Server == 1) { S1A = value /100; } 
            if (Program.Server == 2) { S2A = value /100; } 
            if (Program.Server == 3) { S3A = value /100; } 
 
            Console.WriteLine("Domain Belief Values Retrieved."); 
            Console.WriteLine("Values Returned From Grey List:"); 
            Console.WriteLine("CSP1 A: " + S1A + " CSP 2A: " + S2A + " CSP3 A: " + 
S3A); 
            Console.WriteLine("Calculating Outcome..."); 
            CombinationBelief(); 
            Console.WriteLine("Calculation Complete."); 
            Console.WriteLine(); 
        } 
 
        void CombinationBelief() 
        { 
            attackToThreeValue(); 
 
            double cooefficient = (S1A * S2NA) + (S1NA * S2A) + (S1A * S3NA) + 
                            (S1NA * S3A) + (S2A * S3NA) + (S2NA * S3A); 
            double final = (1 / (1 - cooefficient)) * S1E * S2E * S3E; 
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            Console.WriteLine("CP1 A: " + S1A + " CSP1 NA: " + S1NA + " CSP1 E: " + 
S1E); 
            Console.WriteLine("CSP2 A: " + S2A + " CSP2 NA: " + S2NA + " CSP2 E: " + 
S2E); 
            Console.WriteLine("CSP3 A: " + S3A + " CSP3 NA: " + S3NA + " CSP3 E: " + 
S3E); 
            Console.WriteLine(); 
            Console.WriteLine("Outcome: " + final); 
            Console.ReadLine(); 
        } 
 
        public void attackToThreeValue() 
        { 
            if(S1A.ToString() == "0") 
            { 
                S1A = 0.5; 
                S1NA = 0.4; 
                S1E = 0.1;     
            } 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "1.0") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.0; 
                S1E = 0.0; 
 
            } 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.9") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.05; 
                S1E = 0.05; 
            } 
 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.8") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.1; 
                S1E = 0.1; 
            } 
 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.7") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.2; 
                S1E = 0.1; 
            } 
 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.6") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.3; 
                S1E = 0.1; 
            } 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.5") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.3; 
                S1E = 0.2; 
            } 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.4") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.4; 
                S1E = 0.2; 
            } 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.3") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.6; 
                S1E = 0.1; 
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            } 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.2") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.3; 
                S1E = 0.5; 
            } 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.1") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.6; 
                S1E = 0.3; 
            } 
            else if (S1A.ToString() == "0.0") 
            { 
                S1NA = 0.5; 
                S1E = 0.5; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("ERRORRRR ERRORRR"); 
            } 
 
 
            if (S2A.ToString() == "0") 
            { 
                S2A = 0.5; 
                S2NA = 0.2; 
                S2E = 0.3; 
            } 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "1.0") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.0; 
                S2E = 0.0; 
 
            } 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.9") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.05; 
                S2E = 0.05; 
            } 
 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.8") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.1; 
                S2E = 0.1; 
            } 
 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.7") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.2; 
                S2E = 0.1; 
            } 
 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.6") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.3; 
                S2E = 0.1; 
            } 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.5") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.3; 
                S2E = 0.2; 
            } 
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            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.4") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.4; 
                S2E = 0.2; 
            } 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.3") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.6; 
                S2E = 0.1; 
            } 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.2") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.3; 
                S2E = 0.5; 
            } 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.1") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.6; 
                S2E = 0.3; 
            } 
            else if (S2A.ToString() == "0.0") 
            { 
                S2NA = 0.5; 
                S2E = 0.5; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("ERRORRR"); 
            } 
 
            if (S3A.ToString() == "0") 
            { 
                S3A = 0.5; 
                S3NA = 0.3; 
                S3E = 0.2; 
            } 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "1.0") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.0; 
                S3E = 0.0; 
 
            } 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.9") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.05; 
                S3E = 0.05; 
            } 
 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.8") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.1; 
                S3E = 0.1; 
            } 
 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.7") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.2; 
                S3E = 0.1; 
            } 
 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.6") 
            { 
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                S3NA = 0.3; 
                S3E = 0.1; 
            } 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.5") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.3; 
                S3E = 0.2; 
            } 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.4") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.4; 
                S3E = 0.2; 
            } 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.3") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.6; 
                S3E = 0.1; 
            } 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.2") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.3; 
                S3E = 0.5; 
            } 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.1") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.6; 
                S3E = 0.3; 
            } 
            else if (S3A.ToString() == "0.0") 
            { 
                S3NA = 0.5; 
                S3E = 0.5; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("ERROR"); 
            } 
        } 
 
 
        void GetOtherServerValues(String IP) 
        { 
            if (Program.Server != 3) 
            { 
                GreyList3 = PopulateCurrentWGBLists.readGreyCurrentInfo(3); 
                //print out values of list to console and overwrite file 
                for (int i = 0; i < GreyList3.Count; i++) 
                { 
                    if (GreyList3[i][0] == IP) 
                    { 
                        S3A = Int32.Parse(GreyList3[i][1]) /100; 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
            if (Program.Server != 2) 
            { 
                GreyList2 = PopulateCurrentWGBLists.readGreyCurrentInfo(2); 
                //print out values of list to console and overwrite file 
                for (int i = 0; i < GreyList2.Count; i++) 
                { 
                    if (GreyList2[i][0] == IP) 
                    { 
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                        S2A = Int32.Parse(GreyList2[i][1]) /100; 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
            if (Program.Server != 1) 
            { 
                GreyList1 = PopulateCurrentWGBLists.readGreyCurrentInfo(1); 
                //print out values of list to console and overwrite file 
                for (int i = 0; i < GreyList1.Count; i++) 
                { 
                    if (GreyList1[i][0] == IP) 
                    { 
                        S1A = Int32.Parse(GreyList1[i][1]) /100; 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
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PopulateCurrentWBGLists.cs 
 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace DS_ProofOfConcept 
{ 
    class PopulateCurrentWGBLists 
    { 
 
 
        static String[] WhiteList; 
        static List<String[]> GreyList = new List<String[]>(); 
        static String[] BlackList; 
 
         
         
        public static string[] readWhiteCurrentInfo() 
        { 
            //gets file path position of current program directory 
            string _filePath = Path.GetDirectoryName(System.AppDomain.Current-
Domain.BaseDirectory); 
            _filePath = Directory.GetParent(Directory.GetPar-
ent(_filePath).FullName).FullName; 
            //opens White List for reading from 
            string wListRead = System.IO.File.ReadAllText(_filePath + @"\CurrentList-
Data\S1WhiteList.txt"); 
             
            //remove all spaces from file 
            wListRead.Replace(" ", String.Empty); 
 
            //string[] buffer = wListRead.Split(';'); 
            //WhiteList = new String[buffer.Length + 5]; 
            //WhiteList = buffer; 
 
            //split up all IP's into string array 
            WhiteList = wListRead.Split(';'); 
 
            return WhiteList; 
        } 
 
        public static string[] readBlackCurrentInfo() 
        { 
            //gets file path position of current program directory 
            string _filePath = Path.GetDirectoryName(System.AppDomain.Current-
Domain.BaseDirectory); 
            _filePath = Directory.GetParent(Directory.GetPar-
ent(_filePath).FullName).FullName; 
            //opens Black List for reading 
            string bListRead = System.IO.File.ReadAllText(_filePath + @"\CurrentList-
Data\S1BlackList.txt"); 
 
            //remove all spaces from file 
            bListRead.Replace(" ", String.Empty); 
             
            //split up all IP's into string array 
            BlackList = bListRead.Split(';'); 
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            return BlackList; 
        } 
 
        public static List<string[]> readGreyCurrentInfo(int Server) 
        { 
            //gets file path position of current program directory 
            string _filePath = Path.GetDirectoryName(System.AppDomain.Current-
Domain.BaseDirectory); 
            _filePath = Directory.GetParent(Directory.GetPar-
ent(_filePath).FullName).FullName; 
            //opens Grey List for reading from 
            string gListRead = System.IO.File.ReadAllText(_filePath + @"\CurrentList-
Data\S" + Server + "GreyList.txt"); 
 
            //removed all spaces from file 
            gListRead.Replace(" ", null); 
            string[] buffer = gListRead.Split(';'); 
             
            //for every value in the grey list 'buffer' array 
            for (int i = 0; i < buffer.Length - 1; i++) 
            { 
 
                populateGreyList(buffer[i], i); 
                 
            } 
 
            return GreyList; 
        } 
 
 
 
        public static void populateGreyList(String item, int i) 
        { 
            //remove all spaces from current value 
            item.Replace(" ", null); 
            //create array of the IP and threat level, being split at the ',' 
            string[] buffer = item.Split(','); 
            //add these values to the list array 'GreyList' 
            GreyList.Add(buffer); 
 
        } 
 
    } 
} 
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Program.cs 
 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Runtime.InteropServices; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
 
namespace DS_ProofOfConcept 
{ 
    public static class Program 
    { 
        //public variables for all lists 
        //Whitelist and Blacklist are arrays, whereas the Greylist is a list which 
contain arrays (this will store two values currently). 
        static String[] WhiteList; 
        static List<String[]> GreyList; 
        static String[] BlackList; 
        public static int Server = 0; 
         
        //Opens the console  
        [DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true)] 
        [return: MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)] 
        static extern bool AllocConsole(); 
         
        [STAThread] 
        static void Main() 
        { 
 
             
            //shows console 
            AllocConsole(); 
            while (true) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("Enter Server Number (1,2,3):"); 
                //Server = Int32.Parse(Console.ReadLine()); 
 
 
                //Populate three Lists in current class 
                WhiteList = PopulateCurrentWGBLists.readWhiteCurrentInfo(); 
                GreyList = PopulateCurrentWGBLists.readGreyCurrentInfo(Server); 
                BlackList = PopulateCurrentWGBLists.readBlackCurrentInfo(); 
 
 
                //Output request for user to console 
                Console.WriteLine("Enter IP Address"); 
                //wait for user input 
                String inputValue = Console.ReadLine(); 
 
                //split up using input at '.' to check if input is correct 
                string[] llama = inputValue.Split('.'); 
                //while the amount of '.' is not equal to 4 (amount needed for accu-
rate IPv4) 
                while (llama.Length != 4) 
                { 
                    //repeat user request 
                    Console.WriteLine("Enter IP Address"); 
                    //wait for user input 
                    inputValue = Console.ReadLine(); 
                    //split user input at '.' 
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                    llama = inputValue.Split('.'); 
                } 
                //output current input and length for debugging 
                Console.WriteLine(inputValue + " " + llama.Length); 
 
 
                //make new instance for list checking 
                ListChecking LC = new ListChecking(); 
                //check all lists for the ip and place or change position in lists if 
needed 
                String output = LC.ListCheck(WhiteList, BlackList, GreyList, input-
Value); 
                //output the returned string from ListCheck 
                Console.WriteLine(output); 
                Console.WriteLine(); 
 
                //gets file path position of current program directory 
                string _filePath = Path.GetDirectoryName(System.AppDomain.Current-
Domain.BaseDirectory); 
                _filePath = Directory.GetParent(Directory.GetPar-
ent(_filePath).FullName).FullName; 
                //opens White List file for writing 
                StreamWriter WhiteFile = new System.IO.StreamWriter(_filePath + 
@"\CurrentListData\S1WhiteList.txt"); 
 
                //print out values of list to console and overwrite file 
                for (int i = 0; i < WhiteList.Length; i++) 
                { 
                    //Console.Write(" White " + WhiteList[i]); 
 
                    if (i == 0) 
                    { 
                        WhiteFile.Write(WhiteList[i]); 
                    } 
                    else 
                    { 
                        WhiteFile.Write(";" + WhiteList[i]); 
                    } 
                } 
                //close the white file 
                WhiteFile.Close(); 
                //Console.WriteLine(); 
                //opens Grey List file for writing to 
                StreamWriter GreyFile = new System.IO.StreamWriter(_filePath + @"\Cur-
rentListData\S" + Server + "GreyList.txt"); 
 
                //print out values of list to console and overwrite file 
                for (int i = 0; i < GreyList.Count; i++) 
                { 
                    //Console.Write(" Grey " + GreyList[i][0]); 
                    GreyFile.Write(GreyList[i][0] + "," + GreyList[i][1] + ";"); 
                } 
                //close the grey file 
                GreyFile.Close(); 
                //Console.WriteLine(); 
                //opens Black List file for writing to 
                StreamWriter BlackFile = new System.IO.StreamWriter(_filePath + 
@"\CurrentListData\S1BlackList.txt"); 
 
                //print out values of list to console and overwrite file 
                for (int i = 0; i < BlackList.Length; i++) 
                { 
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                    //Console.Write(" Black " + BlackList[i]); 
 
                    if (i == 0) 
                    { 
                        BlackFile.Write(BlackList[i]); 
                    } 
                    else 
                    { 
                        BlackFile.Write(";" + BlackList[i]); 
                    } 
                } 
                //close the black file 
                BlackFile.Close(); 
 
                //read line holds the console in place until a key is pressed 
                Console.ReadLine(); 
            } 
 
        } 
 
 
 
        //setting values of white list in this class, used when list is changed 
        public static void setWhiteList(string[] WL) 
        { 
            WhiteList = WL; 
 
        } 
        //setting values of black list in this class, used when list is changed 
        public static void setBlackList(string[] BL) 
        { 
            BlackList = BL; 
 
        } 
        /*public static void setGreyList(List<string[]> GL) 
        { 
            GreyList = GL; 
 
        }*/ 
    } 
} 
 
ListChecking.cs 
 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace DS_ProofOfConcept 
{ 
    class ListChecking 
    { 
         
        //values decide what returned percentage equals which tier 
        public int HIGHTHREAT = 70; 
        public int MIDTHREAT = 40; 
        public int LOWTHREAT = 20; 
 
        //amount to increase threat level on grey list if threat detected 
        //and in which tier 
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        public int highTeirIncreaseAmount = 50; 
        public int midTeirIncreaseAmount = 20; 
        public int lowTeirIncreaseAmount = 10; 
        public int belowLowTierReduction = 5; 
         
 
        //checking white and black lists for IP (done seperatly, use same method) 
        public KeyValuePair<Boolean, int> checkthisList(string[] currentList, string 
IP) 
        {    
            for(int i = 0; i< currentList.Length; i++) 
            { 
                if(currentList[i] == IP || currentList[i].Contains(IP)) 
                { 
                    return new KeyValuePair<Boolean, int>(true, i); 
                } 
            } 
            return new KeyValuePair<Boolean, int>(false, 0); 
        } 
 
        //checking grey list for IP 
        public KeyValuePair<Boolean,int> checkGreyList(List<string[]> greyList, string 
IP) 
        { 
 
            for (int i = 0; i < greyList.Count; i++) 
            { 
                if (greyList[i][0] == IP || greyList[i][0].Contains(IP)) 
                { 
                    return new KeyValuePair<Boolean, int>(true, i); 
                } 
            } 
            return new KeyValuePair<Boolean, int>(false, 0); 
        } 
 
 
        //checking lists trying to find if IP is on list and what threat it holds 
        public string ListCheck(string[] WhiteList, string[] BlackList, List<string[]> 
GreyList, string IP) 
        { 
            //scan all lists 
            KeyValuePair<Boolean, int> BlackValue = checkthisList(BlackList, IP); 
            KeyValuePair<Boolean, int> GreyValue = checkGreyList(GreyList, IP); 
            KeyValuePair<Boolean, int> WhiteValue = checkthisList(WhiteList, IP); 
            Console.WriteLine("Current List:"); 
            //if the IP is in the black list (Key will be true) 
            if (BlackValue.Key) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("***BLACK***"); 
                //block IP 
                return "Blocked User"; 
                 
            } 
            //if IP is in the grey list (Key will be true) 
            else if(GreyValue.Key) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("***GREY***"); 
                //check for amount of threat detected 
                int ThreatLevel = CheckThreat(); 
                //if the threat is within the high tier bracket for this attack 
                if (ThreatLevel >= HIGHTHREAT) 
                { 
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                    //if the threat of IP is already above 70 
                    if(Int32.Parse(GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1]) > 70) 
                    { 
                        //make a new array of the new IP being added 
                        String[] array2 = { IP }; 
                        //make new array the size of the Black List and new array list 
to be the correct length 
                        String[] newArray = new String[BlackList.Length + ar-
ray2.Length]; 
                        //combine black list and new array 
                        Array.Copy(BlackList, newArray, BlackList.Length); 
                        //combine old Black List and new values into the new array, 
soon to become the black list 
                        Array.Copy(BlackList, 0, newArray, BlackList.Length, ar-
ray2.Length); 
 
                        //use method within the Program class to update value of Black 
List to then be written 
                        //back to the black list file 
                        Program.setBlackList(newArray); 
 
 
                         
                        //remove add to Black List 
                        Console.WriteLine("WARNING " + IP + " Added To Black List"); 
                        //remove from grey list 
                        GreyList.RemoveAt(GreyValue.Value); 
                        //contact broker HERE 
                        return "Blocking User"; 
                    } 
                    else 
                    { 
                        //otherwise change to a high threat status on grey list 
                        GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1] = Int32.Parse(GreyList[Grey-
Value.Value][1]) + highTeirIncreaseAmount + ""; ; 
                        Console.WriteLine(IP + " Threat Level increased to " + 
GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1] + " on Grey List"); 
                        return "User High Threat"; 
                    } 
                } 
                //if the threat is within the Mid tier bracket for this attack 
                else if (ThreatLevel >= MIDTHREAT) 
                { 
                   //increase their threat status by the mid teir amount 
                   GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1] = Int32.Parse(GreyList[Grey-
Value.Value][1]) + midTeirIncreaseAmount + ""; 
                   Console.WriteLine(IP + " Threat Level increased to " + 
GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1] + " on Grey List"); 
                    return "User Mid Threat"; 
                } 
                //if the threat is within the Mid-tier bracket for this attack 
                else if (ThreatLevel >= LOWTHREAT) 
                { 
                    //increase their threat status by the mid teir amount 
                    GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1] = Int32.Parse(GreyList[Grey-
Value.Value][1]) + lowTeirIncreaseAmount + ""; 
                    Console.WriteLine(IP + " Threat Level increased to " + 
GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1] + " on Grey List"); 
                    return "User Low Threat"; 
                } 
                //if their threat is low  
                else 
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                { 
                    //lower their threat status 
                    GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1] = Int32.Parse(GreyList[Grey-
Value.Value][1]) - belowLowTierReduction + ""; 
                    Console.WriteLine(IP + " Threat Level decreased to " + 
GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1] + " on Grey List"); 
                    //if their threat  status is below zero, they haven't caused is-
sues for a long time 
                    //remove them from grey list, add to white list 
                    if (Int32.Parse(GreyList[GreyValue.Value][1]) == 0) 
                    { 
                        //make a new array of the new IP being added 
                        String[] array2 = { IP }; 
                        //make new array the size of the White List and new array list 
to be the correct length 
                        String[] newArray = new String[WhiteList.Length + ar-
ray2.Length]; 
                        //combine White List and new array 
                        Array.Copy(WhiteList, newArray, WhiteList.Length); 
                        //combine old White List and new values into the new array, 
soon to become the White list 
                        Array.Copy(array2, 0, newArray, WhiteList.Length, ar-
ray2.Length); 
 
                        //use method within the Program class to update value of White 
List to then be written 
                        //back to the White List file 
                        Program.setWhiteList(newArray); 
 
                        //add to white list 
                        //WhiteList[WhiteList.Length-1] = GreyList[Grey-
Value.Value][0].ToString(); 
                        //remove from grey list 
                        GreyList.RemoveAt(GreyValue.Value); 
                        Console.WriteLine(IP + " Removed from Grey List"); 
                        Console.WriteLine(IP + " Added to White List"); 
                        return "No threat, Removed from Grey List, added to White 
List"; 
                    } 
                    return "No threat, User low level on Grey List."; 
                } 
            } 
            //if IP is in the white list (Key will be true) 
            else if (WhiteValue.Key) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("***WHITE***"); 
                //check threat level of current attack 
                int ThreatLevel = CheckThreat(); 
 
                //if thread level is below the low threshold 
                if (ThreatLevel <= LOWTHREAT) 
                { 
                    //Allow Access 
                    return "Allow access, user on White List"; 
                } 
                //otherwise there is an issue 
                else 
                { 
                    //if thread is over the High level tier 
                    if (ThreatLevel >= HIGHTHREAT) 
                    { 
                        //contact Broker 
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                        //create buffer for adding IP to grey list with a high threat 
list 
                        String[] buffer = { IP, ThreatLevel.ToString() }; 
                        //add IP to grey list using buffer 
                        GreyList.Add(buffer); 
                        //remove IP from white list 
                        WhiteList.Except(new string[] {White-
List[WhiteValue.Value]}).ToArray(); 
 
                        new Broker(IP, ThreatLevel); 
                        return "User added to Grey list for High risk"; 
                    } 
                    //if threat is over the mid level tier 
                    else if (ThreatLevel >= MIDTHREAT) 
                    { 
                        //create buffer for adding IP to grey list with a high threat 
list 
                        string[] buffer = { IP, midTeirIncreaseAmount.ToString()}; 
                        //add IP to grey list using buffer 
                        GreyList.Add(buffer); 
                        //remove IP from white list 
                        WhiteList.Except(new string[] { WhiteList[WhiteValue.Value] 
}).ToArray(); 
                        return "User added to Grey list for Mid risk"; 
                    } 
                    //if threat is over the low level tier 
                    else if (ThreatLevel >= LOWTHREAT) 
                    { 
                        //create buffer for adding IP to grey list with a high threat 
list 
                        string[] buffer = { IP, lowTeirIncreaseAmount.ToString() }; 
                        //add IP to grey list using buffer 
                        GreyList.Add(buffer); 
                        //remove IP from white list 
                        WhiteList.Except(new string[] { WhiteList[WhiteValue.Value] 
}).ToArray(); 
                        return "User added to Grey list for Low risk"; 
                    } 
                     
                } 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("***No List***"); 
                //check threat level of current attack 
                int ThreatLevel = CheckThreat(); 
 
                //if threat level is below the low threshold 
                if (ThreatLevel <= LOWTHREAT) 
                { 
                    //make a new array of the new IP being added 
                    String[] array2 = { IP }; 
                    //make new array the size of the White List and new array list to 
be the correct length 
                    String[] newArray = new String[WhiteList.Length + array2.Length]; 
                    //combine Whit list and new array 
                    Array.Copy(WhiteList, newArray, WhiteList.Length); 
                    //combine old White List and new values into the new array, soon 
to become the White List 
                    Array.Copy(array2, 0, newArray, WhiteList.Length, array2.Length); 
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                    //use method within the Program class to update value of Black 
List to then be written 
                    //back to the black list file 
                    Program.setWhiteList(newArray); 
 
                    //Allow Access 
                    return "Allow access, user on White List"; 
                } 
                //otherwise there is an issue 
                else 
                { 
                    //if threat is over the High level tier 
                    if (ThreatLevel >= HIGHTHREAT) 
                    { 
                        //contact Broker 
 
                        //create buffer for adding IP to grey list with a high threat 
list 
                        String[] buffer = { IP, ThreatLevel.ToString() }; 
                        //add IP to grey list using buffer 
                        GreyList.Add(buffer); 
                        new Broker(IP, ThreatLevel); 
                                 
                        return "User added to Grey list for High risk"; 
                    } 
                    //if threat is over the mid level tier 
                    else if (ThreatLevel >= MIDTHREAT) 
                    { 
                        //create buffer for adding IP to grey list with a high threat 
list 
                        string[] buffer = { IP, midTeirIncreaseAmount.ToString() }; 
                        //add IP to grey list using buffer 
                        GreyList.Add(buffer); 
                         
                        return "User added to Grey list for Mid risk"; 
                    } 
                    //if threat is over the low level tier 
                    else if (ThreatLevel >= LOWTHREAT) 
                    { 
                        //create buffer for adding IP to grey list with a high threat 
list 
                        string[] buffer = { IP, lowTeirIncreaseAmount.ToString() }; 
                        //add IP to grey list using buffer 
                        GreyList.Add(buffer); 
                         
                        return "User added to Grey list for Low risk"; 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
             
            return "Error"; 
        } 
 
 
 
        public int CheckThreat() 
        { 
            Console.WriteLine(); 
            Console.WriteLine(); 
            Console.WriteLine(); 
 
            //do calculation!! 
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            Random rand = new Random(); 
            double random = rand.NextDouble(); 
            double NoAttack = 0; 
            double Either = 0; 
 
            string Attack = string.Format("{0:0.0}", Math.Truncate(random * 10) / 10); 
            Console.WriteLine("Threat Score   " + double.Parse(Attack) * 100); 
 
            if(Attack == "1.0") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.0; 
                Either = 0.0; 
                 
            } 
            else if(Attack == "0.9") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.05; 
                Either = 0.05; 
            } 
 
            else if (Attack == "0.8") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.1; 
                Either = 0.1; 
            } 
 
            else if (Attack == "0.7") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.2; 
                Either = 0.1; 
            } 
 
            else if (Attack == "0.6") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.3; 
                Either = 0.1; 
            } 
            else if (Attack == "0.5") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.3; 
                Either = 0.2; 
            } 
            else if (Attack == "0.4") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.4; 
                Either = 0.2; 
            } 
            else if (Attack == "0.3") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.6; 
                Either = 0.1; 
            } 
            else if (Attack == "0.2") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.3; 
                Either = 0.5; 
            } 
            else if (Attack == "0.1") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.6; 
                Either = 0.3; 
            } 
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            else if (Attack == "0.0") 
            { 
                NoAttack = 0.5; 
                Either = 0.5; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("ERROR"); 
            } 
 
 
            double attackPlausability = 1 - NoAttack; 
            double NoAttackPlausability = 1 - double.Parse(Attack); 
 
 
            //Console.WriteLine("Hmmm!!!!   " + Attack); 
            String NoAttackPlausabilityFormatConversion; 
            if(NoAttackPlausability == 1) 
            { 
                NoAttackPlausabilityFormatConversion = "1.0"; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                NoAttackPlausabilityFormatConversion = NoAttackPlausabil-
ity.ToString(); 
            } 
 
            Console.WriteLine("-------------------------------------------------------
------------------"); 
            Console.WriteLine("---Hypothesis-||--Mass--||---Belief--||-Plausibil-
ity||"); 
            Console.WriteLine("-----Attack --||-- " + Attack + "  ||   " + Attack + "     
||     " + attackPlausability + "     ||"); 
            Console.WriteLine("---No Attack -||-- " + NoAttack + "  ||   " + NoAttack 
+ "     ||     " + NoAttackPlausabilityFormatConversion + "     ||"); 
            Console.WriteLine("-----Either --||-- " + Either + "  ||   " + "1.0" + "     
||     " + "1.0" + "     ||"); 
            Console.WriteLine("-------------------------------------------------------
------------------"); 
             
 
             
            Console.WriteLine(); 
            Console.WriteLine(); 
            Console.WriteLine(); 
 
            return Convert.ToInt32(Double.Parse(Attack)*100); 
        } 
 
